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This thesis focuses on two, related, issues that are relevant to the delivery of public services. 
The first is whether it makes a difference if organisations that deliver public services are driven 
by profit and if there is anything distinctive about not-for-profit providers. The second concerns 
the role of intrinsic motivations, both in terms of people who work to provide public goods, 
and decisions that people make about donating to charity. This thesis comprises four 
substantive chapters that use different methods to shed light on these issues.  The first chapter 
provides an overview of the literature in economics on not-for-profit organisations and their 
changing role in the delivery of public services. The second and third chapters both consider 
Legal Aid, which is a public service area, like many others, wherein quality is difficult to assess 
and monitor through contracts. The second chapter compares the performance of not-for-profit 
and for-profit areas across several areas. The next chapter considers a different data set and 
how behaviour has changed as the funding environment for both provider types has unified and 
become more competitive. This includes an analysis of how providers respond to contracts and 
performance standards and whether gaming is more frequent in either type of organisation. The 
final chapter is an experiment carried out with a local authority during the launch of a pro-
social project. It tests whether asking people to make a commitment in advance makes them 
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Charities have often been seen as a special feature of British public life, as institutions that 
cooperate with, but exist outside of the state (Beveridge 1948). Since the foundation of the 
welfare state, their role has changed considerably.  Now, they are more likely to be delivering 
services as a sub-contractor to the state, rather than existing as wholly separate entities.  
 
This thesis looks at two, related, issues in the delivery of public services and the changing role 
of charities within this. The first is whether there is anything different about public services 
delivered by charities or other not-for-profit providers, compared to those driven by profit. The 
second is the role of intrinsic motivations, in both individuals considering whether to donate to 
charity, as well as workers deciding how much effort they put in when working in the public 
service.  
 
In the first chapter, I outline some of the economic evidence concerning whether charities 
bring any distinctive features to the delivery of public services. I also examine evidence on 
whether any such distinctive features can be maintained, as charities adopt a new role 
wherein they are expected to compete alongside private companies to win and deliver 
contracts.  
 
In the second chapter, I use a large and unique dataset on the delivery of legal aid in the UK. 
Legal aid is like many service areas in the public sector, in which quality is important, albeit 
difficult to observe and assess. It has also recently been through a process of standardising 
contracts so that all providers — for profit or not — face the same competitive funding 
environment. In this chapter I examine several different types of advice and test for any 
distinct features between not-for-profit and for-profit providers (“NP” and “FP” respectively). 
 
The third chapter uses a different dataset of legal aid, which focuses on housing advice. This 
is a longitudinal dataset that begins in a time period wherein non-profits and for-profits were 
funded differently and ends after two competitive funding rounds. This allowed me to 
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explore the transitional effects of using contracts and whether NP providers have any 
differential response, compared to for-profits, to the cost pressures put on them in the new 
contracts. It also explores the extent to which both organisations game performance 
standards. 
 
The fourth chapter is an experiment that was conducted alongside the launch of a project at a 
local authority. It tests for the effect of asking people to make a commitment to take part in a 
pro-social activity in the future. It also considers in more detail some of the reasons that people 
may be motivated to do things for charity, or at least say they are going to do them, and the 














This chapter provides an overview of the economic literature on NP providers and their role in 
the delivery of public services. It considers the different economic theories about why their 
behaviour may be distinctive and assesses some of the empirical evidence as to whether any 
such differences have been observed in practice. It also considers some of the issues in 
commissioning NP providers who are motivated by mission and the effects that contracts may 




In the UK, and many other countries around the world, the way public services are delivered 
has gone through a series of transformations. A notable shift occurred during the Thatcher and 
Reagan years, where many public services were privatised. In the UK there was a change in 
policy direction under New Labour with a new focus on incorporating methods and ideas from 
the private sector, such as greater use of incentives and competition, with ownership and some 
control maintained by government. This led to new ‘markets’ and ‘quasi-markets’ being 
introduced with private companies beginning to deliver services that historically had only been 
provided by the state.  
 
There are still many questions about how effectively markets, even those controlled or funded 
by government, can deliver high quality public services. The goods and services provided by 
the state differ from those in the private sector, and what works in one may not work in the 
other (Besley and Ghatak 2005). It’s also become clear, both from new research and from 
events such as the financial crisis of 2008, that some of the methods used to motivate workers 
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in the private sector, which have been increasingly applied to the public sector, can have 
unintended consequences.  
 
It is against this backdrop that there has been a renewed interest in the role of not-for-profit or 
non-profit (NP) organisations. In the UK the coalition government of 2010 to 2015 made 
getting these organisations more involved in public service delivery a major aim in their White 
Paper on public service reform (HM Government 2011). There are a range of benefits that non-
profits are expected to bring to the public services they deliver, such as higher quality, a distinct 
mission, connection to a local community, a more motivated workforce, and support from 
donors. Their lack of a profit motive, which had often been seen as a weakness in economics, 
can be their key strength if it means they do not respond to pressures to cut the quality of the 
service in the same way that for-profit firms might.  
 
The involvement of NPs in the delivery of public services is hardly new. In the UK many 
hospitals and schools that are now provided by the state had their origins in the voluntary sector. 
Around the same time that Lord Beveridge produced his famous report that outlined the 
foundations of the welfare state he also wrote a, less well known, report about the voluntary 
sector. He described the existence of charities as a special feature of British public life and 
viewed them as important entities that cooperated with, but were independent from, the state 
(Beveridge 1948). NPs have often had an important role filling in service gaps around state 
provision, or in some cases provide representation to people who may have actions against the 
state.   
 
What has changed and evolved is the relationship of the voluntary sector to the state. Non-
profit organisations are now more likely to get funding from the state in the form of contracts, 
rather than grants, which means they are delivering public services on behalf of the state.  It is 
unclear whether NPs are suited to this new role as service providers. The strength of some non-
profits is that they are founded by ideologically motivated people who are responding to a need 
they have identified, often in their local area, which may not work at scale. There are also some 
NPs that select their users, for example, schools who choose students on the income or religion 
of the parents. It would not necessarily be desirable for these practices to be replicated, adopted, 
or even encouraged, by the state which aims for universality of services in a way that many 
charities do not. 
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Even where it is desirable for non-profits to deliver services there are concerns they will not be 
able to maintain their distinctive features if they have to compete alongside the private sector 
to win contracts. In spite of the stated intention for the sector to have a bigger role in delivering 
public services, the amount of funding NPs have been provided by the state has either declined 
or stagnanted between the years 2010 and 2015 (NCVO 2017). The organisations that have 
received more funding in the form of contracts are very large non-profit’s (with incomes over 
£10 million); conversely, smaller organisations have not fared well in the commissioning 
process.  
 
This paper reviews the current research and empirical evidence in economics that is most 
relevant to the role NPs have in public service delivery. There are a range of different legal 
entities that a NP organisation might take, for example, from an unincorporated association, to 
a charity. The important distinction is that they that are subject to what Hansmann (1996) 
described as the non-distribution constraint, which means they are ‘barred from distributing 
any profits it earns to people who exercise control over the firm, such as its members, officers, 
directors or trustees.’  I will follow the established convention of grouping all such 
organisations, including charities, under the title of either ‘not-for-profit’ or ‘non-profit’ 
(“NP”). These titles have been described as being a bit misleading (Ortmann and Schlesinger 
1997) since a profit is made, the distinction being the profits are not distributed to the owners. 
I’ll use the abbreviation for-profit (“FP”) for any private company.  
 
In this chapter, after setting out some definitions of NPs, I start by looking at the arguments 
put forward by economists about why NPs have (or do not have) a distinctive role in public 
service delivery alongside some of the empirical evidence.  In the second section I look at the 
practicalities of commissioning NPs, and particularly the challenges in assessing the 
performance of NPs. Measuring performance in the private sector is not straightforward either 
and many of the issues of monitoring how well firms are performing is further complicated 
when the people whose performance is being measured are intrinsically motivated or the 
organisations have some kind of social purpose. I also consider whether the performance 




2.2 What are not-for-profit organisations? 
 
The term ‘non-profit organisation’ or ‘non-profit’ is a broad term for a range of independent 
organisations whose main purpose is something other than to make private profit for their 
directors, members or shareholders (Resource Centre 2018). There are a wide range of legal 
forms that non-profit organisations can take. Grout and Yong (2003) describe the five 
traditional legal forms that they have taken: trusts, unincorporated associations, friendly 
societies, companies limited by guarantee, and industrial and provident societies. Moreover, 
there are two newer legal forms in the UK — Community Interest Companies (CICs) and 
Charitable Incorporated Organisations — which were set up after the government’s strategy 
unit recognised that other legal forms were very cumbersome for some organisations (Grout 
and Yong 2003).  
 
Not all of the legal forms described above are charities. For charities there are additional 
restrictions. The benefit to forming a charity is that they receive some tax advantages. The tax 
status of charities has a long history in UK law. There are records dating back to 1601, when 
the English Statute of Charitable Uses was passed, that show that organisations and donors that 
engaged in certain types of charitable activity would be tax-exempt (Lakdawalla and Philipson, 
2006).  These types of activity are restricted to areas such as health and education, which are 
areas with externalities, uncertainty, information asymmetries, adverse selection, and issues 
with consumer trust (Frumkin and Keating 2001) and which lead to some of the characteristics 
of NPs that are described in the next section.  The assessment as to whether they meet the 
criteria regarding whether they are established for public benefit is on a case-by-case basis 
(Grout and Yong 2003). Furthermore, there are certain restrictions on their governance; for 
example, they must have a board of trustees. 
 
Some authors have introduced a further distinction between NPs that rely on funding from 
either fee-based or donative activities. Fee-based activities are those which have some form of 
notional price, even if the ‘consumer’ of these activities does not pay for the good or service, 
e.g. a state-funded nursing home. Donative activities are those which are not tangibly 
consumed by any group, e.g. campaigning. Other authors (Grout 2009; Hansmann 1980) 
distinguish between member-serving organisations, which are created to provide for their 
immediate members, and public-benefit organisations, which exist primarily to serve the 
community at large. 
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It has recently become popular for some businesses to define themselves as a ‘social 
enterprise’. This is broadly defined as ‘an organisation that trades in the market place in order 
to fulfil social goals’ (Teasdale 2009). Social enterprises have some similarities with NPs that 
make their money from fee based activities but they are distinct from NPs in several ways. The 
first distinction is that not all of their surpluses have to be reinvested back into their services 
or community. To meet the criteria so as to gain accreditation with the Social Enterprise Mark, 
at least 50% of an organisation’s profits must be reinvested (Social Enterprise Mark CIC 2016). 
The remainder of the profits can be redistributed to members, staff or shareholders in the same 
way as that of FP firms. The second difference is that social enterprises must be trading 
organisations, and not rely primarily on grants or donations.  
 
The focus of this review is on NPs that, unlike social enterprises, are subject to a binding non-
distribution constraint and donate all of their revenues back to their mission. This means that I 
will not cover ‘social enterprises’ directly, although as charities are gaining increasing income 
from contracts, rather than grants, more of them will meet one of the criteria of social 
enterprises which is that a majority of income derives from trading.   
 
 
2.3 Economic theories of non-profit organisations 
 
In this section I will present an overview of economic theories on the role of NP organisations. 
It was often assumed that, as NP organisations typically consist of employees that are not 
motivated by increasing profit, they would be less efficient than organisations where profit is 
a significant driving force. Most economic theories now recognise that individuals have further 
concerns alongside profit, and that some people have altruistic preferences and want to do 
things for the public good (or at least give the appearance in front of others that they care about 
the public good). There are also some economic theories which argue that the lack of a profit 
motive can be helpful, without assuming that workers have intrinsic motivations, if it can stop 
firms cutting the quality of the service in a way that has high social costs. NPs have also been 
seen to have further benefits, such as offering a distinctive or more innovative way of delivering 
a particular service.  
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I divide these economic theories into three groups, depending on their primary focus. The first 
group focusses on the difficulty of measuring and contracting over quality and the implication 
this can have about the most appropriate type of organisation to deliver public services. The 
second category of economic theories are those that focus on the idea that NPs have a distinct 
mission that sets them apart from public bureaucracies or FP firms. The third category is for 
theories that focus on the nature of workers in NP organisations and whether altruistic and 
caring employees are more prevalent within them. Although the focus of this review is on NP 
organisations, some of the theories apply equally to public sector bureaucracies.   
 
2.3.1 Incomplete Contracts 
 
One of the most influential theories about NP provision of public services focuses on the non-
distribution constraint (NDC). Hansmann (1980) has argued that this is the ‘essential factor in 
the role of NP enterprise’ and, as set out in the introduction, it means firms can’t distribute any 
profit to people who have some ownership over the firm. Economists have often thought that 
the lack of a well-defined residual claimant would cause NPs to be less efficient (Sloan 2000). 
This theory turns this idea on its head because, in certain conditions, it is this lack of a residual 
claimant that gives NPs their advantage. 
 
These conditions arise when a consumer of a good is not able to easily define, observe and 
contract over the quality of the good that they are buying or using. It will also be difficult to 
verify to a third party the quality of a good that has been provided. This leads to strong 
incentives for profit-seeking producers to lower the quality and raise the price as much as they 
can. This means that consumers may be better off dealing with NP firms. Whilst NPs and FPs 
both have the capacity to reduce quality and charge higher prices, a NP has weaker incentives 
to do so because of the NDC. In this way NPs are like a consumer protection device. In the rest 
of this paper I’ll describe this as the ‘incomplete contracts’ theory although it has also been 
referred to as the ‘trust hypothesis’ (Ortmann and Schlesinger 1997) or the ‘expropriation 
theory’ (Grout and Yong 2003) as it is more difficult for NPs, compared to FPs, to expropriate 
surpluses away from the intended mission. 
 
Hansmann (1980) sets out a range of ‘peculiar market conditions’ that give rise to contract 
failure and where NPs are likely to have a more important role. Hansmann (1980) draws firstly 
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on services where there is a separation between the purchaser and the recipient of the service. 
Easley and O’Hara (1983) give the example of donating money for some disaster in another 
country such as a famine. A donor to the cause is unlikely to be able to visit the country of the 
famine to witness the food being delivered. The NP’s NDC can help assure the donor that the 
donation will benefit the people in need and not end up in the project manager’s bank account.  
 
This issue applies to many services that are commissioned (paid for) by the public sector but 
delivered by third party providers. In the next two chapters I look in detail at legal aid services; 
this is an example of a service commissioned by the government and delivered by separate 
providers. The government is unable to observe the quality of advice given to end users. Legal 
aid also falls into the category of what Hansmann (1980) described as a ‘complex personal 
service’, as it is very hard for a consumer to determine whether the service has been performed 
adequately.  
 
A theoretical model based on some of the idea’s set out by Hansmann (1980) was developed 
by Easley and O’Hara (1983). In their first model, where benefits are easily observable, FPs 
operate relatively efficiently. If the benefits from a service are not easily observable, as in the 
scenarios set out by Hansmann (1980), the non-distribution constraint is valuable. Their model 
demonstrates two conditions where NPs are superior to FPs. The first is where the benefits 
from a service are unobservable or costly to monitor. The second is where low or minimum 
effort results in low benefits. They conclude that NPs have an important economic role and, 
given the increasing importance of service industries, will continue to do so. In these examples, 
they argue the constraints on the NP firm result in “better” outcomes than with FP firms.  
 
There are some clear parallels with the debate around private or public provision of services. 
Several theories have made the case for services to be delivered ‘in house’ by public 
bureaucracies, which could also be applied to provision by NPs (although some issues arise 
about how to commission them which are covered in section 2.4). Hart et al. (1997) applied 
the analysis on incomplete contracts introduced by Grossman and Hart (1986) to the delivery 
of public services. They argued that the larger the adverse consequences of cutting (non-
contractible) quality the stronger the case is for services to be delivered by government 
bureaucracies. Hart et al. (1997) apply this theory to prisons where they argue that contracts, 
while detailed, are ‘still seriously incomplete’ and a theoretical case against privatisation 
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stands. In other service areas, where contracts are more straightforward, privatisation is more 
viable.   
 
A similar trade-off between quality and price was described by Grout (2009). If a profit-
maximising company is responsible for the delivery of a service, they may choose to reduce 
cost regardless of the consequences on (non-contractible) quality. In contrast the public sector 
(and NP sector) will care about quality as well as cost. This doesn’t necessarily mean that the 
public sector is better, as they may be harder to motivate to reduce costs, even where is little 
effect on quality (Grout 2009). Whether the non-profit sector is better hinges on whether the 
social cost of reductions in non-contractible quality are large relative to potential cost savings.  
 
One of the distinguishing features of the ‘incomplete contracts’ theory is that it provides an 
argument for NP provision that is not based on the extent to which these organisations have a 
‘mission’ or social benefit. Shliefer (1998) made the point that the key distinction that 
determines whether a service should be delivered within government or outside of it is not 
whether the service has a ‘social’ benefit but the extent to which such social purposes can be 
put in to a contract. For example, the argument outlined for postal services to be provided by 
the government is that a FP firm has an incentive to stop making deliveries to sparsely 
populated areas, as these are most costly to deliver to. Shliefer (1998) argues that this is not a 
case for government provision, as it is quite simple for the government to contract out the postal 
service, as long as the contract was clear surrounding where mail was to be delivered and that 
rural areas were not to be cut out of the delivery zone.  
 
The ‘incomplete contracts’ theory does not rely on individuals that are altruistic, or socially 
motivated, although it is compatible with theories that do rely on this principle. NP providers 
can exist and provide increased quality, even when their owners are not altruistic. This is 
demonstrated in a paper by Glaeser and Shleifer (2001), who present a formal model of the 
choice an entrepreneur makes about whether to obtain NP status or not when they set up a new 
firm. The model states the key distinction for NPs is that the NDC means they cannot take any 
cash profits as income. They can, however, receive ‘perquisites’ or what can be thought of as 
‘perks’ such as shorter working hours, improved working environment, etc. These are less 
valuable than income. NPs and FPs both care about the quality of the service, not for altruistic 
reasons, but because consumer’s value quality and will be willing to pay an increased amount 
for a higher quality good or service. Consumers correctly anticipate that there are weaker 
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incentives for NPs to provide decreased quality and are therefore willing to pay an increased 
amount to a NP firm. This makes NP status attractive, even to entrepreneurs who are not 
altruistic.  
 
Based on this reasoning, Glaeser and Shleifer (2001) identify a trade-off faced by an 
entrepreneur when deciding on the organisational form. There are benefits from being a NP as 
a commitment device to consumers, but there is a utility loss because the only way that profit 
can be redistributed is through employment ‘perks’.  
 
Vlassopoulos (2009) revisited the Glaeser and Shleifer (2001) model and considered what 
happens when there are long term and repeated interactions between users and firms, in contrast 
to the one-shot game. This is arguably a more realistic application to the commissioning of 
public services where providers are hoping to be able to win not just a current contract, but 
future contracts, making establishing a good reputation important. Vlassopoulos (2009) found 
that FP is the optimal choice for an entrepreneur when reputations can be established, which 






The next set of theories I will describe as ‘mission’ focused theories. These theories capture 
the broad idea that NPs are different because they are set up to achieve a unique mission. The 
mission could, for example, be a desire to help a particularly disadvantaged group of people or 
deliver services using a particular method. Besley and Ghatak (2003) have conceded that, while 
the notion of mission is rather vague, it is the key distinction that guides the behaviour of 
organisations that are not directly responsive to market forces. Not only do these theories 
explain differences between NP and FP firms, but, unlike the ‘contract failure’ theories, these 
also explain the differences between NP provision and that of government bureaucracies. As 
acknowledged by Kapur and Weisbrod (2000), both these organisational forms are subject to 
the NDC, and if this was the only factor governing their behaviour we might expect them to 
deliver services in a similar way.   
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The idea of mission driven NPs fits with them being more flexible and innovative than public 
sector bureaucracies and is one of the key reasons policy makers often advocate their use. 
Weisbrod (1988; 2004) has written several papers that consider how the idea of a mission may 
influence the behaviour of NP firms. In one paper (Weisbrod 2004) a ‘two good model’ is 
presented, where NP firms produce both a ‘mission’ good and a ‘revenue’ good. The mission 
is the core objective of the organisation. If NPs faced no limits on their funding sources they 
would produce just this good. As it stands they often have to produce another good which he 
describes as a ‘revenue’ good. This is not core to the mission of the NP and is only produced 
to finance the production of the ‘mission good’. This means NPs may be higher quality, but 
only on those activities linked to their mission. They may be no better in terms of quality, or 
even lower quality, than FPs if they are producing a revenue good to fund their mission. 
 
Mission goods can take various forms. A firm could have a ‘mission’ to  supply higher quality 
services in which case this theory leads to similar predictions about the distinctions between 
NP and FP firms as the ‘incomplete contracts’ theory. In general, the ‘mission’ captures some 
distinct aspect of quality or supplying a distinctly different service compared to that which is 
provided by government or FP firms (Kapur and Weisbrod 2000). This could mean delivering 
a service to a different group of people who are not well served in other markets. Chetkovich 
and Frumkin (2003) gave the example of the Red Cross supplying blood to rural hospitals, even 
though this is a loss-making activity. Politically the Red Cross cannot abandon this activity, 
although they would maximise profits if they did.   
 
There is no guarantee that the politicians or commissioners of a service will support the mission 
of the NP organisation. In the case of NPs serving a particularly deprived group of the 
population, although a commissioner may not have a problem with this, if the commissioner 
had cared sufficiently about this group being served they could have added something in the 
contract to ensure that providers were adequately targeting such groups, as pointed out by 
Shliefer (1998). It is also important to consider that NP providers won’t always be selecting 
the people who can use their service in a way that best serves the public interest. In some cases, 
they might be, such as those that select more disadvantaged applicants, or a teaching hospital 
that concentrates on difficult cases (Rose-Ackerman 1996).  In other cases, they may be 
selecting people who share characteristics with the founders or staff of the NP. This means that 
some NPs may discriminate based factors such as socio-economic status or sexual orientation. 
An example of this can be highlighted through Catholic adoption agencies who were unwilling 
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to accept gay couples as potential parents. In such cases, there are equity concerns if provision 
was left to NP organisations that were screening users in such a way.  
 
Besley and Ghatak (2005) argued that the main benefit of NPs is their potential to ‘generate a 
variety of different missions’, which in turn can improve productivity if managers and workers 
with similar mission preferences can be matched. They see this attribute of NPs as a key part 
of the case for the decentralisation of public services and they argue that ‘diversity is good not 
only for the standard reason, namely, consumers get more choice, but also in enhancing 
productive efficiency.’ Besley and Ghatak (2005) see this benefit of NPs as about selection, 
not anything distinct about the organisational form. Other authors have made the case that it is 
possible, not just for organisations to select workers that share their mission, but for them to 
change the preferences of their workers (Akerlof and Kranton 2005). 
 
The idea that FP firms can also exhibit identity or mission preferences is not inconceivable. 
The Body Shop is often cited as an example (Grout and Yong 2003; Besley & Ghatak 2005) 
although it is possible that this mission has been compromised following their acquisition by 
L'Oréal. In a similar way that Weisbrod (2004) suggests that NPs may produce a revenue good 
to support production of their mission good, FPs may often be able to produce a mission good 
which will increase their profits on their revenue good. Brands can try and improve their 
reputation by aligning with a charity. Weisbrod (2004) highlights an example of profit 
increasing for the firm American Express after it announced it would contribute a proportion 
of gross amounts charged to its credit card to a charitable foundation. While FP firms may 
exhibit some charitable behaviour and staff in these firms may have distributional preferences 
they are forced to ignore them except where they coincide with profit goals (Steinberg and 
Weisbrod 2005). 
 
Some authors have also argued it is possible for the state to create public agencies with a 
mission driven focus. Mazzucato (2017) cites public agencies who have clear mission 
statements and can attract workers by the prestige attached to working for them. An example 
of this is the Defense Advance Research Projects Agency (DARPA) in the US which has a 
mission of ‘creating breakthrough technologies for security’ (DARPA cited in Mazzucato, 
2017). In the same way that there can be FP firms that have a mission, there can also be NP 
organisations that do not actually produce a mission good that has any benefit to anyone except 
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the managers of the NP firm. These have been called ‘for-profit firms in disguise’ as they are 
exhibiting behaviour that is indistinguishable from a for-profit firm (Weisbrod 1988).  
 
2.3.3 Pro Social Workers 
 
The theories that have been discussed so far focus mostly on the nature of the services or goods 
provided. A further set of theories are centred on the individuals who are employed within NPs 
and the extent in which they may differ from those employed within the private sector, or 
behave differently if employed by a NP. These theories tend to focus on the extent to which 
employees have preferences that mean they care about the service they are providing. These 
altruistic or caring preferences are often referred to as ‘pro social motivation’ or ‘public service 
motivation’ (PSM). They take different forms depending on whether the employee cares about 
the level of the public good that is supplied overall, or whether they directly contributed to it 
being produced, or if they care more about being seen to be contributing to whether it was 
produced. These various ways of modelling pro-social behaviour will be explored throughout 
the next section, along with the implications they have for the choice of organisational form.  
 
2.3.3.1 Modelling Pro-Social Behaviour 
 
It has often been assumed in economics that individuals primarily care about money. Most 
standard models assume that effort is something to avoid, and that employees are disinterested 
with the tasks they complete within work, aside from how they impact on wages. There is now 
a growing literature and body of empirical work that highlights how individuals care about 
more than financial gain, and that money can be a poor motivator for particular tasks. It is also 
now common for economists to model utility where people have altruistic preferences (See 
Francois and Vlassopoulos 2008 for a review of different ways of modelling pro-social 
behaviour).  
 
The idea that people who work in charities are selfless and are motivated only by the desire to 
help is held in high esteem by members of the public (Seu et al. 2015). In reality the reasons 
that motivate individuals to donate their time or money are considerably more complex. The 
complexities of gift giving have been studied in some detail by sociologists, some of whom 
come to a viewpoint that many people give for reasons that are not that far removed from the 
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neoclassical economics simplification that people are self-interested. Mauss (1967) highlights 
that while gifts often appear to be “voluntary, disinterested and spontaneous” they are in fact 
“obligatory and self-interested”. 
 
In economics the motivations for people doing something for charity are typified in one of two 
ways, which was set out clearly by Andreoni (1990). He defined giving as being comprised of 
two components – ‘pure’ altruism and ‘impure’ altruism. The first, ‘pure’ or ‘output-
orientated’, characterises individuals who want to donate or volunteer for a charity as they 
genuinely want a certain level of a good to be provided for others. In contrast ‘impure’ altruism 
captures the more ‘egotistical’ reasons that individuals give. Individuals get various benefits 
from giving or doing things for charity that are unrelated to the provision of the service of the 
charity. Andreoni (1990) calls these benefits the ‘warm glow’. This captures the ‘warm and 
fuzzy’ feelings that derive from doing something for charity, irrespective of how useful the 
activities are. This particular type of altruism can be termed ‘action-orientated’ altruism, which 
captures the idea that individuals motivated by this type of altruism gain benefits from their 
role in contributing towards the outputs, not how much of the output is provided.  
 
Bénabou and Tirole (2006) explored additional explanations of why individuals may be 
altruistic. They include another factor in an individual’s utility function which they define as 
‘reputational’ reasons for giving. This captures the idea that people like to be thought of as a 
‘good person’ and act in a way that make themselves seem good, both in front of others, as 
well as preserving their self-esteem (self-signalling).  
 
The idea of reputation and self-signalling is explored in more detail in chapter 5 as a potential 
explanation for why large numbers of people, when asked, said they would take part in a pro-
social project. When the project launched, very few people followed through on their stated 
intention. One reason could be that, when asked, people like to think of themselves as the sort 
of person who will do things for charity and will contribute to community projects. It’s possible 
that people may have been able to maintain this belief, even when they don’t actually contribute 
in practice to the project.  
 
The theories that have been examined in this section have considered that individuals may have 
different preferences; some people are altruistic, some are not. A contrasting idea has been set 
out by Akerlof and Kranton (2000) with their work on identity economics. This theory presents 
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the idea that individuals do not necessarily have fixed preferences. A person’s identity is made 
up not just of their own characteristics, but those that they aspire to have and can change based 
on the actions of those around them or the environments in which they interact. This means 
that those individuals who are not particularly altruistic can be influenced by an organisation 
once they begin working there.   
 
2.3.3.2 Implications for Organisational Form 
 
Francoise and Vlassopoulos (2008) provide an analysis of how this distinction in how altruism 
is modelled has implications for the providers of public services.  They set out a utility function 
which embeds both ideas of altruism which is 𝑈" = 	𝑦" − 	∅(𝑒") +	ℎ"	(𝑒") +	𝛾"	(𝑔) where y is 
a private good, e is effort and g is the public good. In standard principal-agent models the more 
effort a worker puts in, the lower their utility. In this model, the inclusion of the third term, 
‘impure’ altruism, means that workers can experience higher utility from putting in more effort.  
The difference in the ‘impure’ or ‘pure’ altruism approach depends on the inclusion of the third 
(impure) and fourth term (pure). These aren’t mutually exclusive, and people can be motivated 
by a combination of these two factors. When people are primarily motivated by pure altruism 
it means there is the possibility for individuals to free ride on the effort of others. Workers may 
want the public good to be provided, but they would prefer if someone else put in the effort to 
do this.  
 
Theories which put the most emphasis on the fourth term have tended to predict that public 
service motivation will only be present in NP firms or public bureaucracies. Francois (2000) 
sets out an argument that only firms without a residual claimant can utilize the public service 
motivation of their employees. The argument is based on there being workers who are 
motivated by ‘pure’ altruism They will donate labour or put in extra effort as long this increases 
the amount of public services provided. In a FP firm, if workers put in extra labour effort, the 
residual claimant has an incentive to make adjustments and lower other inputs, so the workers 
extra input doesn’t increase outcomes.  
 
In a later paper Francois (2003) considers the role of NP providers which, due to the lack of a 
residual claimant, can provide a stronger commitment to workers that their effort matters. Like 
the public bureaucracy in his 2000 paper, this leads to a prediction that they can receive labour 
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donations in a way that FP firms cannot. The model in the 2003 paper differs from the 2000 
paper in that it considers the supervision costs rather than the adjustment decision by firms. 
The paper outlines a way that NPs can overcome the free riding problem by paying workers an 
efficiency wage, to induce them to participate.  In an equilibrium FPs are not able to rely on 
the efficiency wage so they pay workers using a supervision technology. This means on 
balance, since the NPs are paying a premium to ensure incentive compatibility, wages are 
higher in NPs, compared to FPs 
 
In both of Francois’ (2000; 2003) models there is not anything different about the individuals 
that work in NP firms, compared to FPs.  The differences are all centred on the organisational 
form, i.e. residual claimant, which means that employees cannot influence the level of output 
in a FP firm, so they do not donate labour even if they have altruistic preferences. This is based 
on the assumption that they are motivated solely by pure altruism. In a later paper Francois and 
Vlassopoulos (2008) set out more detail on the type of services where people are motivated by 
altruism which tend to be where there is a “care” dimension. This helps explain the key 
advantage that NPs have over FP firms in the delivery of public services and the ‘incomplete 
contracts’ theory cannot on its own explain the existence of NP firms. After all, there are many 
services where there is contract failure, e.g. consultancy firms, but no NP providers. From this 
perspective it is incomplete contracts, alongside the altruistic preferences of workers, that 
explains the advantage that NP firms can have.  
 
The theories that define altruism using the ‘impure’ form tend to place less emphasis on the 
organisational form. Besley and Ghatak (2005) created a model where employees do care about 
outcomes, but their primary motivation is to work for an organisation with which they share a 
‘mission’. It is argued that one of the biggest benefits of the voluntary sector, although also 
possible in the private sector, is the potential to get a positive match between employees and 
principals that share the same mission. In their example they argue that teachers will be more 
motivated if they can work in a school that shares their religious mission. The key point here 
is that ‘impure’ altruism alone is not enough to motivate effort, but they must be matched with 
an organisation that shares a mission they view as worthy enough to expend their effort on. In 
this theory the employees are heterogenous and NPs can offer a way to select motivated 
employees. This is in direct contrast to the theory set out by Francois (2003), where the role 
that NPs have in the labour market is not one of selecting motivated workers, but instead 
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inducing such motivated individuals to put in higher effort by credibly offering a wage that 
meets their incentive compatibility constraint.   
 
In the model set out by Akerlof and Kranton (2000) the role of selection that Besley and Ghatak 
(2005) emphasise is less important because an organisation can change the identities of the 
employees that work for them to fit their mission, even if these individuals did not share this 
mission at the time of recruitment. They give the example of what happens when new recruits 
join the military. They are given a new haircut, a new uniform, and put through a range of tasks 
and rituals. This breaks down their previous identity and builds them up as a soldier with a 
strong allegiance to their team. A slightly less extreme process is likely to occur with NP 
organisations who do not generally make their staff change their hair, but often have induction 
processes that encourage them to embrace the mission of their organisation. If it was possible 
for people’s preferences to be shifted and make them care about their mission, they may also 
change their allegiance or become demotivated easily if the environment of the organisation 
changes. This could happen, for example, if rather than being focused on a social purpose the 
organisation becomes more focused on performance standards. 
 
The inclusion of reputational effects (Bénabou and Tirole 2006) adds a number of interesting 
features to the analysis of the organisational form. People may like to be seen to be doing the 
right thing and working for a charity may seem to be socially worthy. An individual may even 
receive higher reputational benefits from working for a well thought of charity, despite it not 
providing as much good as a private company. This has some similarities to ‘impure’ altruism 
in that reputational utility benefits are not linked to the amount of the public good that is 
provided, but nor is it linked to the effort that the person puts in. Instead, it is about creating 
the impression that they are good or signalling to others that they care about pro-social causes.  
 
 
2.3.3.3 Implications for wages 
 
The models that have been discussed offer varying predictions about whether wages will be 
higher or lower in NP firms. Models that use ‘pure altruism’ tend to predict that wages will be 
higher in the NP sector. Francois (2000; 2003) sets out how these organisations can overcome 
the free rider problem by paying their workers an efficiency wage, which encourages 
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employees to put in more effort to keep their higher salaried employment. He argued that 
theories that predict NPs will have lower salaries have not taken into account the free rider 
problem. If individuals are motivated by ‘pure’ altruism they will not accept a lower salaried 
job in the public sector, as they would prefer for someone else to take this job and produce the 
public good, while they take a higher salary in the private sector.  
 
Theories that focus more on ‘impure’ altruism, where employees get some benefit by working 
in the public sector themselves, often make the case that salaries can be lower in the public 
sector as the intrinsic motivation can lower the participation constraint of such employees. 
Delfgaauw and Dur (2007) argue that if wages are higher in the public sector this may attract 
less suitable candidates and discuss some of the way the sector can screen candidates or 
motivated agents can signal their commitment to the cause. In a later paper Delfgaauw and Dur 
(2008) attempted to link the two seemingly contradictory stereotypes surrounding civil 
servants. Those employed as civil servants have a reputation as being lazy (Wilson, 1989), 
despite this people often report positive experiences when they encounter civil servants. In this 
model the lower wages that will be accepted by intrinsically motivated employees can also 
mean “lazy” employees will seek employment within the public sector. The unobservability of 
PSM means these employees, who cannot command a high wage employment in the labour 
market, may be attracted to public sector jobs. 
 
This was elaborated within a later paper, where it was argued that organisations within the 
public sector that were overstaffed were actually a more efficient way of combining highly 
motivated, but less productive management to a larger personnel base (Delfgaauw and Dur, 
2010). While this implies that the public sector attracts agents with relatively low ability, it is 
the least costly way of producing a given amount of public sector output. A similar rationale 
could apply to NP organisations who can attract individuals who are intrinsically motivated.  
 
The Bénabou and Tirole (2006) model also provides a rational for lower wages in the NP sector. 
If people want to be seen to be doing the right thing then high pay, or even a lot of social praise, 
may lead others to think they are doing it for the rewards, not because they are good people. 
There are so many factors in the Bénabou and Tirole (2006) model that they argue there is 
‘multidimensional uncertainty’ about what the impact of introducing an increased material 
reward might be. An increased reward will lead to an increase payoff from the income, but it 
reduces the signalling value of doing a good deed. 
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While there is disagreement about whether wages will be higher or lower in NP organisations, 
most theories that involve workers with altruistic preferences, of any of the types identified 
above, predict that performance related bonuses or pay will be less frequent in the public sector. 
There are several reasons for this. Bénabou and Tirole (2003) argue that these payment 
structures can crowd out people with intrinsic motivations. People may lose motivation if they 
can’t maintain autonomy over tasks (Deci et al. 1999). Theory from behavioural economics 
suggests that some payments for a task can send out a signal about whether a task is valuable 
or worth doing (Bénabou and Tirole 2003; Heyman and Ariely 2004). Ariely et al. (2005) 
suggested that paying for some tasks can change people’s experience of the task and whether 
they enjoy doing it or not, which may mean the role that unpaid volunteers have in NPs can be 
important. These ideas also have implications for the increasing use of contracts which I come 









The ‘incomplete contracts’ theory predicts that NPs will be higher quality than FPs when 
delivering a public service. However, this will be on non-contractible quality which, by 
definition of being hard to contract over, means it is also hard to measure and thus observe.  
Norton and Stagier (1994) point out the difficulties this raises for anyone analysing data from 
the firms to distinguish between the non-contractible quality of the providers and thus empirical 
evidence that finds no difference on quality between NPs and FPs isn’t alone enough to refute 
the ‘contract failure’ theory. They suggest this is why some comparative studies across FP and 
NP firms such as hospitals had trouble identifying any differences in observable quality. Other 
authors, such as Sloan (2000), have been frustrated by claims by the NP sector that their 
distinctiveness cannot be measured, and he argues the major challenge facing NP providers is; 
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“to measure these heretofore unmeasured outputs and evaluation the effects of ownership 
on their provision. Just believing that the outputs are out there somewhere is not terribly 
compelling.” 
 
Overall the evidence on differences between NPs and FPs on quality isn’t conclusive. Sloan 
(2000) reviews several different studies of quality in hospitals that have attempted to find 
differences between FPs and NPs. He finds several studies that have found FP hospitals tend 
to have lower staffing levels, especially lower nurse staffing but that this has not clearly led to 
other measures of quality including outcomes. In many of the studies he reviews there are few 
differences in quality between NP and FP firms, for example Keeler (1992 cited in Sloan 2000) 
found no overall difference between NPs and FPs although FPs did perform better on some 
implicit processes.  
 
In Chapter 2 and 3 I examine evidence from legal aid services in the UK and find that NPs take 
a lot more time per case and cost more, compared to FPs, when they are funded differently. As 
soon as the contracts are unified between NPs and FPs there is convergence on the time taken 
between the two provider types. This suggests the extra time taken by NPs prior to the reform 
relates to the funding structure, not some unique features about the firms. I do find evidence 
that NPs are higher quality on those types of legal aid advice that they have a specialism, but 
on other types of advice FPs are higher quality.  
 
Vlassopoulos (2009) cites evidence from the child care sector in the US and Canada that as a 
group NP centres obtain higher scores on some measures of quality, but there is variation within 
each category. It is the case that FP firms are predominately in the lower part of the quality 
distribution, but there are some NP firms that are low quality and some FP firms that offer high 
quality. The existence of such high-quality providers of child care is consistent with the theory 
that repeated interactions can provide an incentive for profit maximising entrepreneurs to offer 
high quality services, without adopting the NP organisational form.  
 
The ‘incomplete contracts’ theory also means that if something changes about the service that 
makes it easier to assess the quality then the importance of NPs should decline. Jones et al. 
(2017) present a model, based on Glaeser and Shleifer (2001) to look at the effect of an increase 
in information on the likelihood that a provider is NP. They exploit a large exogenous shock 
in the amount of information that Nursing Homes in the US needed to disclose that occurred 
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as part of the Nursing Home Quality Initiative. They found that prior to the reform there was 
evidence that NPs were higher quality on various measures such as having more care staff per 
patient and fewer deficiency points. After the reform they found that a large number of NP 
firms immediately exited the market place. NPs were around five per cent more likely to exit 
after information is revealed compared to FPs that are not more likely to exit.  They also found 
some firms changed to FP status. The firms that exited or changed status were those at the 
lower quality end of the distribution. They conclude that, while historically NP providers have 
had an important role, as information is becoming more accessible to consumers the adoption 
of NP status as a signal of quality is not sustainable.  
 
The ‘mission’ argument also predicts that NPs will be higher quality, but not necessarily on 
the same dimension as the FP providers. Weisbrod (2004) argues that in ‘revenue’ markets 
both NPs and FPs are maximising profit, but NPs will use the revenue to fund their mission. 
Weisbrod (2004) therefore argues that in revenue markets NPs,  
 
“would act indistinguishably from for-profit firms… assuming that a good that was profitable 
for for-profit firms was also profitable for non-profit and governmental providers.” 
 
The ‘mission’ theory means that comparing NPs and FPs on some goods will not find any 
difference. The distinction is in the production of a mission good.  There have been several 
studies to look for evidence of non-profit organisations delivering a tangible mission good. 
Looking at hospices in the US Lindrooth and Weisbrod (2007) found that religious non-profit 
hospices were much more likely to provide services for certain ‘types’ of case – notably cancer 
patients. They argue this is a ‘mission’ good as these cases are much less profitable than other 
conditions such as dementia and Parkinson’s. The reason these different medical conditions 
can be more or less profitable is to do with the cost structure. Hospices are paid at a flat rate 
per day from Medicare. However, costs for hospices are not linear, but u-shaped. They are 
higher at the beginning, and the four days before death which gives an incentive for firms to 
avoid cases where the persons stay will be short-lived. Whilst it is illegal to select patients, 
there are several strategies that organisations can use to attract or deter certain types of patients, 
for example, having specialist treatment facilities for cancer patients. They find there are 
significant differences in shares of patients with diagnoses of different conditions. For profits 
have almost double the number of cases of conditions which are generally associated with the 
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longest stays (and will therefore be more profitable) such as Dementia and Parkinson’s, 
compared to NPs. 
  
Grabowski and Hirth (2003) argue that there are flaws in comparing NP and FP providers 
because the existence of NPs in a market place has positive spillovers on the market place as a 
whole. In a data set of nearly all US nursing homes from 1995 to 1996 they find that it is not 
just the case that on most measure NPs are higher quality, but an increase in NP market share 
was also associated with higher FP quality along six of the quality measures they include in 
their study. Their argument is that one of the primary benefits of NP ownership is to help 
‘alleviate inefficiencies associated with poorly informed consumers’. This follows the 
argument set out earlier that the NDC means that poorly informed consumers can use NP status 
as a signal of quality and better-informed consumers can sort into the FP market.  They describe 
this a bit like an ‘inverse Gresham’s Law’ whether the good (which are NPs which deliver the 
promised quality) drive out the bad (FPs who could exploit these poorly informed consumers). 
They stress the importance of looking at the quality of the marketplace as a whole, not the 
individual firms. They argue that even if NP and FP providers have similar quality a change 
that reduces the role of the NP sector could reduce welfare by changing the prevailing market 
equilibrium.  
 
2.3.4.2 Costs and wage schedules 
 
There are mixed theories about whether costs will be higher or lower in NPs. The ‘incomplete 
contracts’ theory suggests NPs are less willing to make cuts to costs. In this theory NPs may 
also pay higher wages or have better conditions as they are not allowed to redistribute profits 
to owners. Some other theories emphasise that costs may be lower in NPs because they can 
rely on donations of money. Some theories argue that NPs can induce higher effort in their 
staff than FPs, although there are mixed views on whether they will need to pay higher salaries 
than FPs to do so.  
 
In the same way that there isn’t evidence that quality is higher in the NP sector, there isn’t 
conclusive evidence about whether salaries are higher or lower overall. Mocan and Tekin 
(2003) found that in the US childcare sector there is a significant NP wage premium at all 
levels. Malani and Choi (2004) found that there were higher base salaries in the nursing home 
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industry in NPs, compared to FPs. Most other studies have found that there is either no 
difference or that wages are lower in the NP sector.  Weisbrod (1983) found that lawyers in NP 
firms made a choice to work in these firms because they cared about serving the public interest, 
but this meant they earnt about 20% less than they could do if they had chosen to work in a 
private law firm. In contrast several studies found no differences between wages in the hospital 
sector Sloan and Steinwald (1980) found no difference in wages in the hospital sector holding 
other factors constant. Likewise, in the day care industry Preston (1988) found no differences 
in compensation among smaller firms subject to price competition, but did find higher wages 
in NPs when finance came from government due to higher quality standards that impeded entry 
and competition.   
 
There are several studies that have looked at whether staff in public organisations report that 
they are intrinsically motivated. Cowley and Smith (2013) found evidence of a relationship 
between people who reported intrinsic motivation and those who work in the public sector, but 
did not find this to be universal. In countries where there were high levels of corruption public 
sector workers are less intrinsically motivated than private sectors. Tonin and Vlassopoulos 
(2015) found that public sector workers were more intrinsically motivated as measured by the 
indicator on whether retired workers do more volunteering for charity. They found that public 
sector workers did exhibit higher levels of intrinsic motivation, but this was explained by other 
attributes that were linked to volunteering, such as having higher education, rather than by 
them having worked in the public sector. A study by Donegani et al. (2012) found that NPs 
reported much higher job satisfaction compared to workers in the public and private FP sectors, 
and cited this as evidence of warm glow.  
 
A study by Gregg et al. (2011) looks at not just whether staff report being more motivated, but 
whether this translates into them working unpaid overtime. The argument made by Francois 
(2003) that PSM will only exist in organisations that have no residual claimant, has been tested 
by Gregg et al. (2011). They did find some evidence that those in the NP sector are significantly 
more likely to do unpaid overtime than those in the FP sector, which seems consistent with the 
Francois theory. However, they look at workers who switch sector and they find that they find 
that people who were donating labour in a NP who move into a private firm do not change their 
behaviour. They conclude it is not the organisational form that matters for encouraging pro-
social behaviour, but it is the people themselves who are motivated and tend to select into 
working for NP firms.  
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Malani and Choi (2004) have used data on the nursing home industry in the US. They find 
evidence that the people who end up on the boards of NP institutions are drawn from the same 
labour pool as members of FP boards and argue that they have been trained to maximise profits 
and apply this training to the way they manage NPs. Added to their evidence that salaries are 
higher in the NPs they argue this means that NPs are little more than ‘For-Profits in Disguise’. 
 
A number of studies have found that there is less use of high powered incentives in the NP 
sector. In summarizing the empirical evidence Besley and Ghatak (2005) suggest that in 
industries where both FP and NPs are in operation, such as hospitals, for-profits make more 
use of performance-based bonuses relative to base salaries for managers and that this is 
consistent with their model that mission matching is more likely in the NP sector. Malani and 
Choi (2004) also found less use of performance related pay in the NP sector but don’t agree 
with explanations this is due to the presence of more altruistic staff. Instead they argue this is 
because of a fear that if they rewarded executives with performance related bonuses this would 
violate the NDC and they may be sanctioned, thus they prefer to reward them with higher base 
salary instead.  
 
This can also help explain some of the divergence in findings about which sector pays better 
as it depends if you look at base salaries or if you include bonuses. Roomkin and Weisbrod 
(1999) found divergence between NP and FP across the different pay scales. They looked at 6 
different pay grades in hospitals and found that base salaries were greater at NPs while FPs 
made greater use of bonuses. When both base salary and bonuses are taken into account total 
compensation is greater at FPs at the two most senior executive levels, and for one of the lower 
levels, with the other three job levels having higher pay at NPs.  
 
A crucial part of the theory is not only that there will be less high-powered incentives in the 
non-profit sector, but that this won’t adversely affect outcomes. Delfgaauw et al. (2011) found 
some evidence of this in a study that surveyed management practices between NP and FP firms. 
In for-profit firms those organisations that score well in management practices (including the 
use of incentives) also do well for indicators of outcomes.  In non-profit firms the relationship 
is different. Those non-profit organisations who score poorly in management scores don’t seem 
to have worse outputs overall. 
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In the same way that intrinsic motivation in the public sector may vary between countries, the 
way in which people respond to high powered incentives may not be universal. The famous 
relationship that Titmuss (1970) that paying for blood reduced the quality and quantity of 
donations has not always been replicated. Iajya et al. (2013) found that in Argentina found that 
financial rewards did increase donations. They argue that there may be a distinction between 
developed countries, such as the UK, where giving blood is associated with being pro-social, 





2.4 Involving NP Providers in the delivery of public services 
 
In this section I’ll assess some of the specific issues that arise when NPs are commissioned to 
delivery public services.  There are two main stages happen when a public service is to be 
outsourced to the voluntary (or private) sector. Firstly, there needs to be some understanding 
of what goals the service needs to deliver and ways that such goals can be measured. Second, 
there needs to be an assessment of how well competing providers can perform against such 
goals.  I’ll look at each of these stages in turn 
 
2.4.1 Performance Measurement 
 
Setting goals or objectives and measuring them is difficult in any sector aside from the most 
straightforward of tasks (Lazear 1998). There is a huge literature on the challenges and issues 
with measuring performance in the public sector (see Propper and Wilson 2003 for an 
overview, or Burgess et al. 2002 for a typology). A lot of the literature doesn’t specifically 
consider the role of NP organisations, although many of the issues that apply to government 
‘in house’ provision also apply to NP firms. Dixit (2002) sets out some ‘special features’ of 
public sector agencies, which is that they tend to have ‘a multiplicity of dimensions – of tasks, 
of the stakeholders and their often-conflicting interests about the ends and means, and of the 
tiers of management and front-line workers’. I’ll structure the rest of this section around two 
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of these dimensions – multiple principals and multiple outcomes – and additional issues that 
arise if performance standards become the basis of a commissioning process. 
2.4.1.1 Multiple Principals and motivated agents 
 
Most economic theories of performance measurement use the principal-agent model, as the 
starting point for analysis (see Dixit 2002). The general theory of this model, is that there is 
one principal who has the challenge of devising a payment schedule, in order to maximise the 
effort of the agent. Effort is assumed to be costly to the agent. The more (non-verifiable) effort 
put in by the agent, the higher the probability of a random outcome occurring.  
 
In the public sector, there are range of differences from this standard model. The first is that, 
there are many principals.  For example, in a large employment training programme (e.g. the 
JTPA), Dixit (2002), identified several principals:  the congress and the public (top-level 
principals), and job centre managers (middle-tier principals). NPs share these features and also 
often have a range of other principals, such as trustees, people who donate money and 
volunteers donating labour. 
 
A second difference is that effort isn’t always costly to the agent and, as outlined in some 
theories on pro-social motivation, some agents may derive benefits from putting in effort. Their 
motivations are not just simply monetary. When agents have intrinsic motivations, these can 
intersect with the performance standard chosen in ways that can be difficult to predict.  
 
This has shown to be the case, in a range of examples, one of which is the JTPA, where it was 
found that agents (the case workers at job centres) did almost the opposite of what the 
incentives in the performance standards encouraged, and they accepted the least employable 
applicants onto the programme that would require the most effort to help into work. Dixit 
(2002) argues this is because the goals of the agents were in line with the top-level principles. 
He suggested that the motivations of the case workers were a ‘good counter to the adviser 
incentives created for the middle-tier principals – the centre managers – by the gross outcome-
based incentive scheme’.  
 
Some have argued that this is a key benefit of NP provision.  Alcock (2010) argues that the 
non-profit sector may help ‘eliminate’ the moral hazard problem, which characterises 
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principal-agent relations.  However, this relies on the agents of the NP providers sharing the 
same mission as the principal, which may not always be the case. Even in cases where the goals 
of the principal and the agents are in alignment a poorly designed performance standard may 
not reflect the underlying goals of the principals. Propper and Wilson (2003) argue that the 
focus should be on whether performance measures actually help agencies achieve the goals set 
by policy makers.  
 
A final issue on multiple principals is the role of service users, who do not fit clearly into the 
principal-agent model. In the public sector, they are not seen as customers whose satisfaction 
is key to the survival of the provider, in the same way as in the private sector (Besley and 
Ghatak 2003).  There have been attempts to change this, with a policy focus in the UK and 
other countries, to give service users a wider choice of service providers (Cabinet Office, 2014). 
NPs are sometimes seen as being more connected to their users than other organisations. There 
have also been attempts to bring service users onto commissioning or management boards, in 
order to affect outcomes, and perhaps, take on the role of the principal. (See Boyle et al. 2010 
for a review of uses of co-production in public service delivery). Another perspective is that 
service users are not simply 'customers' of a service, but also have a role in delivering the 
service. Important outcomes from public services, such as good health and education, rely on 
service users taking actions themselves in the form of ‘joint production between the individual 
and the service user’ (Simpson 2009).  
 
In addition to service users, society itself, might also be thought of as a principal (Besley and 
Ghatak, 2003). The nature of public goods means they generate externalities. In the next two 
chapters I look at legal aid services provided to people experiencing a problem. This service is 
not accessed by the whole population, but there are benefits to society from the availability of 
access to justice, for people in need.  
 
2.4.1.2 Multiple Outcomes 
 
A second feature of public services which can complicate the principal agent model is that 
outcomes are complex and multi-faceted (Prentice et al. 2007). It is hard to define what the 
different objectives are and even more difficult to effectively measure how well they are being 
achieved. They often fail what Heckman et al. (1997) set out as the two implicit premises of 
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any performance standard:  the first, is that agencies have a specified goal or set of goals, and 
the second, is that these can be quantified, so that success or failure relative to these goals can 
be measured.  
 
It is necessary to be clear about how different this is from the private sector, where the role of 
prices, and then profits, can measure effectiveness. A key assumption of most markets is that 
prices give information about the value of a good or service. There are exceptions, e.g. banking, 
where price mechanisms are limited or incomplete, but in general, price indices are much more 
readily available (Simpson 2009). In addition in FP firms every agent is ultimately accountable 
to the owner(s) of the firm, and how much profit is generated for the principal is the ultimate 
goal (Besley and Ghatak 2003). This is not the situation for charities and public bureaucracies 
where the amount of turnover or profit is not an indication of the overall effectiveness and may 
relate more to the efforts of their fundraising department. 
 
In the absence of such price information, there has been a wide debate about how performance 
in the public sector should be measured. There is often a trade-off between the outcomes that 
are most important and those which are easier to measure. The most straightforward measure 
is often the ‘output’ of the service, as in the number of units of the service they provide, for 
example, the number of inmates in a prison. However, these throughput measures are not very 
useful. In a private sector service, such as a restaurant, the more meals served the better. The 
same cannot be said about many public services, since the more inmates incarcerated in a 
prison, is not necessarily something better. A good value service, is one that offers services, 
which will make it less likely that inmates reoffend, even if this is higher cost than a comparable 
prison that does not offer any such services.  
 
There can also be a tension between outcomes that are achieved in the short term compared to 
those that are longer term or preventative in nature. Simpson (2009) gives the example of fire 
services that typically balance a range of preventative activities, such as doing fire checks, or 
installing smoke alarms, alongside their main activity of fighting fires. A measure that only 
counts the number of fires extinguished, will fail to capture the value of preventative work. 
 
There have been attempts in some areas for the government to commission and pay providers 
based on their achievement of longer term outcomes (Centre for Social Justice 2011). For 
example, providers can get payments if prisoners do not reoffend on leaving prison, or for the 
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number of weeks a person stays in employment. In theory, this focuses spending on those 
providers, who deliver results. It should also enable providers to innovate to find the best 
activity to deliver results, rather than the commissioner needing to tightly specify the activities 
in a contract.   
 
These approaches do not solve the problem of attribution. If an outcome is achieved it can be 
hard to be certain this was because of a particular intervention or provider. Propper and Wilson 
(2003) make a distinction between ‘gross’ and ‘net’ outcomes.  'Gross outcomes', are the 
overall change that has happened or is predicted to happen. ‘Net outcomes’ are those that are 
the direct result of the organisation that has been commissioned. An organisation that has high 
‘gross’ outcomes, may actually be adding very little value, if they are cherry picking the easiest 
cases. This has been a concern with the ‘payment by results’ contract. Although ‘net’ outcomes 
may be a better reflection of the value of the service, they too are very problematic in terms of 
designing a payment mechanism, because they are more ‘noisy’.  
 
It can also be hard to pick an outcome, which does not skew the performance of others, leading 
to ‘adverse specialisation’ (MacDonald and Marx 2001). In the public sector, where a job can 
often require workers to perform several tasks, perverse effects can arise when only some of 
these are rewarded (Burgess and Metcalfe 1999). There are a range of other ways that 
performance standards can be manipulated. 
 
Given how hard it is to measure outcomes, some rely on output measures, or even just 
measuring processes. This is an approach that has widely been used in the UK, by education 
body OFSTED. Burgess et al. (2002) comment that although this approach is very costly, there 
has been little evidence that it is effective, particularly when little is known about the causal 
links between processes and outcomes.  
 
Propper and Wilson (2003) suggest there may be some scope for using targets based on 
independent information sources, such as household surveys, to measure the health of people 
living in an area, which they argue could force the relevant organisations to focus on the 
outcomes that really mattered, e.g. illness prevention, and these measures would be very 
difficult to manipulate by individual organisations.  
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2.4.2 Commissioning NP Providers 
 
In this section I consider some of the additional issues when performance standards are put into 
contracts and become the basis of a commissioning process. This includes how well NPs are 
likely to be able to compete for contracts, and secondly how they might behave after contracts 
are awarded.  There is a large debate about the relative merits of contracts compared to using 
grants to fund the voluntary sector, and also about the use of competition in the public sector 
in general, which I can’t cover in detail. Where it is available empirical evidence or data is also 
explored. 
2.4.2.1 Awarding contracts 
 
In the previous section, I set out some of the challenges commissioners have with setting the 
parameters, or outcomes, they wish to achieve or the activity that will be provided in a contract. 
Even where they do know what outcomes they wish to achieve, they may not know how much 
it will cost, or what quantities are feasible. Firms, both FP and NP, have more information than 
the government in this respect (Dixit 2002). 
 
Some people have argued that NPs have a competitive advantage over FPs, because they can 
benefit from outside donations of time and money. Lakdawalla and Philipson (2006) make this 
point, to claim that NPs have a cost advantage, and will enter public sector markets at a lower 
price than FPs. There are some indicators that providers, both NP and FP, are bidding for 
contracts at lower than cost price. The Charity Finance Group found that 11 service delivery 
charities with incomes above £50 million, were making a loss, of 11% on average, on their 
public-sector contracts (Charity Finance Group cited by Evans 2018). It is not clear whether 
this was intentional, or if donors are happy for their donations to cross-subsidise government 
contracts in this way.   
 
There are other arguments that NPs may do poorly when services are competitively tendered. 
The ‘incomplete contracts’ theory predicts that NPs perform better on those aspects of quality 
which are hard to observe and contract over. It may be hard for NP providers to demonstrate 
their  value, in the tendering process. The ‘mission’ argues they will be distinct when working 
towards such a mission, but if this ‘mission’ isn’t a specific part of the service being 
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commissioned, and there is no extra payment for this part of the NP service, then they may 
appear more expensive than FPs.  
 
In theory, commissioners of public services should not judge providers on price alone, but also, 
quality and wider social value. The Treasury Green Book (HM Treasury 2018) states that value 
should be given to wider costs, benefits, and outcomes, which are not market traded. To give 
public sector bureaucracies more imperative to do this, the Public Services (Social Value) Act 
(2012) was introduced, which requires public bodies to have ‘regard to economic, social and 
environmental well-being in connection with public services contracts’. This legislation has 
been welcomed by NP providers.  
 
Another of the advantages of NPs, is they are often seen as able to deliver more innovative 
services. However, if they are bidding for a specified piece of work under contract they are 
limited in their capacity to innovate, in terms of what the service should look like.  There may 
also be adverse selection in the marketplace as a whole. If NP providers, or quality FPs, are not 
able or willing to reduce the quality of their service to the unit price specified in the tender, 
then they may decide not to bid to deliver the service at all. In a similar way that Delfgaauw 
and Dur (2007) have argued that low wages can lead to adverse selection of workers into the 
public sector who are not motivated to deliver results, so contracts where a low price is offered 
to deliver a service may lead to low quality providers selecting in to the market.   
 
Evidence, from the UK, suggests that NP providers, as a whole, are not very effective at 
winning public-sector contracts. There are some organisations, who are winning contracts, but 
these are very large NP organisations with incomes of over £10 million. The amount of 
government funding NPs received, has been either falling or stagnant, for the years between 
2010 and 2015 (NCVO 2017), although this has been in the context of the austerity policies, 
following the 2008 financial crash. There have been such concerns that smaller charities are 
failing to have a role in public sector supply chains, that the government has recently spoken 
about launching several new initiatives to try and make it easier for them to be involved (HM 
Government 2018). 
2.4.2.2 Behaviour in relation to Contracts 
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The second area I’ll look at is whether there is anything distinctive about how NPs behave once 
they have been awarded contracts, compared to FPs. At this stage the information asymmetries 
take the form of moral hazard. Providers that been awarded a contract have incentives to alter 
their behaviour in ways which adversely affect the principal. 
 
The first way that providers may do this is by failing to deliver the services they agreed to, or 
to game the performance standards that are set, in such a way that the commissioner finds it 
hard to assess that quality has been lowered. There is a large literature on gaming. Several 
common techniques are to ‘cream-skim’ which is to select people to take part in a project who 
will most easily meet the performance standard, not those who are most in need. Another 
gaming response is to only focus on the outcomes which are monitored, instead of the 
unintended unmeasurable objective (for further reviews on gaming see Courty and Marschke 
2004; Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991; Finn 2010). 
 
There is some evidence that some of the providers for the JTPA with the NDC constraint have 
been less likely to game performance indicators. Heckman et al. (1997) found that training 
centres behaved differently, and some of those with the NDC were less likely to game. 
However, there is other evidence from the same project which found that at other training 
centres there was gaming (Courty and Marschke 2004). Other studies in the public sector on 
using incentive schemes in the public sector have found that the can raise productivity but can 
lead to some reallocation of efficient workers towards those tasks which have been incentivized 
(Burgess et al. 2010). 
 
It’s not even entirely clear that NP firms will game less from the theory. Indeed, if they don’t 
have any particular intrinsic motivation around the performance standard, they may even game 
more, or adopt complex strategies towards a performance standard. So, for example, a strategy 
suggested by Heckman et al. (1996) is that workers may cream skim a certain number of 
candidates onto the programme, in order that they could redistribute their time, to enable them 
to work with a certain number of candidates who may perform badly on the performance 
standard. This has some parallels with the ‘mission’ and ‘revenue’ good narrative suggested 
by Weisbrod (2004). 
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The example set out by Heckman et al. (1996) is an interesting perspective of motivated staff 
‘gaming’ the performance standard in order to be able to still achieve their mission. It is also 
possible that other volunteers or staff may lose motivation entirely. For example, Alcock 
(2010) argues that people, who thought they were volunteering for a mission driven 
organisation, may lose commitment, if the organisation ends up devoting a lot of effort to 
regulatory control. As outlined in section 2.3.3, in the presence of motivated workers, setting 
targets or incentives can have dysfunctional reactions (Ariely et al. 2005; Deci et al. 1999; 
Steed 2013). 
 
Francois (2000) argues that motivation of workers can be diminished in some contract 
structures, but for a different reason to most of the literature on intrinsic motivation. He argues 
that as workers are motivated by pure altruism, if contracts are tightly specified such workers 
may free ride on the efforts of others. This means in some cases, where there is output-based 
contracting, then the public sector can end up, unintentionally, mimicking some features of the 
residual claimant.  If a worker is given performance related pay or strictly contracted to produce 
outputs then the capacity of workers, motivated by pure altruism, to affect outcomes will be 
reduced. This could also apply to a worker is working for a charity who has taken on a very 
tightly specified contract which may limit their ability to draw on the extra effort of their 
motivated workers. Francois (2000) made the case that ‘privatization and output-related 
contracting with employees are not that different’.  
 
Another issue is whether competitive pressures may lead NPs and FPs to converge. As set out 
above, if the specific ‘mission’ of the NP has not been commissioned, then as competition 
between hospitals increases, any differences in behaviour will narrow, as NPs will have ‘less 
latitude than previously to produce outputs they deem to be socially worthy' (Sloan, 2000). 
 
Sloan (2000) cites evidence of NPs being less able to pursue their mission good, for example 
Gruber (1994 cited in Sloan 2000) found that there was a decrease in the amount of care 
hospitals in California provided to the uninsured as a result of increased price competition. 
Kapur and Weisbrod (2000) also found some evidence this has happened using data from 
nursing homes they some signs of convergence and make the case that it was ‘growing 




A paper by Lu (2016) found that in response to a quality disclosure to improve information 
provided to consumers NPs respond in the same way to the quality disclosures as FPs, so they 
improve quality along the reported dimensions and reduce quality on dimensions that are not 
reported. She still does accept the theory that NPs are simply “FPs in disguise’ because there 
are some other dimensions under which NPs behave differently, so for example NPs report 
fewer deficiency citations. 
 
Glaeser and Shleifer (2001) note in their paper that if governments are particularly weak at 
monitoring contracts they will tend to specialize in dealing with NP firms. In practice it may 
be difficult for commissioners to make a case that they can restrict a competitive process to NP 
firms or that a service should maintain the use of grant funding.  
 
 
2.5 Discussion and conclusion 
 
In summary, economic theory has put forward a range of benefits that NP providers can bring 
to the public sector in terms of higher quality, a more motivated workforce, more innovative 
missions. The empirical evidence is more mixed as to whether these have been realized in 
practice, although to some extent this is because some of the attributes that NPs may perform 
better on are those that it is very hard to pick up in some performance standards.  
 
This review highlights some issues with the new role that NPs have as a subcontractor of the 
state. One of these is whether NPs will be successful in winning tenders and if the 
characteristics that politicians have stated they value about the NP sector are being adequately 
valued in the commissioning cycle. Some data from the UK indicates that the NPs that are 
winning government contracts are very large charities, and to win these contracts they have 
had to emulate practices from the private sector. This may come at a cost of drifting from their 
mission. More research is required on the extent to which NPs who are successful at winning 
contracts have been able to maintain their distinctive features, and also the effects of the process 
on the motivations of staff and the quality of service. 
 
This review also raises some questions about the role of altruism in the public sector, which 
has often been assumed to be unambiguously good. The ways in which people volunteer has 
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changed dramatically since Beveridge wrote his report on voluntary action. Beveridge (1948) 
wrote at length on the role of friendly societies, where people came together to volunteer in 
ways which were explicitly mutually beneficial. Now more volunteering is focused on doing 
things for other people, although sometimes the impact on the recipient of the volunteering is 
not always assessed. Much of the renewed focus on volunteering focuses more on the benefits 
that volunteering brings to those who participate. More evidence is required about the extent 
which it boosts service quality. There may be areas which are better suited to the use of 
volunteers, for example, hospices, where people may value the care and empathy a volunteer 
brings. In other areas, such as Legal Aid, users of the service may value care and empathy, but 
somewhat below the skills and knowledge that a fully qualified solicitor who is being paid may 
bring.  
 
Finally, there are some important questions about the role that NPs will take in society in the 
future. We have had several decades where NPs, and public bureaucracies, have been 
encouraged to learn from the private sector, to be more efficient, and to offer choice to 
customers. In a strange reversal of fortune, more recently, we have seen the debate shift no 
longer from what NPs can learn from the private sector, but the other way around. Few people 
could have predicted that the Archbishop of Canterbury would give a speech advising bankers 
that they should focus less on profit and more on care and values (Malnick 2013); or that after 
years of privatization, we would see the nationalization of some large private banks. 
 
This raises the question as to whether NPs should be restricted to their traditional areas of 
health and education. Perhaps a new area for more NPs to explore could be in banking and 
finance, which may be the area where we need non-profit organisations and pro-socially 
motivated staff the most.  
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This chapter adds to the empirical research evidence on whether there is anything 
distinctive or different about non-profit providers of public services compared to 
their for-profit competitors. I use a unique data set from the Ministry of Justice to 
test for quantifiable differences between providers of legal aid services. I focus 
on three questions; do NPs have a different client base? Do they behave 
differently in relation to cases? Do they differ in their outcomes? I find some 
evidence of a distinctive ‘mission’ with NPs having more clients with a disability, 
and they have better outcomes in the areas they have traditionally specialised in 
such as welfare benefits advice. However, I do not find that they are higher 
quality overall, for example, in immigration advice they take a lot less time and 




Is there anything different or distinctive about NP providers of public services, in comparison 
to their FP counterparts? Some politicians think the answer to that question is yes, and in 
several countries, there has been a concerted attempt to get more NPs to deliver public 
services. In the UK, for example, the coalition government of 2010 to 2015 set out their 
intention to make a ‘decisive end to the old-fashioned, top-down take-what-you-are-given 
model of public services’ (HM Government 2011). One of the major aims was to increase 
innovation and performance in the public sector by encouraging more providers from civil 
society to deliver public services  
 
The interest shown by some politicians in encouraging charities to deliver public services has 
been supported by some theory and empirical evidence within economics. In theory most 
economists have argued that NPs bring some potential benefits to the delivery of services. 
Some theories focus on the non-distribution constraint they face, which means they are unable 
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to distribute profits among themselves, and so consequently, have a lower incentive to cut 
quality and costs (Hansmann 1980; Glaeser and Shleifer 2001). In services where quality is 
important, and asymmetries of information make it hard to monitor or measure, this means NPs 
offer considerable advantages (Hart et al. 1997). Other theories argue that the benefits of NPs 
are linked to their ability to attract volunteers or altruistically motivated staff who can put in 
extra effort, without this being exploited by a profit seeking manager (Francois, 2003). 
 
On the counter side, there are other theories that there is little real difference between NPs and 
FPs in practice; with NP organisations being just ‘for-profits in disguise’ (Malani & Choi 
2004). Even economists who are positive about the contribution of NPs, have expressed 
concern that the distinctive features of NPs cannot be maintained when they are put under more 
cost pressure through competition. Other authors such Grabowski and Hirth (2003) have 
argued that the benefits of NP provision are the positive spillover effects they have on the 
marketplace as a whole, they cannot be observed in the behaviour of individual providers.  
 
Another set of theories have been described as ‘hybrid’ theories by Lu (2013). These theories 
make the case that the distinguishing feature of NPs is that they are set up with a specific 
mission. This leads to predictions that the quality of service delivery will be higher than, or the 
behaviour different to, for-profits, if the activity is geared towards this mission. If activities are 
undertaken by NPs to raise revenue to subsidise their mission, the quality potentially will not 
differ from NPs (Weisbrod, 2004). Besley and Ghatak (2005) argue that productivity in NPs 
will be higher, if, there is a good match between the mission motivations of the NP and its 
workers and staff. 
 
The main contribution of this paper is to use a large and unique dataset, to add to the growing 
research on the differences in practice between NP and FP providers. The dataset   was acquired 
from the Ministry of Justice on Legal Aid. This is an area, like many other public services, 
where quality is hard to assess and contract over.   Furthermore, there is a risk of higher social 
costs for individuals and society, if people are unable to access high quality advice. In this area, 
NP and FP providers had been funded differently, up until 2007, when all providers had to 
compete to deliver contracts under identical funding conditions. The structure of these 
contracts used fixed fees, which have been used in many other public services. The market 
place for these contracts were a mix between private solicitors, which will be referred to as for-
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profits (“FPs”) in this paper, and a more diverse collection of organisations that are not-for 
profit (“NPs”) which include Law Centres, Citizen’s Advice Bureaux and other charities. 
 
Before conducting the empirical analysis, I apply the economic literature on NP delivery of 
public services to legal aid.  From the literature review, I develop four hypotheses, and use 
regression analysis to test for differences in observable characteristics between NP and FP 
providers of legal aid, to see how performance between them differs in  four main areas. The 
first area is the client base of providers, where I look at whether NP providers are more likely 
to take on cases with clients with a disability or ethnic minority. The second is the 
characteristics of the case, and whether NPs take longer to complete cases. Prior to the 
introduction of the contracts, the average time taken per case to reach a final outcome was 
significantly longer for NPs than FPs. The third area relates to the quality of advice and whether 
NPs get better outcomes for clients, based on the definition of outcomes used in the 
performance standards. The fourth area is whether NPs arrive at different outcomes to FPs 
based on disaggregating the outcomes in a way that is not monitored in the contracts.  
 
I find that NPs have a number of distinctive features in comparison to FPs. The first is that they 
serve a different client base, with a larger number of clients with a disability. This finding is 
consistent with theories that NPs have a distinct ‘mission’ to deliver in more community 
settings. This is consistent with findings in other service areas that NPs provide services to 
poorly informed consumers (Grabowski and Hirth 2003). 
 
However, unlike in the research from Grabowski and Hirth (2003) I do not find consistent 
evidence that NPs deliver a higher quality service. There are some areas where they do perform 
well, such as welfare advice and housing advice, where they get better outcomes and take a 
similar amount of time.  Conversely, in immigration, the picture is very different, and FPs take 
over an hour more time per case. This is not consistent with the “incomplete contracts” theory 
that NPs are less likely to cut cost and quality than FPs, and the amount of time taken has 
implications for the outcomes of the service provided. In immigration advice, as might be 
expected by the lower amount of time spent per case, NPs close less cases with outcomes that 
are of substantive benefit than FPs and significantly less people who go to NPs get permission 
to enter or remain in the UK permanently.  
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The providers also get different types of outcomes. Some of these differences can be explained 
by some of the different features of NP and FP providers. In debt advice, the market is 
dominated by Citizen’s Advice Bureau, who use a lot of volunteers to deliver their service and 
typically do not employ solicitors, so are less likely to take on an adversarial approach to debt 
advice where the debt is challenged (Moorhead et al. 2003).  This may explain my finding that 
in debt advice NPs report more cases with substantive benefit to the client, but, they close very 
few cases where the debt is challenged or written off, compared to FPs. 
 
In housing, where the NPs in the market are more likely to be law centres who do employ 
solicitors, this is not the situation. The disaggregated housing outcomes show that NPs are more 
likely to get the more tangible outcomes, such as the client retaining their home. In welfare 
advice, NPs get better outcomes and this is an area the NPs have always specialised in, whereas 
FPs have not.  
 
This research does find evidence that NP providers have some distinctive features, but in 
immigration and debt advice, these features are not indicative of a higher quality of service. 
The results raise some concerns from a social justice perspective because users of a service 
may not be aware that if they go to a NP provider they may be less likely to have their 
immigration application or asylum claim granted, or their debt written off. It is not clear 
whether the users are selecting to go to particular provider types, by choosing the service that 
is best for them, which is a key assumption of increasing supplier diversity in the Open Public 
Services White Paper (HM Government 2011).  Research suggests that people who are less 
poorly informed of their rights in general go to NP providers in Legal Aid (Patel et al. 2008). 
This means that NPs have some additional value in terms of reaching people who would not 
otherwise access advice, although it may be preferable if they more NPs were able to work in 
collaboration with FP firms, in areas in which they have less expertise.  
 
There are some important caveats to the findings. I have only tested differences between NPs 
and FPs on observable characteristics. Some of the theory suggests that they will differ on 
aspects of quality that are not easy to observe. Also not considered are the range of other 




This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 starts out with an overview of legal aid and the 
development of a unified funding for this area. Section 3 sets out some of the literature on NP 
providers in the public sector and this is applied to the delivery of legal aid services. Section 4 
describes the data sources and the empirical strategy. Section 5 sets out the main results, and a 
discussion of these results is set out in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.  
 
3.2 Overview of Legal Aid and the Contract Changes 
 
In this section, I set out some of the features of legal aid that are important for the analysis in 
this paper, such as the mix between NP and FP firms, how quality and outcomes are monitored, 
and the funding changes that took place just prior to 2009, which is the time period of the data 
I am analysing here.   
 
When people think of legal aid their immediate thought is often of criminal legal aid which is 
the advice and representation funded by the state that people can access if they are accused of 
a crime. The focus of this research is on a second and very different type of legal aid – civil 
legal aid or what is sometimes called ‘social welfare law’. This is the advice and support people 
are able to access when they experience a problem in an area such as housing or accessing 
benefits.  
 
Legal aid is a type of public provision, similar in some respects to emergency services,  in that 
some people will never use, and may not even be aware  exists. It is typically accessed by 
people only when something goes wrong. It is not a universal service and is subject to 
increasingly stringent means and merits tests. In 1998, 52 per cent of the population were 
eligible for legal aid, falling to 29 per cent by 2007 (The Low Commission 2014).  Even those 
who are eligible are often not aware of their rights and, so consequently, will not access any 
services when they experience a problem (Balmer et al. 2010).  
 
Despite many people not being eligible, and many people who are eligible not accessing the 
service, it is still used by a relatively large share of the population. In the data set used in this 
study, there are over 750,000 cases with 638,223 unique clients using the services. This equates 
to roughly 1 in 100 of the UK population accessing this service over 2009-10. This data set 
only includes people who access publicly funded legal aid advice. There are large numbers of 
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voluntary providers offering advice, which is not funded through the Ministry of Justice 
contracts and are therefore not included in the data set analysed in this study.  
 
3.2.1  Diversity of provision in Legal Aid 
 
When Legal Aid began being publicly funded in 1949, it was delivered almost exclusively by 
private solicitors and administered by the professional regulatory body of solicitors, the Law 
Society (Moorhead et al. 2003). This is quite different from many other public service areas in 
the UK, such as such as health care and education, where services were founded by charities.  
 
When Legal Aid was founded, Moorhead et al. (2003) argue it represented the ‘interests of the 
legal profession.’  Between 1973 and 1986, there was an expansion of legal aid, which included 
more areas of social welfare law that had a greater impact on poor and disadvantaged 
communities (Hynes 2012). In 1989, the administration of the legal aid scheme was removed 
from the Law Society and placed into the hands of a government agency. In part this was to 
reflect that legal aid was no longer exclusively delivered by solicitors. This was initially called 
the Legal Aid Board (LAG). In 2000 this was replaced by the Legal Services Commission 
(LSC), which ran the legal aid schemes for the time period studied in this paper.  The LSC was 
replaced by the Legal Aid Agency (LAA), an executive agency of the Ministry of Justice on 1 
April 2013. 
 
There is a great range of diversity in the NP organisations that deliver legal aid. Hynes (2012) 
argues that some advice centres do little more than give information on the law, while others 
will provide casework services to a similar, if not higher, standard to lawyers/FPs. The largest 
and most well recognised of all the NP organisations are Citizens Advice Bureau (“CAB”) 
(Patel et al. 2008). The CAB were set up to give people advice and information during the 
Second World War and their approach has tended to be more focused on disseminating 
information. Most CAB offices have a few typical features; they tend to be located within a 
community network, they primarily do not employ solicitors, they have a large number of 
volunteers, and tend to specialise in debt and welfare cases. There is a lot of diversity among 
the individual Bureaux, but they all operate underneath the network and branding of the 
national Citizens Advice Bureau charity. 
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Law Centres are another type of NP advice provider that operate through a national network. 
They are distinctive from other NP providers in that they mostly do employ solicitors. In 1970, 
the first Law Centre was established to address a shortage in lawyers with specialist knowledge 
of social welfare law, and a lack of access of legal advice, in terms of location, access, language 
and physical accessibility. When Law Centres were initially founded, Hynes (2012) argues that 
the Law Society felt threatened by them and initially tried to prevent solicitors from practising 
in them. Government intervention followed, which allowed the continued existence of Law 
Centres as long as ‘they did not impinge on the commercial interest of private practice’. 
 
These differences in the way that NPs and FPs have developed, means there are some 
distinctions between the providers,  and therefore, neither group is homogeneous. FPs 
providers of legal aid tended to focus on the type of cases where there was an overlap with 
their non-publicly funded work., Hynes (2012) gives the example of FPs being more likely to 
specialise in family cases (which are publicly funded) because this complements some other 
areas of the law that they take on privately, e.g. divorce cases. 
 
3.2.2 Unifying the contracts for FP and NP providers 
 
Although NP and FP providers of legal aid had coexisted for some time, the first attempt to 
fund them in the same way came in 2007 with the introduction of the ‘Unified Contract’. As 
the name suggests, this unified the funding conditions between both provider types with the 
intention of creating a ‘level playing field’ (Trude and Gibbs 2010) in the delivery of publicly 
funded legal aid between NPs and FPs.  
 
The introduction of these contracts followed a review of legal aid by Lord Carter of Coles 
(2006) which was published by the Ministry of Justice. His report was motivated by a desire 
to reduce public spending on legal aid, and he recommended using a market-based approach 
to procure legal aid services. The recommendations he made were not adopted in full, but, this 
did pave the way for fixed fees to be introduced for all providers of legal aid. For NP providers 
this was a big change since they moved from being paid for the number of hours they worked 
on a case, to being paid for the number of cases they took on. In contrast, most FP providers 
began using a type of fixed fee payment structure in 2004, although unlike the contract 
 64 
introduced in 2007, these fixed fees were ‘tailored’ to the average cost per firm. In some 
exceptional cases, providers can make an application to get paid at the hourly rate.  
 
The purpose of introducing the new contracts was not just to standardise conditions between 
all the providers, but to introduce an efficiency imperative among providers bidding for 
contracts. The fixed fee schedule puts providers under tight time pressures as they get paid the 
same fee, regardless of the time taken on the case. Any providers that consistently take longer 
than the allocated time for each case will end up making significant losses. The amount of time 
allocated is slightly different for each different area of social welfare law. An intention of the 
new contracts was to encourage some providers to exit the market and reduce the number of 
firms delivering legal aid. The Carter report expressed concerns at the higher costs of NP 
providers, and particularly in the categories of debt and welfare benefits, where NP providers 
hold most of the contracts. In debt, NP providers average cost per case is £332, compared to 
£199 for FP providers. In welfare benefits, NPs average cost per case is £353, compared to 
£243 for FPs (Lord Carter 2006). 
 
When the Carter Review (Lord Carter 2006) was published and the changes were introduced 
there were concerns that the changes would lower the quality of advice. In part, this motivated 
Lord Bach to conduct a review called the ‘Study of Legal Advice at Local Level’ (Ministry of 
Justice 2009). Similar concerns were set out in a report by the House of Commons 
Constitutional Affairs Committee (2007) which made the case that the risk of reducing access 
to justice outweighed the cost savings that could be made from the changes to the funding of 
civil legal aid. 
 
One of the key arguments for the NP delivery of public services is that NPs may provide higher 
quality services in areas where there is contract failure and asymmetric information. It is 
difficult to assess whether the longer case time taken by NPs, prior to the reforms, s was 
because they were providing a higher quality service or were simply less efficient. In an area 
such as legal aid, where contracts are incomplete, and the quality of care is hard to observe, it 
can be difficult to measure the performance of providers. In the next section, I spend some time 




3.2.3 Measuring quality and outcomes of providers 
 
In this chapter, I am comparing the performance of NP and FP providers on how they deliver 
legal aid. The assumption here is that it is possible to measure and compare the outcomes 
between providers. Legal aid is subject to many of the issues around performance measurement 
in the public sector, that were discussed at length in Chapter 2, which mostly stem from there 
being multiple principles and multiple outcomes.  
 
The provision of legal aid has some similarities with the standard model of the Principal-Agent 
‘problem’. In this model, there is typically one principal, which in this case would be the 
commissioner - the LSC, who may have different objectives to the providers of legal aid (the 
agents). The challenge is to get the agent to carry out the desires of the principal, which are 
presumed to be in conflict. The commissioner and the providers of legal aid are likely to have 
some shared objectives, about the provision of justice and good quality advice, but they may 
have different cost priorities, or different ideas about how this should be delivered. 
 
In the standard case, the agents are motivated by maximizing rewards (payment) and 
minimizing effort. The difference to the standard model is that there are wider variety of 
principals, particularly for NP providers who also have trustees, volunteers and donors, who 
each may have different objectives to the commissioning body. NPs also secure funding from 
other government bodies, aside from the LSC, who also may have differing priorities. Another 
difference is that agents and the staff that work in both NPs and FPs may have a range of 
different motivations aside from payment. 
 
There are also a wide range of varying outcomes that can result from legal aid. This leads to a 
range of challenges in measuring performance. When the output is perfectly observable, the 
principal can generally reward the agent directly for their effort (see Simpson 2009 for a 
discussion).  It is more difficult when the outcomes are multifaceted (Prentice et al. 2007). 
Given the range of different outcomes that can take place, rewarding solely one of these can 
have negative effects (see Holmstrom & Milgrom 1991; MacDonald and Marx 200 for more 
formal analysis).  
 
The performance measurement system used in the unified contract is centred on the immediate 
or short-term outcomes for the client. Many providers see the outcomes of legal aid being much 
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wider than this, and thus, talk about the role of legal aid in upholding justice and the important 
benefits it imparts to society as a whole. Advice UK (2008), for example, found that large 
numbers of people came to seek advice following a failure to correctly administer benefits 
payments by the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP). Some advice providers see a key 
part of their role as being to feed this information to the DWP and encourage them to change 
the way benefits are administered to prevent further people needing to access advice in the 
future. Another example is immigration advisers repeated attempts to raise attention of 
miscarriages of justice towards British Citizens from the Windrush generation because of the 
Home Office's decision making, led to policy work from organisations such as the Legal Action 
Group (Bawdon 2014).  
 
As well as the broader impacts on society as a whole, many advice providers have argued that 
the outcomes used in the legal aid contracts do not capture the longer-term benefits of good 
quality advice. These longer-term outcomes are more difficult and costly to monitor.  When 
NP providers have produced guidance or reports on the outcomes they achieve for their clients, 
they include long term outcomes, such as the health and education of their clients, as well as 
community outcomes, such as reducing social exclusion (see Bhavnani 2005; Citizens Advice 
Bureau 2010; PWC 2013).  
 
Another challenge of measuring advice is that, in common with many public services, 
productivity does not relate to the volume measure of the output of an organisation (Simpson 
2009). An organisation that delivers a large number of units of advice is not necessarily doing 
a good job. Many providers see their role as equipping people to be able to solve problems by 
themselves, so they will not require further advice in the future (Randall 2013 for a discussion 
of prevention in advice). Advice has parallels with other public services, where prevention is a 
goal, but this is often not picked up in performance measures (Simpson 2009). The value of 
advice in preventing future problems happening has been the focus in how some NP providers 
demonstrate their impact, (see Citizens Advice 2010 for example) as well as on the interest 
within the sector of initiations such as Public Legal Education, which has the goal of building 
the knowledge and capability of the population (Joe Randall 2013; PLEAS 2007). 
 
A final challenge in measuring outcomes of advice, is the question of attribution. Like many 
other public services, outcomes depend on some random component, so the principal is not 
able infer the workers effort precisely from the outcome achieved (Burgess and Ratto 2003).  
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So, for example, in immigration cases a grant of leave to remain is unambiguously good for 
the client. However, in some cases the person would probably be refused the right to stay, 
regardless of what the legal provider does. A report by Trude and Gibbs (2010) sums this up 
well:  
 
“in individual cases, outcomes could never be used as a measure of quality, because high 
quality legal representation may still result in a negative outcome for an individual client.” 
 
If providers were set a target around the number of people that get leave to remain this would 
lead to very strong incentives for providers to select clients and not represent some cases.  
 
This means that legal aid providers have never been paid for achieving certain outcomes, as 
has become a trend in other public service areas. There have been two main ways of ensuring 
quality among providers that deliver legal aid contracts, and neither of these are perfect.  
 
The first is by requiring all providers to meet a particular quality standard. There are several 
tools used to assess this standard. All providers are required to submit an application for the 
Specialist Quality Mark (Ling and Pugh 2011), which is mostly focused on auditing the 
processes and procedures providers have in place. Another tool, which is held in wider esteem 
by the sector, is Peer Review; where the cases, rather than processes, are reviewed. The peer 
review system used in Legal Aid has 5 levels, and the LSC has set the level required at level 3, 
which is ‘threshold competence’ although authors such as Trude and Gibbs (2010) argue that 
level 2 ‘competence plus’ would have been more suitable to ensure quality advice.  
 
The second is the introduction of a number of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs), which were 
designed to capture quality of work, accessibility and value for money (Legal Services 
Commission 2010). Some of these attempt to ensure that providers do not spend very short 
amounts of time on cases. Another of these concerns the outcomes of the cases closed, with a 
target for the number of cases they close with an outcome that is said to have had a ‘substantive 
benefit’ to the client. The targets are different for different areas of law. The target is highest 
for debt and welfare benefits at 50%, for housing it is 40% and for immigration is much lower 
at 15%.  
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The term ‘substantive benefit’ (sometimes also called ‘positive outcomes’) may be a bit 
misleading, because in reality, a provider can close a case with this outcome code when, in 
fact, very little of benefit has happened with the case. In each area of law, there are a range of 
outcome codes and the LSC have defined some of these codes as being of ‘substantive benefit’ 
and some that are not. In practice, most of the cases that are called ‘substantive benefit’ are just 
a case being closed, and there is a lot of variability of impact within this code.  
 
Some of the outcomes within substantive benefits are rather ‘indeterminate’ (Citizens Advice, 
2010). In a paper by Balmer et al. (2012) they ask, ‘how substantial is substantive benefit’ and 
argue that the imperative to monitor outcomes has obscured large differences in the quality of 
advice. They draw attention to the fact that, in some types of advice, a large number of cases 
are closed with the outcome code ‘client advised and enabled to plan and/or manage their 
affairs better’, which is significantly less tangible than an outcome, such as, a client being 
‘housed, rehoused or retaining a home’ Yet both these outcomes count within the definition 
of 'substantive benefit'. This means that providers may be able to game the performance 
standard, and report the outcome ‘plan better’, even when they have done very little work on 
their client’s case. Despite these problems with the outcome measures used in the contract, it 
is the only indicator I have available. 
 
3.3 Theories of non-profits from economics applied to legal aid provision 
 
There is a growing literature on the role of NP organisations within economics and their role 
in delivering public services. Some early papers argue that NPs are less preferable to FPs, 
because the lack of a residual claimant means they will be less efficient, and workers in NPs 
will be less motivated (Alchian and Demsetz 1972). More recent papers emphasise that the 
lack of residual claimant and the fact that NPs are barred from distributing profits to people 
who control the firm (Hansmann 1980), can be a positive attribute, as it means they are less 
likely to cut quality (Glaeser and Shleifer, 2001). They can also attract donations of money, or 
labour from their own workforce or volunteers, which can increase quality or reduce cost 
(Francois 2003; Lakdawalla and Phillipson 2006). Other theories argue that the most important 
feature of NPs is that they have a distinct mission (Lindrooth and Weisbrod 2004), and that 
donations of labour will be more important when volunteers are matched with a firm that has 
the same mission as them (Besley and Ghatak 2005). The preceding chapter considered these 
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arguments in more detail and set out how these theories lead to predictions about how NPs may 
differ from FPs in the delivery of public services. In this section, I look at how some of these 
ideas apply to legal aid.   
3.3.1 Incomplete contracts  
 
Hansmann (1980) argues that in areas where it is hard to write complete contracts over 
outcomes, then NP providers can have significant advantages over FP providers, because their 
lack of a residual claimant means they are less likely to cut costs and quality.  Glaeser and 
Shliefer (2001) show this gives a rationale for an entrepreneur, who is not altruistic, to choose 
to be NP, as a way of signalling to consumers that they will be higher quality.  
 
The idea of ‘incomplete contracts’ isn’t enough to justify the use of non-private providers and 
it depends on the extent to which quality is important. In some cases, cutting costs can 
considered a good thing, because it may also reduce the cost to the public purse in delivering 
this service. In other cases, where the social costs of cutting non-contractible quality is large, 
the case for provision by FP providers is weakened (see Grout 2009; Hart et al. 1997). 
 
This means that for services, where it is easier to specify outputs on contracts and/or the social 
costs from incomplete contracts are minimal (e.g. refuse collection), then there is a stronger 
case for private provision. For services where it is hard to specify outputs in contracts, and 
there are high social costs from outputs not being specified, then, conversely, there is a stronger 
case for non-profit provision. Legal aid would fit the latter category, as there is a care element 
in providing face to face advice, high variability in the quality of case work that is hard to 
assess, and high social costs if people are not adequately represented, such as being denied the 
right to a fair hearing, being deported, or being made homeless, as a result. 
 
This theory leads to two predictions on how NP providers may differ from FPs. The first, is on 
the time taken per case, which is an indicator that providers have cut costs. It is hard to make 
a clear judgement if reducing time is good or bad, as providers can be reducing the time they 
take because they are more efficient, but the time pressures in the contracts were seen to be 
something that could risk quality.  
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The Bach report (Ministry of Justice, 2009) looked a number of potential ways that providers 
might game the contracts, which included cherry-picking, paralegalisation and case-splitting. 
I will focus on their first concern, cherry-picking, as this is the one that most closely impacts 
on the time per case: A number of commentators have raised concerns that the time pressure 
gives providers the incentive to ‘game’ the standard contract, by not taking on certain cases. 
These are typified by the concerns set out by one provider below: 
 
“we get paid as much for doing a debt case that’s got two debtors in as for doing a debt case 
which has twenty debtors ..., so if we were a commercial organisation we would turn away the 
twenty- debtor cases because they are just too complex” (advice centre cited in Ministry of 
Justice, 2009) 
 
This might mean that providers may cream-skim clients, or they may take on cases that are 
complex and complete them to a low standard. It is hard to identify which cases will take 
longer. Previous research has found some factors that influence whether a case will take longer. 
Smith and Patel (2008) found that with debt advice, the number of debt types was a key 
indicator for advice time. Therefore, clients who have multiple debts, will take the longest to 
complete. Unfortunately, the data set I analyse in this paper does not have this level of detail 
on the nature of the cases funded. Smith and Patel (2008) also found that people receiving 
disability benefits had longer advice time than those who were not. Conversely, they found that 
BME clients had shorter advice times. It is not clear if the longer advice time for clients on 
disability benefits, or in outreach centres, is to do with the needs of the client, or because these 
are more likely to be delivered by NP providers. If it is the case that these types of cases take 
longer to complete, providers have an incentive to take on fewer clients with a disability.  
 
This second hypothesis from this theory is that NP providers will be higher quality than FP 
providers. I will look at the differences between the outcomes reported by NPs and FPs testing 
if they are different. The challenge, of course, is that this theory predicts that the quality will 
be higher on those attributes which are hard to measure, therefore, comparing performance 
between providers, solely on the measures that are in the contract, has limitations. I also 
compared NP and FP providers on outcomes that, while observable from the dataset analysed, 
are not monitored as part of the contract. The measure I use is how often providers report an 




3.2 Having a unique mission 
 
A second set of theories on NP provision argues that their distinctive feature is they have some 
core ‘mission’, which they have been set up to achieve (Weisbrod, 2004). This is sometimes 
characterised by a 'two good model' where charities face a ‘trade off’ between two objectives. 
The first objective is to produce a “revenue good” which makes money, and ‘mission goods’ 
which may not make money but help achieve the objectives of the charity (Lindrooth & 
Weisbrod 2007).  
 
Within the economics literature, these two goods have been characterised in different ways. 
One interpretation means delivering the same good, but to different groups of people. A lot of 
the empirical evidence has found NP providers delivering to a different client base. Norton and 
Staiger (1994) look at the performance of NPs in one particular area – the provision of medical 
services to the uninsured. This provision of free care to the uninsured is seen as one of the most 
important ways that hospitals can differ. Their study found that, for a given hospital, there is 
no evidence that FP ownership lowers the volume of uninsured patients they take on. However, 
FP hospitals locate in better insured areas, and consequently, overall, take on less uninsured 
cases. While FP hospitals provide adequate community service to the communities they choose 
to serve, they also avoid areas with large numbers of uninsured.   
 
In legal aid, this could translate into NP providers delivering to different types of clients. NP 
legal aid providers often make claims that they deliver to clients, who are in particular need. 
So, for example, on the CAB website they make a point of highlighting that each of their 
centres: 
 ‘plays an integral role within its local community… to understand, respond and adapt to local 
needs… We are a local service, working with the local people, for the benefit of the community’ 
(CAB, 2017).  
 
The Law Centre’s Federation expresses a similar mission statement, to serve local communities 
on their website. In their annual report for 2016-17 (Law Centre’s Federation 2017), they also 
showcase examples of their work, where they were able to support people who were in chronic 
need. For example, the North Kensington Law Centre are currently supporting Grenfell 
survivors, and claim they are one of the few local organisations who the residents trust. 
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There are also differences in where providers locate geographically around the UK. FP 
solicitors firms are usually based in an office near the centre of town and are located 
predominantly in large urban centres. In contrast, NPs are more likely to be located in rural 
areas or in outreach centres. An additional dataset, I requested from the Ministry of Justice, 
contained a full list of all providers operating in each region in the UK, including those holding 
contracts as well as those without. This data shows that in the UK there were 1179 outreach 
offices, all of which have non-profit organisations as their main office. An outreach office is 
one that is run in a community centre, or GP’s surgery, or more accessible location. Other 
research (Smith and Patel, 2008) has found that people who access advice in outreach services 
for debt advice, were different from those who accessed services funded by mainstream LSC 
contracts, and they were more likely to be younger, male and more ethnically diverse.  Their 
data set also found that people who accessed outreach projects, were often clients who were 
financially excluded, and had not previously sought advice. 
  
A second interpretation of the two-good argument, is that NP providers may effectively deliver 
two separate types of good; one that is profitable, and another that is not. Chetkovich and 
Frumkin (2003) give the example of the Red Cross in the USA, who supply blood to rural 
hospitals, even though this is a loss-making activity. This could apply to an individual providers 
case load, where they take on cases that will take longer than the fixed fee, thus, making a loss, 
which they then balance with shorter cases that take less time than the fixed fee, on a 'swings 
and roundabouts' basis. It could also apply to the sort of activities that NPs do that comes 
outside of individual case work. This includes activities such as public legal education, or 
taking on test cases to challenge legislation, that have a wider reaching public benefit.  
 
One of the concerns from the Ministry of Justice (2009) study, conducted by Lord Bach, was 
that with the rise of contracts and commissioning, such as the approach adopted by the Ministry 
of Justice, where agencies were funded to provide a set number of units of advice, NP agencies 
would find it harder to get support for social policy and preventative work  not funded by legal 
aid.  
 
Another way that a different mission can manifest, is through a different way of delivering a 
service. The theory outlined by Besley and Ghatak (2005) is that NPs can be more effective 
when there is a matching of missions.  In legal aid, Moorhead et al. (2003) found differences 
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in the way that the types of organisation approached cases. For example, in debt cases, NPs 
were more likely to adopt an approach known as ‘debt counselling’, compared to the more 
litigious approach of solicitors. This may be a sign of mission matching or be related to 
differences in the scope of work NPs are permitted to undertake, with solicitors being able to 
conduct all types of litigation, whilst NPs are not. 
 
This theory leads to several predictions of how NP and FP providers may differ. As some of 
these are about pursuing a mission and different activities from those funded through the legal 
aid contracts, the data I have does not adequately reflect the full impact made from  what some 
of the organisations do. Nonetheless, I will be able to test for differences in the type of 
outcomes that the different providers get, as well as whether NP providers take on clients with 
different demographics.  
 
3.3.2 Pro Social Motivation 
 
Another potential advantage of NP organisations, is that they may be able to attract additional 
donations of money or time from volunteers or paid staff, which can help to lower the cost of 
provision (Francois and Vlassopoulos 2008) and improve quality. 
 
There is a debate about whether only NP firms will be able to attract donated labour, in the 
form of extra effort, from employees who are intrinsically motivated. Some authors have 
argued that altruism will only be present in non-profit firms. Francois (2003) argues that any 
additional effort that workers exert in a for-profit firm, will be exploited by the manager of the 
firm. For example, if staff work harder to take on more cases, managers may exploit this by 
hiring less staff, and so, workers  may feel that their behaviour is not having any impact on 
outcomes and stop doing unpaid overtime. The theory predicts that in non-profit firms this is 
less likely to happen, and any effort that pro-socially motivated workers are willing to provide 
will improve the quality of output (Gregg et al. 2008).  
 
Besley and Ghatak (2005) offer a different interpretation of the role of intrinsic motivations. 
They suggest that workers have mission preferences about how the service should be delivered. 
For example, advisers may choose to work in a certain type of legal aid organisation, because 
they believe in delivering advice in a certain way. Similarly, in FP solicitors practices, workers 
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may be attracted to a particular firm, because of their reputation on delivering legal aid work.  
The importance of non-profit organisations is not just that workers are motivated, but that there 
are different ‘types’ of motivated workers and motivated agents. Productivity will be higher 
when the types of mission and intrinsic motivations of the agents are well matched. Crucially, 
this  needs to not only take place in NP organisations, but, may be more likely than in FPs,  due 
to a clear focus on a distinct mission in NPs. 
 
There are several ways that this could apply to the legal aid contracts. The first, is that workers 
at NP firms may be more likely to work unpaid overtime to work on cases and to ensure quality 
of advice is high. The second, is that NP providers may be able to attract volunteers to work 
unpaid on their service, in addition to paid members of staff. This may mean the NP providers 
may be better value for money, as they can mobilise more resources. Some NPs use a large 
numbers of volunteers, who are not qualified solicitors, to deliver their service. For example, 
the CAB have over 20000 volunteers, and their website (Citizen’s Advice Bureau 2017) 
proudly states that volunteers are at the heart of their service. There is a question about what 
the implications will be in terms of quality, as volunteers may have lower qualifications than 
paid staff. Moorhead et al. (2003) found that non-lawyer firms were cheaper per hour because 
of lower wages and using volunteers, but they spent more time per case, so had a higher average 
cost.  
 
Third, NPs may also be able to attract additional donations, not just in terms of labour, but by 
attracting funding from other sources. In legal aid, many non-profit organisations are able to 
attract significant additional funding, with much of this coming from local authorities, and also 
from other philanthropic funders. 
 
I do not have data on whether staff are working unpaid overtime, or whether volunteers work 
on cases, but it is important to understand these are differences between providers. It is also 
possible that NPs will find it harder to keep workers motivated, if they are working under very 
strict time constraints in the contracts, and if they are prevented from working on activities that 
they see as core to the NPs mission.  
 
In summary, although providers are not permitted to select clients on the basis of observable 
characteristics, some NP providers may have set their service up in a particular mission driven 
way, so as to be more likely to be accessed by people who are socially excluded, for example, 
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by providing outreach services. I will test whether this leads to any differences in the 
observable characteristics of clients. 
 
3.3.3 Research Questions 
 
In the previous section, I set out an introduction and applied some of the economic theories on 
NPs, from the previous chapter, to legal aid and set out several ways in which NP providers 
may differ from FP providers. Some of these are not testable from the data I have access to, 
and some of the theories suggest NPs will be distinctive in ways that are difficult for third party 
observers to assess. Nonetheless, there are several ways in which providers are likely to differ, 
from the ‘incomplete contracts’ theories, they may differ on the time taken per case and the 
quality of the outcomes. From the ‘mission’ theories, they may differ on the characteristics of 
the clients that they see and the type of outcomes they report.  
 
The four hypotheses I test are as follows:  
i. Do the clients that NP providers serve have different characteristics in terms of ethnicity 
and disability? 
ii. Do NP providers take longer per case than FP providers?  
iii. Do NP providers report a higher quality of advice based on the performance measure 
for outcomes in the contract? 




3.4 Data and Summary Statistics 
 
3.4.1 Description of Data 
 
This paper uses data obtained from a Freedom of Information request submitted to the Legal 
Services Commission, part of the Ministry of Justice, in 2011. The data contains a breakdown 
of all matters funded through the Legal Help scheme, over the period of 2009/10. Legal Help 
falls under the definition of ‘controlled work’ and only covers basic levels of advice and 
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representation. It does not cover representation at tribunal or specialist advice (which is funded 
through Controlled Legal Representation (CLR)).  
 
The dataset has a total of over 750,000 observations, grouped under 15 different categories of 
law. FPs deliver a larger share overall of these cases, 63 %, compared to 37% delivered by 
NPs. This does not represent unique clients for each law firm, but there is an indicator if the 
client has more than one case open. In total, there are 638,223 unique clients. The data does 
not have a provider identifier, so I am unable to say how many providers in total there are, but 
it does tell us if the provider was a non-profit organisation or a private solicitors practice.  
 
Table 3.5 in the appendix, shows the numbers of cases in each of the 15 categories of social 
welfare law, and how these cases are distributed between NP and FP providers. Some types of 
advice are delivered almost exclusively by FP providers, for example, criminal law, medical 
negligence, consumer, family, mental health, personal injury, and public law. Some areas are 
delivered by both NP and FP, but the overall number of cases is small, for example, 
employment and education. In the rest of this paper, I focus on the four areas of advice which 
are delivered in a large number by both NP and FP providers – these are debt, housing, 
immigration, welfare benefits. 
 
Within these four areas of advice, there is variation between how cases are distributed between 
NP and FP. The most even spread is housing, where the numbers for NP and FP are the most 
similar, 50087 and 52162 respectively. Immigration advice is more commonly delivered by FP 
providers compared to NPs. Debt and welfare benefits both have much larger numbers of cases 
delivered by NP providers. The difference is largest for debt with 88,175 delivered by NPs 




The data contains information on the following variables: 
 
Supplier type. The data reports if the provider is a  firm of solicitors (all of which are FP), or 
if the provider is a NP organisation. As outlined in Section 1, NP organisations are not a 
homogenous group. They include the Citizen’s Advice Bureaux, which provide generalist 
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advice usually delivered by non-lawyers, alongside organisations like Law Centres, Housing 
Aid Centres and Refugee Advocacy Groups or Organisations, who usually employ solicitors 
to deliver advice.  
 
Category: There are 15 categories of social welfare law total, but there are some important 
differences in how these cases are distributed between FP and NP providers as outlined above. 
The data reports the overall category of law, for example, Housing, but I do not have any more 
detailed information on the specific type of case i.e.. whether a housing case relates to 
homelessness or disrepair. The summary statistics show the 4 categories of law that I look at 
in more detail in this report, the others are detailed in table 1 of the appendix.  
 
Client ID: Each person in the data is identified by a unique client identity number. Clients can 
have multiple matters open at one time. This can be two matters in different categories of social 
welfare law (e.g. a housing and a debt case), or two matters of the same case type (subject to 
eligibility rules). Around 15% of all cases involve a client who has more than one matter start 
open.   
 
Gender: There are more cases  where women are the clients, compared to men. This is mainly 
driven by women being more likely to access advice for debt, housing and family cases. This 
pattern is reversed  (10,430 compared to 20,800), in actions against the police and immigration 
cases, where men make up a larger share of the  client base. 
 
Ethnicity: Providers report the ethnicity of clients where this is known, although there are a 
reasonably large number of missing values (13,265, which is 2% of the total). Around two 
thirds (65%) of cases have clients identified as White British. 
 
Disability: Providers are required to report whether the client has a disability, and these are 
split into eight categories; cognitive impairment, long standing illness or health condition, 
learning disability, mental health condition, physical impairment, sensory impairment, other 
disability,  or no disability. The majority of cases are with clients with no reported disability 
(73%) which still leaves over 25% cases where the client reports some disability. Providers 
report only one disability code, even in cases where the client may have several different 
disabilities (e.g. sensory and physical impairment).  
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Time and Duration: Providers report how much time they spend in minutes on each case and 
the duration of the case in days between when the case was opened and when it closed. A key 
aim in developing the fixed fee scheme was to encourage providers to be more efficient and 
spend less time on each case. 
 
Outcome Codes: On closing a case, providers must mark the outcome of the case. There are a 
number of specified outcome codes for each type of social welfare law (outcome codes for 
debt, welfare, housing and immigration are set out in the appendix). The challenges in 
measuring outcomes in legal aid were discussed in section 2.3.  
 
Region: the data is disaggregated by regional LSC office. The categories used are largely 
historical and based on the location of the LSC regional. 
 
There is wide variation between the regions, in terms of the number of providers, and also the 
provider type (non-profit compared to solicitors). The regions where the smallest proportion of 
cases were done by NPs were Cardiff, Leeds, London, Newcastle, Nottingham and Reading. 
In all of these regions, the majority of cases were delivered by FPs, with NPs delivering under 
35% of cases. The region where the greatest proportion of cases were carried out by NPs was 
in Manchester, where 49% of cases were delivered by NP providers. Other regions that had a 
large share of cases done by NPs, were Birmingham, Brighton, Bristol and Cambridge, all of 
which had over 40% of cases done by NPs. In Chester, the smallest of all the regions, nearly 
all cases (97%) were delivered by NP providers. 
 
Whilst the information above shows how many cases were opened by provider type in each 
area, it fails to provide the whole picture of how likely it is for someone to go to a non-profit 
provider. In each region, there will be providers who are operating without a contract and  not 
funded by the LSC. Table 3.6 in the appendix, shows a list of how many providers in each 





Table 3-1. Summary Statistics 
  % of total done 
by NP 
% of NP 
cases 
% of FP cases Overall   
Freq. 
% of all 
cases 
Type of Case 
     
Debt 82.63 30.54 3.81 106710 13.76 
Housing 48.99 17.35 10.72 102249 13.19 
Immigration 42.64 18.01 14.38 121950 15.73 
Welfare benefits 77.23 29.09 5.09 108776 14.03 
      
Client Characteristics 
     
F-Female 35.22 51.42 56.12 421553 54.37 
M-Male 39.58 48.29 43.75 352311 45.44 
Disability Dummy = 1 57.28 34.89 15.44 175855 22.68 
Ethnicity Dummy = 1 39.77 29.23 26.27 212252 27.38 
Client has more than one case 43.99 18.53 8.79 121629 15.69 
      
Region 
     
Birmingham 41.92 10.33 8.49 71138 9.18 
Brighton 46.75 6.48 4.38 40059 5.17 
Bristol 39.80 7.99 7.17 57973 7.48 
Cambridge 43.72 8.84 6.76 58403 7.53 
Cardiff 34.82 6.18 6.87 51268 6.61 
Chester 96.87 0.62 0.01 1854 0.24 
Leeds 29.87 7.41 10.32 71611 9.24 
Liverpool 35.80 4.56 4.85 36764 4.74 
London 32.75 20.13 24.53 177482 22.89 
Manchester 48.52 13.67 8.61 81331 10.49 
Newcastle 30.78 5.19 6.92 48652 6.28 
Nottingham 32.60 5.42 6.65 47985 6.19 
Reading 29.90 3.19 4.44 30808 3.97 
      
Case and Client Details NP Mean FP Mean Overall Mean 
Duration (mean) 137.69 190.75 170.89 
Time in minutes (mean) 217.95 231.22 226.26 
Age (mean) 40.06 37.09 38.20 
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3.4.3 Estimation and Framework 
 
The main methodology used in this paper is to compare NP and FP providers on the four areas 
set out above. The four research questions concern (i) the clients served by the provider; (ii) 
the time taken per case; (iii) the number of cases closing with an outcome that is defined as 
substantive benefit; and (iv) the number of cases closing with specific types of outcome codes.  
 
For (i) the dependent variable is whether the case is delivered by a NP provider. In this case, 
the dependent variable is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the provider is NP. The 
following OLS regression was run, as well as a logit regression, where the coefficients reported 
are the marginal effects at the means. The results show the probability of a case being seen by 
a NP firm, when the client has a disability, or is from an ethnic minority background. The main 
estimating equation is of the following form, for client 𝑖 in region 𝑗. 
 
𝑁𝑃"3 = 	𝛼 + 𝛽6𝐷𝐼𝑆" +	𝛽:𝑈𝑁𝐾𝐷𝐼𝑆" 		+<𝛽=
>
?@6
	𝐸𝑇𝐻" + 	𝛿𝑋" + 𝜂𝑍3 	+	𝜀"3 
 
𝐷𝐼𝑆" is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the client reports a disability and 0 if they 
do not. 
𝑈𝑁𝐾𝐷𝐼𝑆" is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the disability of the client is reported 
as unknown and 0 if the disability is known. There are 8 categories of disability that have been 
combined into this one dummy variable. 
𝐸𝑇𝐻" is a vector of ethnicity dummy variables. These are 4 ethnicity dummy variables that 
have been collapsed from larger categories. All clients with a Black ethnicity e.g. Black 
African, Caribbean, Mixed have been combined to give one dummy variable. All clients with 
an Asian ethnicity (e.g. Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Chinese) have been combined into one 
dummy variable. All other ethnicities have been combined into a group ‘other ethnicity’. The 
fourth ethnicity category is unknown ethnicity. The omitted variable is White ethnicity.  
 
The reason why only one dummy variable category has been used for disability (alongside 
unknown disability) is because the overall direction of results, is the same for all of the 
disability categories, when they were included as separate dummy variables. This was not the 
case for ethnicity, where there were differences between different ethnicity categories.  
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𝑋"	is a vector of client control variables which include the age and gender of the client,  
𝑍3 is a vector of regional controls that include the region of the provider. London is the omitted 
region.  
 
For (ii) the dependent variable is a continuous variable of the number of minutes taken per 
case. An OLS regression of the following form was run:  
 
𝑌"3 = 	𝛼 +	𝑁𝑃" + 𝛽6𝐷𝐼𝑆" +	𝛽:𝑈𝑁𝐾𝐷𝐼𝑆" 		+ <𝛽=
>
?@6
		𝐸𝑇𝐻" + 	𝛿𝑋" + 𝜂𝑍3 	+	𝜀"3 
  
All of the explanatory variables are the same as those set out in (i), with the only difference 
being that NP is now included, not as the dependent variable, but as an explanatory variable, 
for the behavioural outcome of the amount of time taken per case.  
 
For (iii) the dependent variable is a binary outcome that takes a value of 0 or 1, if the case is 
closed with substantive benefit for the client. Some additional regressions are run with more 
specific outcome codes, with all the same control variables. The equation is the same as for 
(ii), with the only difference being that time per case is included, as an explanatory variable. 
When testing for the difference in outcomes, I control for the time spent per case, because I am 
not concerned with whether one provider type gets better outcomes because they spend longer; 
what is of relevance is if some other characteristics about the organisations lead to a difference 




3.5.1 Do NPs have a different client base to FP providers? 
 
Table 3.2 reports regression results with NP as the dependent variable. The results show the 
OLS regression results (similar results were obtained from a logit regression, these results are 
reported in appendix table 3.8). For this analysis, ethnicity has been collapsed into five 
categories: Black, Asian or Chinese, Other, White, and Ethnicity Unknown. In the regression, 
the omitted category is White, so results are relative to this omitted variable.   
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For disability, the 9 different disability categories have been collapsed into three dummy 
variables: having a disability, disability unknown, and no disability. I did also run regressions, 
with each of the different disability categories reported separately, but these are not included 
in the results table, because there were no substantive differences in how NPs and FPs took on 
cases across the disability types.  
 
NPs are more likely to have clients who have a reported disability for all types of advice. The 
differences are large, and statistically significant for all types of advice. In each category, NPs 
have a higher number of clients with a reported disability. The coefficient is largest for Welfare 
cases, at 0.079 in the OLS, and 0.085 in the logit regression, but for all types of case the 
coefficient is highly statistically significant.  
 
The results in table 3.2 show that that the likelihood that ethnic minorities visit a NP provider 
varies across ethnicity categories, and type of advice. NP providers are more likely to have 
clients, who are Black for debt advice only, with a coefficient that is positive and highly 
statistically significant (P<0.001). In contrast, for housing and immigration cases, it is negative, 
so NPs are less likely to have Black clients on for these cases.  
 
In most cases, the numbers of clients reporting an Asian or Chinese ethnicity was not 
statistically significantly different from those who are White. NP providers were less likely to 
report having a client from an ‘other’ ethnic category, and the coefficients on this were large 
and all highly statistically significant. They were also much less likely to have cases where the 
ethnicity of the client was unknown.  
 
For gender, there are three categories; female, male and unknown gender. There are two 
dummies in the regression (the omitted variable is male). On the female variable, none of the 
results are highly statistically significant, with the exception of immigration where NPs are 
more likely to have female clients.  
 
For age, there are statistically significant differences that are similar in size and direction for 
all types of legal aid. In all cases, the coefficient is negative, with NPs less likely to take on 
clients with a higher age.  
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There is a lot of regional variation between NPs and FPs. In all of the regressions, the omitted 
region is London, so results are interpreted in comparison to this. For most of these case types, 
people are more likely to go to a NP than a FP, with the exception of debt advice in Cardiff; 
debt, welfare and immigration advice in Liverpool; and immigration advice in Newcastle, 





Table 3-2. Regression results (OLS). Dependent variable: NP provider 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
DEBT  HOUSING WELFARE  IMMIG 
  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  
Eth: -0.243*** -0.169*** -0.046*** 0.391*** 
Unknown (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) 
Eth: Black 0.017*** -0.016*** -0.030*** -0.097*** 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) 
Eth: Asian -0.008 0.008 -0.003 -0.022*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) 
Eth: Other -0.067*** -0.039*** -0.153*** 0.064*** 
  (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) 
Dis: Has  0.038*** 0.076*** 0.079*** 0.029*** 
 disability (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.007) 
Dis:  -0.310*** -0.238*** -0.311*** 0.065*** 
 Unknown (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) 
Gender: F 0.001 -0.006* 0.000 0.066*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Gender:  0.154*** 0.173*** 0.137*** 0.148*** 
 unknown (0.032) (0.027) (0.026) (0.022) 
Age -0.003*** -0.006*** -0.003*** 0.006*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Age sq 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Birmingham 0.149*** 0.078*** 0.116*** 0.255*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) 
Brighton 0.112*** 0.247*** 0.167*** 0.190*** 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) 
Bristol 0.143*** 0.270*** 0.171*** 0.108*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.010) 
Cambridge 0.127*** 0.265*** 0.201*** 0.501*** 
  (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) 
Cardiff -0.073*** 0.298*** 0.072*** 0.066*** 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) 
Chester 0.207*** 0.000    0.252*** 0.000 
  (0.012) (.)    (0.015) (.) 
Leeds 0.008 0.099*** 0.030*** 0.209*** 
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 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) 
Liverpool -0.061*** 0.110*** -0.242*** 0.000    
  (0.006) (0.008) (0.005) (.)    
Manch 0.076*** 0.310*** 0.146*** 0.602*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) 
Newcastle 0.007 0.072*** 0.091*** -0.262*** 
  (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) 
Nott 0.114*** 0.335*** 0.206*** -0.028** 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.010) 
Reading 0.021** 0.209*** 0.231*** -0.250*** 
  (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.011) 
_cons 0.871*** 0.527*** 0.759*** 0.123*** 
  (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011) 
n  106,575 101,802  108,570 110,274 
Dependent variable is dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the provider is 





3.5.2 Do non-profits take longer than FP providers to deliver cases? 
 
 
Figure 3-1. Difference between NPs and FPs in time taken per case (minutes) 
 
Figure 3-1 shows a summary of the time taken by NP and FP providers. There is a lot of 
variation between the different case types. For debt advice, NP providers take a lot longer than 
FP providers; the data from the regression results with controls estimates this as 40 minutes 
longer per case. This is large and is statistically significant. The regression results are shown 
in Table 3.3.  
 
For housing cases, the mean time taken by NPs is less than that taken by FPs, although the 
number is very small at 8 minutes less. The median is the same. The regression results, which 
take into account all the control variables, gives a positive, yet still small, coefficient of 6 
minutes. This is very small, but, is still statistically significant. 
 
For welfare cases, like in housing cases, the mean for NPs is lower than FPs. The median, 
however, is larger for NPs. The regression results also give a negative coefficient with NPs 
taking 15 minutes less time, after taking into account, controls. This is statistically significant.  
 
In the area of immigration law, the differences between NP and FP providers are largest. NPs 











Debt Housing Welfare Immigration
Mean Median Regression Results
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from the linear regression is 72  minutes less, the difference is large and is statistically 
significant.  
 
The rest of the regression results are presented in Table 3.3. Cases where the client is Black or 
Asian, take statistically significantly longer in time, compared to White clients, although with 
the exception of immigration advice, these differences are small. Cases with ‘other’ ethnicity 
take less time for debt and housing cases, but longer with welfare cases.  All disability cases 
take longer time, 15 minutes longer in debt cases, rising to over 30 minutes for both housing 
and welfare cases. Cases where the client is female take longer, 10 minutes longer in debt cases, 




Table 3-3. Regression results (OLS). Dependent variable: time taken per case. 
          
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
DEBT  HOUSING WELFARE  IMMIGRATION 
  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  
NP 40.13*** 5.454*** -14.89*** -72.10*** 
 
(1.017) (1.027) (1.073) (2.121) 
Eth: 0.751 9.982*** 6.769** 115.5*** 
Unknown (2.203) (2.140) (2.190) (5.294) 
Eth: Black 4.471** 12.07*** 7.291*** 65.18*** 
 (1.530) (1.521) (1.474) (4.276) 
Eth: Asian 10.08*** 15.69*** 16.24*** 60.60*** 
  (1.762) (2.118) (1.475) (4.521) 
Eth: Other -11.41*** -3.074 20.21*** 53.40*** 
 (2.379) (2.062) (1.785) (4.315) 
Dis: Has  14.56*** 31.65*** 39.83*** 26.09*** 
 disability (0.852) (1.153) (0.969) (4.917) 
Dis:  22.70*** 27.16*** 44.47*** 4.654* 
 Unknown (1.554) (1.646) (1.826) (2.367) 
Gender: F 10.76*** 4.067*** 4.314*** -12.78*** 
  (0.723) (0.981) (0.829) (1.870) 
Gender:  -60.16*** 12.87 -43.19*** -52.52*** 
 unknown (10.54) (8.828) (9.032) (15.39) 
Age 2.141*** 0.308 2.849*** -8.023*** 
  (0.153) (0.189) (0.167) (0.364) 
Age sq -0.0195*** -0.00153 -0.0315*** 0.0959*** 
 (0.00171) (0.00217) (0.00180) (0.00452) 
_cons 91.90*** 184.0*** 120.4*** 498.6*** 
  (3.622) (4.146) (3.982) (7.917) 
N 106647 101986 108660 112336 
Standard errors in parentheses; Regional controls also included. 













Figure 3-2: Outcomes closed of 'substantive benefit'. Difference between NPs and FPs. 
 
Figure 3-2 shows a summary of the data on outcomes (and the regression results are shown in 
Table 3.4). The graph shows the percentage of cases that end with an outcome code, which the 
Legal Services Commission regard as being of “substantive benefit” to the client. The outcome 
codes that are included in this measure are slightly different for each area of social welfare law. 
Section 3.2.3 sets out a fuller explanation of how substantive benefit is measured and some of 
the limitations with its use as a performance measure. 
 
The figure shows that for debt, housing and welfare cases, NP providers end a lot more cases 
with substantive benefit to the client. The columns on the left are the raw data without adding 
in any controls.  The difference is largest in housing, where the difference is close to 15%. The 
difference is very small in welfare, only 4%. The pattern is reversed in immigration, where FPs 
report a larger share of cases closing with substantive benefit than NPs; 28% compared to 24%. 
 
In the figure, the columns on the right show the results from the OLS regression, which has 
controls for client characteristics, region and the time taken. This reduces the differences 







Debt Housing Welfare Immigration
Difference between NPs and FPs on outcomes of 
substantive benefit to client
Raw data OLS coefficient
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|t|) = 0.0000). Summary regression results are reported in 3.4, with the full regression results 
with regional control and logit regression also shown in the appendix in tables 3.9 and 3.10. 
 
In terms of productivity, if we think of productivity as the outcomes achieved divided by the 
input (time per case) used to achieve them, for some types of advice NPs are more productive 
than FPs. NPs get better outcomes on housing and welfare cases, without taking more time per 
case so one could argue they are more ‘productive’ in these case areas. Although they get better 
outcomes in debt advice, they spend a lot longer per case. It is less clear in this instance if they 
are more productive than FPs, as it is hard to assess if the slightly better outcomes are justified 
by spending that much more time per case. In immigration, FPs do better, but spending a lot 
longer per case so, as in the case of debt, an interpretation on productivity is less clear. These 
issues are discussed in more detail in section 3.6.2.  
 
There is variation between outcomes achieved for different ethnicities. Clients who are Black 
are less likely to get an outcome of substantive benefit in debt cases, and Asian clients are less 
likely to get an outcome of substantive benefit in all types of advice, apart from immigration.  
 
Clients who report a mental health condition are less likely to get an outcome of substantive 
benefit in housing and immigration. In immigration, the coefficient is the largest and is 
statistically significant at the 1% level. Clients with a mental health disability are more likely 
to get a positive outcome in welfare cases. Women are also more likely to get an outcome that 





Table 3-4. Regression results (OLS). Dependent variable: outcome of substantive benefit 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)    
 
DEBT  HOUSING WELFARE  IMMIG 
  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  
NP 0.071*** 0.127*** 0.028*** -0.022*** 
 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
Eth: -0.041*** -0.019** -0.074*** -0.043*** 
Unknown (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) 
Eth: Black -0.029*** -0.007 -0.008 -0.004 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) 
Eth: Asian -0.055*** -0.025*** -0.047*** 0.042*** 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) 
Eth: Other -0.012 0.006 -0.043*** -0.030*** 
 (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Dis: Has  0.009** -0.015*** 0.007* -0.042*** 
 disability (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) 
Dis:  -0.020*** -0.012* -0.003 -0.059*** 
 Unknown (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.003) 
Gender: F 0.014*** 0.009** 0.007** 0.061*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Gender:  -0.046 0.012 0.042 0.025 
 unknown (0.036) (0.026) (0.030) (0.022) 
Age 0.001* 0.003*** -0.001 0.002*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
time (hours) 0.024*** 0.001** 0.008*** 0.018*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
Repeated 
Case -0.017*** 0.015*** 0.009** -0.068*** 
 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
_cons 0.610*** 0.533*** 0.692*** 0.107*** 
  (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) 
n 106,574  101,801 108570 108570    
Dependent variable is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the case closes with the outcome code that the 
client is advised to plan better, 0 otherwise; Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
Results including regional controls and Logit results reported in appendix table 3.9 and 3.10. 
 




Table 3-5. Regression results (OLS). Dependent variable 'plan better'. 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
DEBT  HOUSING WELFARE  
  OLS  OLS  OLS  
NP -0.030*** 0.109*** -0.034*** 
 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Eth: 0.016 -0.001 -0.048*** 
Unknown (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) 
Eth: Black 0.007 -0.011* -0.022*** 
 (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) 
Eth: Asian 0.007 0.015* -0.038*** 
  (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) 
Eth: Other 0.108*** 0.071*** 0.030*** 
 (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) 
Dis: Has  -0.008* -0.021*** -0.081*** 
 disability (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Dis:  0.010 -0.015** -0.006 
 Unknown (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) 
Gender: F -0.013*** -0.014*** 0.003 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Gender:  0.085* 0.014 0.084** 
 unknown (0.039) (0.026) (0.028) 
Age 0.001 -0.002*** 0.002** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
time (hours) -0.027*** -0.028*** -0.029*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Repeated 
Case 0.018*** 0.013*** 0.012*** 
  (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
_cons 0.413*** 0.416*** 0.450*** 
  (0.014) (0.012)    (0.013) 
n 106,574  101,801 108570 
Dependent variable is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the case closes with the outcome code that the 
client is advised to plan better, 0 otherwise; Standard errors in parentheses; Regional controls also included; * 




3.5.4 Do NPs get different types of outcomes for clients? 
 
In the previous section, NPs and FPs get similar overall results in housing and welfare. In debt, 
NPs get better outcomes overall, and in immigration, FPs do better. The definition of positive 
outcomes used in the previous section is very broad and in this section I look in more detail at 
the specific outcomes that NP providers are achieving compared to FPs. 
 
I start with the outcome code ‘plan better’. In section 3.2.3, I set out how this has been 
described as less ‘tangible’ than some of the other outcome codes (Balmer et al. 2012). In the 
Legal Aid Handbook, produced by the Legal Action Group, they advise providers that, where 
justified by the case, they should always select the ‘plan better’ outcome rather than an 
outcome such as ‘client ceased to give instructions’ (Ling and Pugh 2011). 
 
Since the outcome code ‘plan better’ is similar, in some respects, to some of the outcomes that 
are not considered 'substantive benefit', if providers report a large number of cases closing of 
this type, this will not necessarily reflect high quality advice. The ‘plan better’ outcome is 
included in the definition of substantive benefit for debt, housing and welfare advice, but 
cannot be reported for immigration advice.  
 
Table 3.5 reports regression results with this variable as the dependent variable. This shows 
the OLS regression, similar results were obtained from a logit regression (the results for this 
are shown in appendix table 3.10 where regional controls are also shown). The rationale for 
including this as the dependent variable is it is an indicator for the amount of cases that are 
closed with the least tangible outcome code so it could be seen as a measure of ‘gameability’ 
and to see the proportion of each providers caseload that they close with this outcome.  
 
It is useful to compare the results of Table 3.4 alongside Table 3.5 to see if providers which 
seem to get a lot of cases closing with substantive benefit are only doing so because they report 
‘plan better’ often. The biggest difference in ‘plan better’ is in housing. Here, NPs report this 
outcome code more often than FPs, with a coefficient of 0.11 in the OLS and logit regressions. 
This is a large and significant difference. If this outcome code is excluded from the definition 
of 'substantive benefit', then the difference between NPs and FPs that get an outcome of 
substantive benefit narrows significantly.  
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Looking in more detail at the housing outcomes, in table 3.13 in the appendix, NPs close a very 
large share of cases with the outcome code ‘plan better’ at 35%. The other stand out features 
from table A5b is that NPs close a lot more cases with the outcome code ‘client housed, re-
housed or retains home’. Although it is difficult to put these outcomes into a hierarchy, for 
cases involving homelessness,  one could argue that preventing homelessness is the best 
outcome for clients.  
 
I cannot conclusively say this makes NPs better, because this outcome is only available for 
clients who are at risk of homelessness, and they may have taken on a bigger share of this type 
of case. If this is the reason, i.e. a selection effect, it is still the case that people, who are at 
imminent risk of homelessness, choose to go to a NP provider rather than a FP private solicitor.  
 
In debt, NPs are less likely to report ‘plan better’ than FP. Since NPs already reported better 
outcomes if ‘plan better’ is excluded from the analysis, the difference widens even more. 
However, looking in more detail at the outcomes that NPs report for debt, there are some 
important differences to those that FPs report. NPs end a lot more cases with affordable 
repayment plans. They very rarely end cases with the debt being reduced or written off. 
Although the overall  numbers of these cases are small, FPs do over double the amount of cases 
where they debt is written off, compared to NPs, even though NP providers do nearly 5 times 
as many debt cases as FPs. NPs are also more likely to apply for a bankruptcy order than FPs 
are.   
 
In Welfare, NPs are less likely to report the outcome ‘plan better’ than FPs although the size 
of the coefficient is small (-0.035 for the OLS). The welfare outcomes reported are similar for 
NPs and FPs, although NPs get more outcomes of 'substantive benefit' overall, largely driven 
by conducting more cases, in which the client receives or retains a payment.  
 
Immigration is the only area where NPs do worse on the measure ‘substantive benefit’. Looking 
at the outcome codes in table 3.15, there are several differences in the performance of NPs and 
FPs. NPs have over double the proportion of cases that end with the outcome, (that is not of 
substantive benefit) that the 'client is advised and taking action themselves' – over 20% of NP 
cases end with this outcome. This, like ‘plan better’, is a very vague outcome code, and there 




In immigration, NPs also have fewer cases closing with the outcome codes IA and IB, i.e. 
where the client is granted permission to enter, or humanitarian protection. FP providers report 
these outcomes much more often than NP providers. A regression with IA where the person is 
granted leave to enter or remain permanently, as the dependent variable, has a negative and 
statistically significant value on the NP coefficient (-0.022).  
 
Although NP providers report less cases of substantive benefit, they also report less cases that 
close with the outcome IE, which is where the application was refused. This clouds the picture 
as to whether NP providers do better or worse in the provision of immigration advice, because, 
although they report less cases with the positive outcome codes IA to ID, they also report less 
cases with this negative outcome code.  In numbers, NPs have 4322 cases, ending with the 
application being refused, whilst FPs have 7591. Although FPs undertake more immigration 
cases, this does not account for this large difference.  
 
FP providers may get more clients with applications refused, because they are more willing to 
take on cases where a positive outcome is less likely. Nonetheless, the large differences 
between the provider types indicates that a person's decision of whether they are allowed to 
remain in the UK, could be adversely affected by which type of provider they instruct or seek 
advice and representation from.  
 
3.6 Discussion of findings 
3.6.1 Client profiles of different provider types 
 
The difference between the types of clients that FPs and NPs serve, could be evidence of 
selection. This could be in one of two ways; first, that providers select particular clients, or, 
second, the clients select particular types of firms.  
 
Selection of clients by providers 
 
Selection of clients could work in one of two different ways. Providers may attempt to take on 
cases that are easier, or will take less time in a way, in an attempt to game the contract, which 
may also involve turning away clients who they think will be harder to profit from. In contrast, 
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providers (or staff that work in them) may do the exact opposite and take on what they think 
are the more challenging or difficult cases, or work with the most disadvantaged clients, if this 
is in keeping with their mission. It is also possible that they may pursue a mix of these 
strategies, selecting some easier cases, so that they can redistribute any time saved towards 
those cases that are more challenging and time consuming. Heckman et al. (1996) proposed 
that this is a strategy that bureaucrats in a job training programme may have adopted, and it is 
also a consistent strategy with a firm balancing ‘revenue’ and ‘mission’ in the way that 
Weisbrod (2004) suggested they might.  
 
The first type of selection, where providers directly select clients, is not allowed in most cases. 
The Unified Contract (and the law) is clear that discriminating against clients on the basis of 
disability, race, or gender is prohibited. The Unified Contract published by the Legal Services 
Commission (2008) states that: 
 
 ‘providers must not decline work because a potential clients disability, age or ethnic groups 
will or may result in additional costs or disbursements being incurred compared to clients 
without that disability, age or from a different ethnic origin’. 
 
However, providers do have permission to manage their mix of cases. The Unified Contract 
goes on to advise providers that they can manage their case load with the following statement;   
 
‘you should not specifically target certain sorts of clients or types of work in order to have the 
effect of maximizing cases of lower complexity. However … you may change your case mix 
within a category of law by accepting a broader range of cases, reflecting the type of cases 
arising locally in this category of Law, than previously’. 
 
As providers are able to turn clients away, with the justification that they need to balance the 
number of matters starts they take on, this could open the door for gaming. The results on time 
per case found that clients with a disability take longer than those without. Clients may be 
turned away, with the justification that it is because of  case load constraints, and so, 
consequently, there may be particular groups of clients who are systematically turned away by 
different providers. The fact that the LSC have so explicitly stated that providers cannot target 
easier cases shows they that are concerned that providers may do this. 
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It is difficult to gather evidence that monitors whether people are being turned away, and also 
to establish this is due to selection, rather than overcapacity. Moorhead et al. (2003) conducted 
an experiment where they used ‘model clients’ who had to try to book and attend appointments 
at two types of provider (lawyer verses non-lawyer) in legal aid. In practice, this has some 
parallels between non-profit and for-profit firms, as non-lawyer firms are often, but not always, 
non-profit. They found non-lawyer firms were more likely to have some access problems. 
Although, overall, the problems were less serious than with private solicitor firms. So, whilst 
many people who tried to access a non-lawyer firms were delayed in some way (42% of visits) 
all those who tried, were able to see an adviser.  However, in some cases ‘only after 
considerable persistence on the part of the model client.’ With private solicitors, although 
problems occurred in less of the visits (only 15%), in some of these, access was denied totally 
(rather than just delayed). This could be interpreted as non-lawyer firms being ineffective, or 
it could be a screening device to identify those clients, who are more willing to wait, and, 
therefore, targeting a rationed service on the clients most in need of support.  
 
Selection of providers by clients 
 
One of the assumptions in the increasing use of competition in the public sector, is that users 
can choose the type of service that best suits them. This assumes that they have clear 
preferences between different providers, and are able to make informed choices. In legal aid, 
this assumption may not hold since ‘the decision to seek advice and the choice of provider is 
far from obvious’ (Patel et al., 2008). 
 
Many people have a lack of knowledge about the advice services that are available to them, or 
even that they are able to get any sort of help. Research by Balmer et al. (2010) found that 
people who were more affluent and educated were more likely to be aware of their legal rights. 
They found that people, who reported having mental health problems, were less likely to be 
aware of their legal rights. They found that knowledge of rights affected which type of provider 
they accessed. Respondents who did not know their rights were less likely to access solicitors 
firms, and people who did not know their rights were more likely to access a CAB. 
 
Patel et al. (2008) also found there was a lack of legal knowledge among survey respondents. 
They found only 65% of people who had an advisor located within two miles of their home 
were able to identify this fact. The exception seems to be with the CAB who were very well 
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recognised. Many people thought that they lived near a CAB, even when this was not the case. 
Patel et al. (2008) suggest that this may indicate a degree of brand recognition, leading to an 
assumption such a service exists everywhere.   
 
On the one hand, NPs, may be providing a valuable and important service, if they are able to 
give advice to people, who were not aware of their rights and would not have accessed a service 
at all, had they not come across the NP provider in an outreach location. In this sense, they may 
have a role that Grabowski and Hirth (2003) identify in medical care, where they allow poorly 
informed consumers to use NP status, as a signal of quality, whereas better informed consumers 
can sort into the FP market. Challenges are raised, however, if the advice is different in 
substance to that which they would have got if they had gone to a FP solicitors firm.  There are 
some equity concerns in that if going to a local provider means a person is less likely to get a 
debt written off, or obtain a grant of leave to remain in  an immigration claim than if they went 
to a FP solicitor. Very little is known about the preferences of people, and whether they are 
proactively choosing a NP firm, or if they are just going to the only place they have heard of. 
This does somewhat violate one of the assumptions at the heart of the White Paper, which is 
that people are offered choice or are choosing the type of provider that will give them the best 
service. 
 
In practice, it seems more likely, that rather than FP providers deliberately selecting clients 
who do not  have a disability, it is more to do with the process of NPs operating in ways, which 
makes it more likely that people with a disability select them.  The location of NP advice 
services, the fact they are often located in more deprived communities, and offer services in 
outreach locations such as GPs surgeries, is likely to be one of the reasons for more people 
with a disability using their services. 
 
NP providers are also more likely to have a more diverse workforce, although it is unclear if 
this has any impact on how clients make decisions about which type of firm to go to. The Legal 
Services Research Centre (2009; 2011) used to carry out routine monitoring of the supplier 
base. The 2009 report found that NP providers had a slightly higher proportion of firms with 
BME managerial control (16%) compared to FPs (11%). For NPs, this represented an increase 
compared to previous years, but for FP solicitors firms this was a decrease. This may reflect 
the concerns set out above that a large number of private solicitors firms were exiting the 
marketplace, and many of these will be firms with high proportion of BME staff.  
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The 2011 survey found that FP solicitor’s offices were less likely to have BME solicitor fee 
earners (58% of private solicitors office contained no BME paid staff compared to 45.8% of 
NPs). There was a similar pattern with disability, with only 5.2% of FP solicitors having one 
of more disabled fee earner compared to 21.2% of NPs. In addition, 31.7% of NPs had at least 
one or more long-term ill or disabled volunteer. It may be the case that this affects the selection 
decisions of clients, who may, consciously or otherwise, end up selecting a provider where 
staff share their demographics.  
 
In terms of ethnicity, NP providers have fewer cases with people from an ethnic minority than 
FP providers, although they employ more BME fee earners compared to FPs. One of the major 
concerns about the reforms to legal aid, was the impact on BME firms and clients. A report by 
the House of Commons Constitutional Affairs Committee (2007) dedicated a chapter to this 
issue and argued that the reform proposals would affect BME-controlled legal aid providers, 
more significantly than other providers. This report cited evidence that there appears to be a 
strong relationship between the ethnicity of managerial control and client ethnicity, with 30.1% 
of civil BME clients being aided by BME majority managed provider, and 93.3% of White 
British clients being assisted by White British managed providers.  
 
It is not clear if the reason for these correlations is because BME clients seek out firms managed 
by BME staff, or if it is because of other variables, such as the geographical locations of 
different firms (Grindley, 2006). There are more BME run firms and also clients in large urban 
centres, so it may be that BME clients are going to their nearest provider, not selecting the 
provider based on the ethnicity of their staff. This certainly seems to be the case with Housing. 
In Chapter 3, I look at when adding in a control for the urban classification of the provider 
eliminates the difference between NP and FP providers of housing advice, but this issue 
warrants more investigation to see if the same holds for other advice areas.  
 
3.6.2 Time and quality of different provider types 
 
 
The result that NP providers do not take longer for most types of advice is surprising and does 
not seem to fit with the 'incomplete contracts' theory that FPs have a stronger incentive to cut 
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costs and increase profitability. NPs do take longer to deliver debt advice, but they take a lot 
less time to deliver immigration advice; the difference is very large. It is also interesting 
because, in the period prior to the reform, it was observed that NPs take a lot longer than FPs 
(Lord Carter, 2006) in welfare and it was thought that this could be to do with something 
distinctive about NP providers. The fact that such changes were eliminated with the contract 
changes, suggests it was more to do with the funding structure, than anything about the 
organisational form.  
 
It is possible that providers do not reliably report the true time spent per case and this may 
differ between provider types. A report published by the Ministry of Justice (2009) found that 
some advisers, in both Law Centres and Citizens Advice Bureaux, did not feel like it was worth 
recording the accurate time spent per case since, unless it reached the exceptional threshold, it 
would only be paid at the fixed fee. Both these providers are NPs, this may indicate that the 
amount of time they report spending does not fully reflect the full costs to the organisations of 
these cases.  
 
Time, by itself, as a measure is not an ambiguously good or bad indicator. If providers are able 
to reduce the amount of time on a case, but get better outcomes, then it could be considered 
good to reduce time per case. However, if time is short and outcomes are bad, as seems to the 
case with how NPs deliver immigration advice, then, this is a cause for concern.   
 
In debt, NP providers spend longer per case, but they do also get better outcomes on aggregate 
than FPs. In the field of legal aid, some have argued that in most cases spending more time on 
a case, is necessary, for delivering quality advice (see Social Action 2009 and Trude and Gibbs 
2010). This can end up being better value for money, because it means the adviser will be able 
to spend more time gathering accurate information, and, therefore, get a better result. Social 
Action (2009) also argue that some users have a preference for advisers who are able to take 
the time to listen and explain, and also show empathy and sympathy.  
 
Although NPs get better overall outcomes for debt advice, the differences in the type of 
outcomes they achieve for clients, highlights some distinctions between the two providers. The 
lower number of cases closed by NPs with the debt being reduced or written off is consistent 
with research by Moorhead et al. (2003), that non-lawyer firms are more likely to take an 
approach, such as helping clients manage debt, rather than take a more adversarial approach 
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and attempt to get that debt written off. Most people would consider that getting a debt written 
off or reduced is preferable for a client, compared to arranging to repay that debt.  
 
Moorhead et al. (2003) suggest that firms may be less likely to take on these adversarial cases, 
because of either their lack of expertise or tighter controls on the legal aid cost they can incur 
under contracts. Debt advice is an area largely dominated by Citizen’s Advice Bureau. Hynes 
(2012) cites an interview with an experienced member of CAB staff, who said that a frequent 
problem with training volunteer and paid advisers in their Bureau, was that they sometimes did 
not advise clients on a legal solution. Hynes (2012) argues that ‘this can mean that clients are 
let down if they are not referred to a service that provides litigation in court’.  
 
In housing and welfare, NPs get unambiguously better outcomes than FPs. Unlike in debt, 
where NPs achieved fewer of the outcomes that were better, such as getting a debt written off, 
in housing NPs get a higher proportion of the most tangible outcomes, where the client is either 
housed or retains their home. In welfare, NPs also get a large number of cases ending where 
the client receives some kind of payment. This is consistent with the work by Moorhead et al. 
(2003) who found that welfare cases were different to debt cases, because non-lawyer agencies 
were more likely to take on adversarial cases and challenge a benefits decision in comparison 
to FPs (56% compared to 28% of solicitors). In welfare and housing, NPs get better outcomes 
and they also take the same or less time than their FP counterparts. For these cases it is easier 
to make the case that they can be considered more ‘productive’ than NP providers. 
 
The picture is completely different in immigration, where NP advisers spend a lot less time, 
and get worse outcomes than FPs. The link between the amount of time spent per case in 
immigration, is consistent with research on asylum cases, where a greater time spent on the 
case, led to both higher quality outcomes for clients and better value in the longer term because 
there were fewer (costly) appeals (Trude and Gibbs 2010). For these cases it is clear that NP 
providers are lower quality, but harder to make claims about productivity. FP firms are higher 
quality but take a lot longer time to achieve these better outcomes.  
 
The reason for these different outcomes across areas could be due to the different specialisms 
of the different firms. NP providers were often set up with a mission of helping people with 
problems in debt, housing and welfare. In contrast, FP firms would be more likely to talk on 
work that complements their private practice. FP firms would also have a portfolio of private 
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immigration cases and so may have more experience and expertise on these type of cases. It is 
also possible that some NP firms may not be accredited to the same level of work in 
immigration advice and may not be permitted to appeal cases where a person’s application was 
refused. 
 
One of the other surprising features about immigration cases, is that NPs are less likely to refer 
cases on, or proceed the matter under further funding compared to FPs. If they have a lack of 
expertise in an area, this can be mitigated by better cross working between providers, who can 
focus on the cases where they have a specialism. It had been a major focus of previous policy 
around legal aid for providers to work within networks, and there is a question whether 
competitive tendering has threatened this.  
 
It is important to reiterate that all the analysis on outcomes is on those aspects of the service 
that can be given an outcomes code and measured in the contract. I have no information about 
the longer-term outcomes of the advice. In addition, as outlined in Section 3.3, many NP 
organisations are engaged in a wide range of other activities, such as policy work, public legal 
education and campaigns, and I do not consider the outcomes from any of this work in this 
study. It could even be consistent with the ‘mission’ model of service delivery that a NP 
provider may end up putting less effort or resources into the work funded through these 
contracts in order to do other activities that are core to their mission or take on clients not 





In this paper I find that NPs have a number of distinctive features in comparison to FP firms. 
The first is that they serve a different base, and consistent with theories that they have a distinct 
‘mission’ to deliver in more community settings, they have more clients with a reported 
disability. They have less clients from BME backgrounds, but this difference is explained by 
their location in more rural areas than FPs who are located in more urban areas.  
 
I do not find consistent support for the theory that NPs are higher quality. In welfare and 
housing, they arrive at better outcomes, and contrary to predictions, take around the same time 
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to finish cases. In debt, they take longer, and although they get better outcomes on aggregate, 
this hides substantial differences within the cases. In immigration, they spend a lot less time 
per case than FPs, and close less cases with positive outcomes for clients.  
 
The finding that NPs do not spend more time than FPs overall is important, because prior to 
the fixed fee system being introduced, they did spend longer. This was seen as a distinctive 
feature of their service and could have indicated higher quality. As this reduced when the 
funding was brought into line with FPs, it suggests the difference was driven by the more 
generous funding mechanism NPs had available to them, rather than anything distinctive about 
the organisational form.  
 
In this study, it seems to be the case that NPs have a similar role, as described by Grabowski 
and Hirth (2003), where they are located in areas, in which they serve more disadvantaged 
clients. It does raise concerns that in some areas of advice, the quality or type of advice, is 
different to FP solicitors and a better situation would be if more collaboration between 
providers was encouraged. It is not clear that clients are making choices about where to get 
advice in the informed way that the aspirations of the Open Public Services White Paper (HM 
Government 2011) set out.  Many people are not aware they could go to a private solicitors and 
will often go to a NP organisation, because they are the only provider they are aware of (Patel 
et al. 2008). If they had more information, for example, that their debts may be more likely to 
be written off if they went to a FP firm, they may make different choices. There may also be 
some wider reaching positive spillovers from FP delivery of legal aid, in that, if they are more 
likely to successfully challenge debts, they may provide discouragement to the sort of predatory 
lending practices that are widespread today. 
 
The research also raises some concerns about the use of volunteers. It is generally assumed that 
it is a benefit if NP organisations can use donated labour and volunteers to deliver the service. 
This may reduce quality if the volunteers are not as skilled or have a different skill set to a 
solicitor. It is also a distinction that may narrow over time, as there has also been a growth in 
non-lawyer services in the private sector as well (Hynes and Robbins 2009), with some 
solicitors well known for making greater use of non-solicitor staff, for example, using a large 
number of paralegals supervised by solicitors. There is currently a major drive to encourage 
more firms who are partly or wholly owned or controlled by non-lawyers to provide legal 
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services (Ministry of Justice 2016) which has been motivated by a policy drive to make markets 






3.8 Appendix to chapter 3 
 
 
Table 3-6. All categories of legal aid by provider type 
Case Type 
% of total 
done by NP 
% of NP 
cases 




% of all 
cases 
Against the police 0.17 0.00 0.86 4215 0.54 
Clinical negligence 0.00 0.00 1 3202 0 
Community care 25.78 0.63 1 7016 1 
Consumer 9.47 0.10 1 3041 0 
Debt 82.63 30.54 4 106710 14 
Education 34.92 0.20 0 1681 0 
Employment 60.39 3.10 1 14808 2 
Family 0.98 0.87 52 256506 33 
Housing 48.99 17.35 11 102249 13 
Immigration 42.64 18.01 14 121950 16 
Mental health 0.46 0.06 8 37716 5 
Miscellaneous 3.22 0.05 1 4165 1 
Personal injury 0.35 0.00 0 1697 0 
Public law 1.38 0.01 0 1596 0 
Welfare benefits 77.23 29.09 5 108776 14 
Total 
 






Table 3-7. Legal aid providers by region, including those no contract 





Contract Total NP No 
Contract 
Contract Total FP 
         
Birmingham 163 35 198 16 382 398 596 33 
Brighton 151 36 187 27 286 313 500 37 
Bristol 227 54 281 24 366 390 671 42 
Cambridge 161 41 202 25 320 345 547 37 
Cardiff 126 33 159 5 278 283 442 36 
Leeds 217 52 269 18 393 411 680 40 
Liverpool 38 24 62 8 89 97 159 39 
London 340 83 421 62 839 901 1322 32 
Manchester 169 59 228 4 469 473 701 33 
Newcastle 69 26 95 10 235 245 340 28 
Nottingham 163 24 187 14 224 238 425 44 
Reading 103 17 120 7 160 167 287 42 
          






Table 3-8. Regression results (LOGIT). Dependent variable: NP provider.  
 (1) (2) (3)    (4)    
 
DEBT HOUSING  WELFARE IMMIG 
  LOGIT  LOGIT  LOGIT  LOGIT  
Eth: -0.156*** -0.248*** -0.035*** 0.548*** 
Unknown (0.005) (0.009)    (0.006) (0.011)    
Eth: Black 0.015** -0.009    -0.032*** -0.135*** 
  (0.005) (0.005)    (0.004) (0.009)    
Eth: Asian -0.009 0.016*   -0.009* -0.035*** 
 (0.005) (0.007)    (0.004) (0.009)    
Eth: Other -0.049*** -0.038*** -0.121*** 0.075*** 
  (0.006) (0.007)    (0.005) (0.009)    
Dis: Has  0.040*** 0.084*** 0.085*** 0.036*** 
 disability (0.003) (0.004)    (0.003) (0.010)    
Dis:  -0.194*** -0.305*** -0.219*** 0.067*** 
 Unknown (0.004) (0.006)    (0.005) (0.005)    
Gender: F 0.001 -0.007*   0.000 0.090*** 
 (0.002) (0.004)    (0.002) (0.004)    
Gender:  0.161*** 0.230*** 0.132*** 0.201*** 
 unknown (0.040) (0.034)    (0.027) (0.030)    
Age -0.003*** -0.006*** -0.004*** 0.008*** 
 (0.000) (0.001)    (0.001) (0.001)    
Age sq 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000*** 
  (0.000) (0.000)    (0.000) (0.000)    
Birmingham 0.161*** 0.091*** 0.098*** 0.292*** 
 (0.005) (0.007)    (0.005) (0.006)    
Brighton 0.106*** 0.273*** 0.169*** 0.225*** 
  (0.006) (0.007)    (0.008) (0.013)    
Bristol 0.148*** 0.306*** 0.176*** 0.141*** 
 (0.005) (0.007)    (0.006) (0.013)    
Cambridge 0.128*** 0.297*** 0.216*** 0.849*** 
  (0.005) (0.008)    (0.007) (0.017)    
Cardiff -0.051*** 0.339*** 0.052*** 0.085*** 
 (0.005) (0.008)    (0.005) (0.008)    
Chester 0.456*** 0.000    0.811*** 0.000    
  (0.049) (.)    (0.146) (.)    
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Leeds 0.003 0.117*** 0.013* 0.245*** 
 (0.005) (0.007)    (0.005) (0.005)    
Liverpool -0.047*** 0.130*** -0.184*** 0.000    
  (0.005) (0.009)    (0.004) (.)    
Manch 0.062*** 0.355*** 0.135*** 0.780*** 
 (0.004) (0.007)    (0.005) (0.010)    
Newcastle 0.003 0.092*** 0.069*** -0.550*** 
  (0.005) (0.008)    (0.006) (0.018)    
Nott 0.108*** 0.397*** 0.249*** -0.028*   
 (0.006) (0.010)    (0.009) (0.014)    
Reading 0.014* 0.236*** 0.290*** -0.593*** 
  (0.006) (0.009)    (0.011) (0.029)    
n  106,575 101,802  108,570 110,274 
 
Dependent variable is dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the provider is NP, 0 otherwise; the 
results show logit regressions with the margins at the means. Standard errors in parentheses 







Table 3-9. Regression results for debt and housing (LOGIT). Dependent variable: outcome 
 
DEBT  HOUSING 
  (1) OLS  (2) LOGIT  (3) OLS  (4) LOGIT  
NP 0.071*** 0.058*** 0.127*** 0.130*** 
 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)    
Eth: -0.041*** -0.035*** -0.019** -0.018**  
Unknown (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)    
Eth: Black -0.029*** -0.028*** -0.007 -0.007    
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)    
Eth: Asian -0.055*** -0.051*** -0.025*** -0.024*** 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)    
Eth: Other -0.012 -0.011 0.006 0.005    
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006)    
Dis: Has  0.009** 0.009** -0.015*** -0.016*** 
 disability (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)    
Dis:  -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.012* -0.011*   
 Unknown (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)    
Gender: F 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.009** 0.009**  
  (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)    
Gender:  -0.046 -0.032 0.012 0.010    
 unknown (0.036) (0.033) (0.026) (0.026)    
Age 0.001* 0.001 0.003*** 0.003*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)    
Age sq 0.000 0.000 -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
Birmingham -0.032*** -0.033*** 0.087*** 0.083*** 
  (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)    
Brighton -0.022** -0.022** 0.083*** 0.081*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)    
Bristol 0.009 0.011 0.098*** 0.098*** 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)    
Cambridge -0.068*** -0.062*** -0.031*** -0.033*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006)    
Cardiff -0.021*** -0.019** 0.050*** 0.044*** 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)    
Leeds 0.016* 0.018** 0.099*** 0.097*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)    
Liverpool -0.054*** -0.051*** 0.060*** 0.056*** 
  (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)    
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Manch -0.015** -0.014** 0.060*** 0.056*** 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)    
Newcastle 0.008 0.010 0.127*** 0.129*** 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008)    
Nott 0.002 0.005 0.101*** 0.102*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)    
Reading -0.003 -0.003 0.106*** 0.106*** 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)    
time (hours) 0.024*** 0.029*** 0.001** 0.002**  
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)    
Repeat Case -0.017*** -0.015*** 0.015*** 0.016*** 
 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)    






n 106,574 106,574  101,801  101,801 
Dependent variable is the outcome, which is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the case closes with an 
outcome of substantive benefit to the client. Columns (1) and (3) reports OLS coefficients and columns (2) and 
(4) reports the margins at the means after a Logit regression.  Standard errors in parentheses * p<0.05, ** 









Table 3-10 Regression results for welfare and immigration (LOGIT). Dependent variable: 
outcome 
 
(1) (2)    (3) (4)    
 
WELFARE  WELFARE IMMIG IMMIG 
  OLS  LOGIT  OLS  LOGIT  
NP 0.028*** 0.027*** -0.022*** -0.020*** 
 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)    
Eth: -0.074*** -0.070*** -0.043*** -0.058*** 
Unknown (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)    
Eth: Black -0.008 -0.008 -0.004 -0.005    
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)    
Eth: Asian -0.047*** -0.046*** 0.042*** 0.038*** 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007)    
Eth: Other -0.043*** -0.042*** -0.030*** -0.032*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)    
Dis: Has  0.007* 0.007* -0.042*** -0.043*** 
 disability (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007)    
Dis:  -0.003 -0.003 -0.059*** -0.063*** 
 Unknown (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004)    
Gender: F 0.007** 0.007** 0.061*** 0.062*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)    
Gender:  0.042 0.041 0.025 0.023    
 unknown (0.030) (0.030) (0.022) (0.024)    
Age -0.001 -0.001* 0.002*** 0.003*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)    
Age sq 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000 -0.000    
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
Birmingham -0.073*** -0.070*** 0.083*** 0.080*** 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)    
Brighton -0.008 -0.007 0.040*** 0.043*** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)    
Bristol 0.027*** 0.032*** 0.037*** 0.036*** 
  (0.006) (0.007) (0.011) (0.010)    
Cambridge -0.011 -0.011 0.023*** 0.022**  
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008)    
Cardiff -0.046*** -0.045*** -0.023*** -0.026*** 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)    
Leeds 0.025*** 0.029*** -0.011* -0.011*   
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.005)    
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Liverpool -0.083*** -0.079*** -0.022* -0.022*   
  (0.006) (0.005) (0.010) (0.010)    
Manch -0.045*** -0.045*** 0.011 0.012*   
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)    
Newcastle -0.035*** -0.035*** 0.023*** 0.025*** 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)    
Nott 0.024*** 0.028*** -0.001 -0.001    
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.011)    
Reading 0.016* 0.019* 0.103*** 0.097*** 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.010)    
time (hours) 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.018*** 0.017*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)    
Repeat Case 0.009** 0.009** -0.068*** -0.074*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)    






n 108570 108570    112336 112336    
Dependent variable is the outcome, which is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the case closes with an 
outcome of substantive benefit to the client. Columns (1) and (3) reports OLS coefficients and columns (2) and 








Table 3-11. Regression results (LOGIT). Dependent variable 'plan better' 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)    
 
DEBT  DEBT HOUSING HOUSING  WELFARE  WELFARE 
  OLS  LOGIT  OLS  LOGIT  OLS  LOGIT  
NP -0.030*** -0.026*** 0.109*** 0.112*** -0.034*** -0.037*** 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)    (0.003) (0.003)    
Eth: 0.016 0.013 -0.001 -0.007    -0.048*** -0.051*** 
Unknown (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007)    (0.007) (0.007)    
Eth: Black 0.007 0.007 -0.011* -0.011*   -0.022*** -0.021*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005)    (0.005) (0.005)    
Eth: Asian 0.007 0.007 0.015* 0.015*   -0.038*** -0.038*** 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)    (0.005) (0.005)    
Eth: Other 0.108*** 0.093*** 0.071*** 0.066*** 0.030*** 0.023*** 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006)    (0.006) (0.005)    
Dis: Has  -0.008* -0.008* -0.021*** -0.018*** -0.081*** -0.072*** 
 disability (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)    (0.003) (0.003)    
Dis:  0.010 0.010 -0.015** -0.013*   -0.006 -0.001    
 Unknown (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)    (0.006) (0.005)    
Gender: F -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.014*** -0.014*** 0.003 0.004    
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)    (0.003) (0.003)    
Gender:  0.085* 0.066 0.014 -0.004    0.084** 0.062*   
 unknown (0.039) (0.036) (0.026) (0.027)    (0.028) (0.026)    
Age 0.001 0.001 -0.002*** -0.002*** 0.002** 0.002**  
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)    (0.001) (0.001)    
Age sq -0.000* -0.000* 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000* -0.000**  
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    (0.000) (0.000)    
Birmingham -0.048*** -0.045*** -0.114*** -0.120*** -0.096*** -0.093*** 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)    (0.005) (0.005)    
Brighton -0.006 -0.003 0.030*** 0.024*** -0.032*** -0.026*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)    (0.007) (0.007)    
Bristol -0.027*** -0.024*** -0.015* -0.014*   -0.027*** -0.023*** 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)    (0.006) (0.006)    
Cambridge -0.067*** -0.067*** -0.051*** -0.052*** 0.050*** 0.039*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)    (0.006) (0.005)    
Cardiff -0.056*** -0.054*** -0.229*** -0.269*** -0.096*** -0.092*** 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008)    (0.006) (0.006)    
Leeds 0.014* 0.016* -0.067*** -0.064*** -0.050*** -0.044*** 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)    (0.006) (0.006)    
Liverpool -0.128*** -0.139*** -0.158*** -0.168*** -0.232*** -0.284*** 
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 (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)    (0.005) (0.007)    
Manch -0.032*** -0.029*** -0.062*** -0.062*** -0.059*** -0.055*** 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)    (0.005) (0.005)    
Newcastle -0.073*** -0.073*** -0.052*** -0.048*** -0.089*** -0.086*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)    (0.006) (0.007)    
Nott 0.018** 0.020** -0.031*** -0.030*** -0.093*** -0.088*** 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)    (0.007) (0.007)    
Reading 0.030*** 0.031*** 0.053*** 0.049*** 0.034*** 0.028*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)    (0.008) (0.007)    
time (hours) -0.027*** -0.032*** -0.028*** -0.037*** -0.029*** -0.038*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)    (0.001) (0.001)    
Repeated 
Case 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.011*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)    (0.003) (0.003)    
_cons 0.413*** 
 
0.416***                 0.450***                 
  (0.014) 
 
(0.012)    
 
(0.013)            
n 106,574 106,574  101,801  101,801 108570 108570    
Dependent variable is the outcome, which is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the case closes with the 
outcome the client is advised and able to ‘plan better’, 0 otherwise. Columns (1) and (3) and (5) reports OLS 
coefficients and columns (2) and (4) and (6) reports the margins at the means after a Logit regression.  Standard 







Table 3-12. Debt outcome codes by provider type 
Outcome Code % of cases 
with this 
outcome 
done by NP 
% of NP 
cases 
% of FP 
cases 
% Overall 
DA-Liability contested successfully 42.18 0.83 5.42 1.63 
DB-Debt written off (rather than just 
reduced 
67.68 1.75 3.98 2.14 
DC-Debt reduced 75.77 1.60 2.44 1.74 
DD-Affordable payment arrangements 
negotiated 
88.72 37.26 22.59 34.71 
DE-Admin order made 88.41 0.48 0.30 0.45 
DF-Client referred for IVA 79.38 0.17 0.22 0.18 
DG-Bankruptcy order made 88.75 8.08 4.88 7.53 
DH-Client advised and able to plan and/or 
manage their affairs better 
80.19 26.23 30.91 27.04 
DI-Matter concluded otherwise 69.98 3.40 6.96 4.02 
DJ-Debt Relief Orders Made 98.16 3.80 0.34 3.20 
DU-Matter stopped on advisor's rec 76.86 1.61 2.32 1.74 
DV-Matter proceeded under other CLS 
Funding 
27.25 0.13 1.71 0.41 
DW-Client referred to another 
organisation 
76.56 0.65 0.95 0.70 
DX-Client advised and taking action 
themselves or with the help of a third party 
82.14 3.71 3.85 3.74 
DY-Client advised and third-party action 
or decision awaited 
76.98 0.77 1.10 0.83 
DZ-Outcome not known/client ceased to 
give instructions 
79.03 9.50 12.02 9.94 
Total 82.67 100.00 100.00 100.00 















































Outcome Code % of cases with 
this outcome 








HA-Client receives damages or property 31.69 0.62 1.28 0.95 
HB-Client receives new or increased 
periodical payment 
66.00 1.98 0.98 1.47 
HC-HA and HB 53.27 0.54 0.45 0.50 
HD-Sum owed by client to a third party is 
reduced or is less than claimed 
53.21 1.16 0.98 1.07 
HE-Liability of client to make regular 
payments is reduced or is less than claimed 
63.93 1.00 0.54 0.77 
HF-Client housed, re-housed or retains home 58.24 32.27 22.27 27.17 
HG-Repairs or improvements to the client's 
home 
36.56 1.57 2.63 2.11 
HH-Opponent/other party action benefits 
client 
32.06 1.72 3.52 2.64 
HI-Opponent/other party action prevented 31.08 1.38 2.95 2.18 
HJ-Opponent/other party action delayed 41.95 1.41 1.88 1.65 
HK-Client secures explanation or apology 18.39 0.67 2.85 1.78 
HL-Client advised and enabled to plan 
and/or manage their affairs better 
57.70 34.19 24.12 29.06 
HM-Matter concluded otherwise 43.23 4.56 5.76 5.17 
HU-Matter stopped on advisor's rec 37.70 1.24 1.98 1.62 
HV-Matter proceeded under other CLS 
Funding 
13.82 2.16 12.94 7.65 
HW-Client referred to another organisation 64.94 1.05 0.55 0.80 
HX-Client advised and taking action 
themselves or with help of a third party 
52.05 3.97 3.52 3.74 
HY-Client advised and third-party action or 
decision awaited 
59.65 1.10 0.72 0.91 
HZ-Outcome not known/client ceased to 
give instructions 
41.39 7.39 10.07 8.76 





Table 3-14. Welfare outcome codes by provider type 









% of NP 
cases 
% of FP 
cases 
% Overall 
WA-Client receives/retains lump sum 74.17 5.72 6.77 5.96 
WB-Client receives continuing, 
increased or new periodical payment 
78.26 21.30 20.11 21.03 
WC-Client receives/retains both a lump 
or periodical payment 
84.23 18.20 11.58 16.69 
WD-Sum owed by client to a third party 
is reduced or is less than that originally 
claimed 
77.02 2.40 2.43 2.40 
WE-Liability of client to make regular 
payments is reduced 
64.95 0.56 1.02 0.66 
WF-Client advised and able to plan 
and/or manage their affairs better 
76.09 25.63 27.36 26.02 
WG-Matter concluded otherwise 72.52 10.21 13.15 10.88 
WU-Matter stopped on advisor's rec 77.55 3.31 3.25 3.29 
WV-Matter proceeded under other CLS 
Funding 
57.58 0.11 0.28 0.15 
WW-Client referred to another 
organisation 
82.35 0.53 0.39 0.50 
WX-Client advised and taking action 
themselves or with the help of a third 
party 
80.02 2.45 2.07 2.36 
WY-Client advised and third-party action 
or decision awaited 
67.04 1.08 1.81 1.25 
WZ-Outcome not known/client ceased to 
give instructions 
74.72 8.50 9.77 8.79 
Total 77.26 100.00 100.00  
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Table adapted from: Legal Aid Agency (2018)	
  




% of NP 
cases 
% of FP 
cases 
% Overall 
IA-Client Granted Permission to 
Enter/Remain Permanently 
36.28 8.97 11.84 10.60 
IB-Client Granted Humanitarian 
Protection or Discretionary Leave to 
Enter/Remain 
31.94 1.59 2.54 2.13 
IC-Case Results in Grant of Other 
permission to Enter/Remain for a 
Defined Period 
42.56 11.69 11.86 11.79 
ID-Citizenship gained 37.56 1.07 1.33 1.22 
IE-Application refused 35.47 8.45 11.56 10.22 
IF-Matter concluded otherwise 43.77 5.71 5.51 5.60 
IG-Decision Withdrawn 26.32 0.37 0.78 0.61 
IU-Matter Stopped on Advisors Rec 35.60 5.71 7.77 6.89 
IV-Matter proceeded under other CLS 
Funding 
15.20 0.48 2.02 1.36 
IW-Client Referred/Transferred to 
Another organisation 
33.65 3.06 4.53 3.90 
IX-Client advised and taking action 
themselves 
67.64 20.55 7.39 13.04 
IY-Client advised and third-party action 
or decision Awaited 
34.56 1.56 2.23 1.94 
IZ-Outcome not known/client ceased to 
give instructions 
53.25 15.10 9.97 12.17 
Unknown 26.32 0.01 0.02 0.02 
Double Dash 36.35 15.68 20.65 18.52 
Total 42.91 100.00 100.00 100.00 











In the UK, and other countries, politicians have encouraged charities to deliver services, on 
behalf of the state, based on a belief that they are higher quality or have some distinctive 
features. This paper adds to the evidence base on whether they do have any distinctive features, 
and if so, whether such features can be maintained when they are funded through contracts. I 
use a large dataset from the Ministry of Justice to shed light on what happens when NPs 
compete against FPs to deliver a service in the same funding environment. I find some support 
for the theory that NPs are higher quality, as they close more cases with substantive benefit to 
clients and this difference is maintained over the contracting period. On other measures there 
is convergence between NPs and FPs such as the time allocated per case. I find some evidence 






Since the 1980s, in the UK and other countries, there have been efforts to move away from the 
‘traditional’ model of centralised public service provision by the state, which has been 
criticised for being inefficient and failing to offer adequate choice to those who use the service 
(Besley and Ghatak 2003). In the UK a major aim of the 2010 to 2015 Coalition Government, 
was to use competition to ‘open up’ the delivery of public services to more non-profit or 
charitable organisations, as well as private enterprises (Cabinet Office 2011; 2014). This has 
changed the relationship that many charities have with the state as they take on a new role as a 
service provider. It has also introduced many charities, who have traditionally been funded 
through grants, to the sort of price competition that is common in the private sector.  
 
In theory there are a range of benefits that NPs can bring to service delivery, including being 
higher quality (Hansmann 1980; Glaeser and Shleifer 2001), more innovative and responsive 
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to local need, having a distinct social mission (Weisbrod 2004), and being better able to harness 
the efforts of a pro-socially motivated workforce (Francois 2003). There are other theories that 
argue the benefits of non-profits have been overstated (Malani and Choi 2004).  Even authors 
who do think that NPs will have distinctive features, have cast some doubt, as to whether these 
can be maintained, when they have to compete with FPs to deliver contracts.  
 
Sloan (2000) argues increased competition in hospitals will narrow the differences between 
NPs and FPs as the competition limits the potential NPs will have to produce outputs ‘they 
deem to be socially worthy’. In some other service areas there is evidence of convergence 
between provider types (Gruber 1994; Kapur and Weisbrod 2000). There are other theories 
that suggest that NPs will fare well in competition. For example, Besley and Ghatak (2005), 
argue that competition can aid the process of matching the mission between staff and managers. 
Lakdawalla and Philipson (2006), argue that NP providers will have a cost advantage over FP 
providers, as they can draw on donated labour or grants. A different approach is offered by 
Grabowski and Hirth (2003), who argue that the benefits of NP provision, is not something that 
should be viewed in the outcomes achieved by individual NP providers, but, the positive 
spillover effects they have on the market place as a whole.  
 
The contribution of this paper is twofold. Firstly, it adds to the empirical evidence on the 
differences between how NP and FP providers deliver services. I use a large and unique 
administrative dataset on the delivery of Legal Aid services. This is a service area that is 
delivered by a combination of For-Profit (FP) solicitors firms, and charities or Non-Profit (NP) 
providers.  
 
The second contribution, is to explore whether these differences between providers are 
maintained in a more competitive environment. In this paper, I exploit two large changes in the 
funding of legal services, in order to look at whether differences between NPs and FPs continue 
to persist, since providers are put under more cost pressures and encouraged to compete against 
each other to win contracts. The issues that arise in developing contracts for legal aid, an area 
where quality is important but hard to observe, apply to many other public services.   
 
Legal Aid is an area that has not received very much attention from academics, who for the 
most part have focused on public services, such as health and education (Economidies et al.  
1986). It has, however, received a significant amount of government scrutiny. The Ministry of 
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Justice (2011), reported that there have been over 30 separate consultations into various aspects 
of legal aid over the last 5 years. While this is infuriating for practitioners, the constant changes 
to the funding of legal aid provide ample opportunities for research purposes. In this paper, I 
examine the effects of the efforts to streamline the contracts for all providers of legal aid. I 
discussed more details in Chapter 3 about the type of providers that deliver legal aid.   I continue 
to use the same abbreviations  whereby FP indicates for-profit firms (solicitors) and NP is used 
for any not-for-profit organisation. There are three time periods; in the first, they were funded 
differently; and in the second and third, they faced identical conditions.  
 
The methodology used firstly compares the performance of NP and FP providers, in each of 
the three time periods identified above, in housing legal aid. The providers are compared along 
two main dimensions (1) time taken per case, and (2) the outcomes achieved for clients. Within 
these two categories, I also identify some measures, which could indicate that providers are 
‘gaming’ contracts. The two measures I use that could indicate gaming are (1) spending very 
short amount of time on a case, and (2) reporting the outcome code that has the least ‘tangible’ 
benefits to the client (Balmer et al. 2012). 
 
For the difference between Period 0 and Period 1 I am using a difference-in-difference, where 
only one group is assumed to be treated, this is NPs who start having fixed fees for the first 
time. FPs are the control group in this case. For the changes to the contracts between Period 1 
and 2 I am using heterogenous treatments analysis. The method used is to compare the same 
treatment (i.e. the introduction of the standard contract) to two different groups (NPs and FPs) 
and I am testing if they responded in the same way to this change. 
 
The results show convergence on some measures. For time taken per case, prior to the 
introduction of the Unified Contract in 2007, there were large and significant differences in 
time taken to complete cases, with NP providers taking around 50 minutes longer per case. 
When the funding conditions were unified, there was almost complete convergence on the 
average time per case.  This convergence was driven by a behavioural change, with the NP 
providers reducing the amount of time taken per case. Some changes take place by the exit 
from the marketplace of some FP providers, who took less time per case. This provides some 
support for the theory proposed by Lakdawalla and Philipson (2006) that FPs will be the first 
to exit the market when conditions become more unfavourable to providers. 
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There is some evidence that NPs are higher quality, because they close a larger share of 
outcomes that have been defined as being of ‘substantive benefit’ to the client. This is the 
indicator of quality used in these contracts. Both providers improve on this measure, but the 
two provider types do not converge. At the end of Period 2, there are still large and significant 
differences between providers. In addition, NP providers are less likely than FPs to close cases 
in a very short amount of time.  
 
These results have significance for a wide variety of public service areas, who outsource and 
fund their providers, using a fixed fee mechanism. This raises some concerns about efforts to 
increase the diversity of providers of public services through competition. While it is true that 
the reforms did encourage more NP provision of Legal Aid advice, the NP providers ended up 
converging in behaviour, on some measures, to the FP providers they were competing with.  
 
There are also concerns about how quality is monitored in the contracts. There are very limited 
attempts to assess quality in the contracts, and there is no attempt to value some of the other 
activities or services offered by providers. Even those quality standards that are in place, such 
as the outcomes achieved, and the time taken per case, do not seem to be met by all providers 
– particularly FPs. There also seems to be the potential to game the performance standards, to 
give the appearance that quality is improving. Closer inspection shows that all the recorded 
improvements, in outcomes, are driven by the increasing number of times providers use the 
very ambiguous outcome code, that the client has been able to ‘plan better’, instead of the  
more substantive outcomes of, for example, retaining their home or being rehoused.  
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: The next section describes legal aid and the 
reforms in more details. Section 3 sets out the framework for analysis. Section 4 describes the 
data and empirical strategy. Section 5 sets out the results. Section 6 concludes.  
 
4.2 Legal Aid and the introduction of competitive tendering 
	
	
In this chapter, I study the introduction of competitive tendering within Legal Aid contacts for 
civil cases (criminal cases are not considered here). In the previous Chapter, I set out a general 
introduction to the public provision of legal aid services. To recap, Legal Aid is the provision 
of advice and support, to people who experience a problem. I am looking at civil legal aid or 
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‘social welfare law’, which are those areas of law, ‘that impact on poor and disadvantaged 
communities’ (Hynes 2012). The dataset used is on ‘Legal Help’, which is the first level of 
legal aid and assistance people can access. The service enables people to get information, and 
in some cases, the provider will negotiate and represent the client to third parties. 
 
Legal Aid began being publicly funded in 1949. Unlike many other service areas, at the outset, 
it was delivered almost exclusively by private solicitors, and administered by the professional 
body of solicitors, the Law Society (Moorhead et al. 2003). This is quite different from some 
other service areas, where services were set up by charities, and FP firms have come to be 
involved only recently. There has been a gradual expansion of non-profit provision of legal 
aid. with an increase in the number of non-profit firms entering the market place, during the 
time period of this data.   
 
In the preceding chapter, I described the differences between these private solicitors (FPs) and 
non-profit firms (NPs) in more detail. In some areas of Legal Aid, NP firms have a different 
operating model to FP firms. The Citizens Advice Bureau, the best-known NP provider of 
advice (Patel et al. 2008) often uses volunteers to deliver advice. This can mean that the people 
delivering advice have lower levels of qualifications in NPs, compared to FPs. This is not the 
case with all volunteers, with solicitors often providing pro bono advice, but, on aggregate, 
there are more qualified lawyers working in FP firms. Some authors make a distinction between 
‘lawyer’ and ‘non-lawyer’ firms (see Moorhead et al. 2003). While this has often mapped onto 
the differences between NP and FP firms, this is blurring, as more FP firms have made greater 
use of non-lawyer non-legally qualified staff, which is sometimes known as ‘para-
legalisation’.  While some concerns have been raised that the increasing use of non-lawyers 
may reduce quality (Ministry of Justice 2009), more recently the government has encouraged 
firms who are partly or entirely controlled by non-lawyers to provide services, as they believe 
it encourages the market to provide more affordable legal services to consumers (Ministry of 
Justice 2016). 
 
In this paper, I focus on housing legal aid, as this is area predominately delivered by NP and 
FP providers, where most of the staff (in both NP and FPs) are solicitors, thus, it is a more 
accurate comparison of like-for-like. It is also an area of legal aid where a very similar numbers 
of cases are delivered by NP and FP providers. In the dataset I am using, 52% of cases were 
delivered by FPs and 48% by NPs.  
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This paper looks at the period between 2005 and 2012, where the contracts for NP and FP firms 
were standardised, so both provider types face identical conditions. This involved some large 
changes to the way Legal Aid was funded. It is these changes that I exploit to see if the 
differences, between NP and FP providers, are maintained, in a more competitive funding 
environment.  
 
In the analysis, I look at three distinct phases. The first phase is called “Period 0” in the rest of 
the paper and refers to cases that began between 2005 and 2007. During this time period, there 
had been some attempts to make NP and FPs face the same conditions. For example, 
administrative control had been removed from the Law Society and Specialist Quality Marks 
were developed, which were open to non-lawyer providers of legal aid. In this time period, 
NPs and FPs were funded differently; NPs were paid by the hour, and FPs were paid on by 
tailored fixed fees, which had been introduced in 2005.  
 
During this time period, a review of legal aid was conducted by Lord Carter of Coles  (2006). 
This report recommended using a market-based approach to procure legal aid services, 
motivated mainly by the need to find financial savings and promote efficiency. To work 
towards this market-based approach, the report recommended that all legal aid contracts should 
be standardised, requiring all providers, NP and FP, to face the same funding structure. This 
led to the changes I study in the next two time periods.  
 
The second phase (referred to as “Period 1”) began in October 2007, where the providers for 
legal aid were part of the ‘Unified Contract’. This introduced fixed fees for civil legal aid, 
following the recommendations made in the Carter Review. This contract was called ‘The 
Unified Contract’ because it unified the contracts, so that they were the same for all providers, 
non-profits and private solicitors. The main feature of the contract was the ‘fixed fee’ structure, 
meaning that providers were paid the same fixed amount for a case, regardless of the time 
spent. This also meant that the competitive process was identical for all providers of legal aid. 
Table 1 below, summarises the main changes during these contracting periods.  
 
The fixed fees introduced a clear incentive for providers to spend less time per case and caused 
concerns that this would risk the quality of advice. In response to such concerns, as well as the 
large growth in demand for advice services, during the recession following the banking crisis 
of 2008, Lord Bach conducted a study into the provision of legal advice at the local level 
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(Ministry of Justice 2009). This reported in 2009 and set out some of ways that providers may 
be able to ‘game’ the new legal aid contracts. This included, cherry picking cases, closing cases 
early, splitting up cases, and manipulating outcome codes. All of these gaming methods could 
perversely affect client outcomes. In section 4.3, I set out some performance measures that 
might be indicative of gaming on the part of providers.    
 
The other important change, that was introduced in 2007, was a set of new Key Performance 
Indicators (“KPI”) for legal aid. The stated intention of these KPI’s was to prevent providers 
lowering the quality of advice, and the measures were designed to capture the quality of work, 
value for money and client access (Legal Services Commission, 2010). Providers had to report 
on these KPI’s, but failure to meet the KPI’s was not considered a breach of contract. In 
practice, the measures have a very limited definition of quality and I discuss in some detail the 
limitations of the definition of quality they use, which measured through the number of cases 
that end with a positive outcome for the client.  
 
The third phase (referred to as “Period 2”) began in April 2010, when the ‘Standard Contract’ 
was introduced, for providers who were successful in tendering to deliver the service. This was 
similar, in most ways, to the Unified Contract.  One of the main differences was that now 
failure to meet the KPIs by a provider was considered a breach of contract. In practice, there is 
little evidence that these KPIs were rigorously enforced, and some of the standards were not 
binding in any case with providers finding it relatively easy to meet them. The changes are 















Dates April 2005 (pre-reform 
period longer but I used 
cases after this date) 
Oct 2007 – 2010  Nov 2010 – 2013  
Payment structure for 
NP’s 
Paid an hourly rate for 
work done.  
Fixed Fees Fixed Fees 
Payment structure for 
FP’s 
Tailored Fixed Fees  Fixed Fees Fixed Fees 
Pre-requisits for firms to 
apply for contracts 
Quality Mark (introduced 
in 2000) 
Level 3 Quality Mark Level 3 Quality Mark 
Key Performance 
Indicator’s 
None. KPI 1 
Civil Contract Work – matters 
and cases providing substantive 
benefit to clients – 40% (min) 
(Q)  
KPI 2 Controlled Work (non-
fixed fee) –Assessment 
reduction – 10% (max) (V)  
KPI 3  Licensed Work – 
Assessment reduction – 10% 
(max) (V) 
KPI 4 Fixed Fee Margin – 20% 
(max) (V)   
KPI 5  Matter Start Usage – 
85% (min) (A) 




Timeliness for Completion of 
Cases – new for 2010. 
Damages: Net costs – 2:1 (min) –  
Assessment of KPI’s	
 
None.  KPIs in the Unified Contract for 
monitoring purposes only.  
KPI’s used as formal contract 




4.3 Framework  
 
	
In this section, I outline some of the main features of the contracts that were introduced in 2007 
and 2010 for Legal Aid.  I set out a simple framework, with some hypothesis of how NP and 
FP might respond differently to these contracts. There are two main areas which I study: the 
time taken and the outcomes achieved.  
 
 
4.3.1 Time taken 
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The contracts introduced in Period 1 and Period 2 have a ‘fixed fee’ payment structure. This 
means providers get paid the same for any case, regardless of how much time the case takes to 
complete. This fixed fee structure puts a very strong cost pressure on providers.  
 
There is some leeway for providers to take on cases that are particularly complex, since if a 
case ends up taking a very long time, defined as three times longer than the fixed fee (based on 
the old hourly rates), then firms can make a claim to be paid at the hourly rate. This is known 
as the ‘exceptional case threshold’ within the contracts. These cases undergo more scrutiny by 
the Legal Services Commission, with all exceptional cases subject to assessment. When the 
cases are submitted as exceptional, the provider is initially paid the standard fee, while the costs 
are being assessed by the LSC, and then credited with any balance deemed appropriate by the 
LSC.  
 
To avoid providers gaming this measure, and opening and closing short cases, the contract has 
a KPI that introduces a ‘fixed fee margin’. This ‘fixed fee margin’ KPI specifies the time a 
provider takes, should not fall below 20% of the fixed fee amount. In practical terms, how this 
is calculated is slightly counter intuitive, because the whole point of fixed fees is that there is 
no hourly rate associated with each case, but, the LSC look at the costs that would have been 
payable had the previous hourly rates been applied.  This should prevent providers consistently 
opening and immediately closing cases, without spending any significant time on the case. The 
Standard Contract (Period 2) made this an enforceable KPI.  
 
Figure 4.1 illustrates these features. Thus, a provider is paid the same fixed fee, if they spend 
between 0 minutes and the exceptional threshold. The fixed fee was £171 in 2007. This means 
that providers are expected to spend roughly 3.5 hours on each case (based on the hourly rate 
of £50.70 outside London). By the rules of the KPI, they should not be spending less than the 
fixed fee margin. Providers who consistently take longer than the amount of time allowed by 
the fixed free structure, and less than the exceptional threshold, will make a loss.  Conversely, 
providers who consistently take less time than the fixed fee threshold, could potentially make 








Figure 4-1: The fixed fee schedule 
This means it is not just the average time that is important in determining profitability, but also 
the distribution of the cases. For this reason, I look at two measures for time: the average time 
and the number of very short cases a provider takes on.  
 
Of course, if a firm reduces the amount of time they spend on cases this is not necessarily bad, 
if they are maintaining or improving quality. A firm that is able to reduce the amount of time 
spent, but maintain good quality outcomes, is making efficiency improvements. In the next 
section, I include outcomes, and all the analysis in this paper includes time as a control variable 
for outcomes.  
 
I examine time because, despite this ambiguity over whether reducing time spent on cases is 
good or bad, it is a good indicator of those providers who are lowering their costs. Secondly, 
there is a link between outcomes and time spent (which is discussed more in the next section) 
and providers who consistently close extremely short cases are likely to be low quality, and 
this could be an indication of gaming the contracts.  Providers who close cases very early, was 
identified as a gaming response in the Bach Review (Ministry of Justice 2009). It is linked to 
another concern that providers would 'cherry-pick' the easiest cases that would take shorter 
amounts of time, avoiding those cases that are more complex and consequently, take longer. It 
would be preferable for me to be able to observe more complex cases, but there is no indicator 
for this in the dataset. So, while time is not perfect as a measure to examine gaming in the 
contracts, those providers consistently closing very short cases raise concerns about quality. 
Their incentive to close cases changes between 2007, when it was monitored but not enforced, 
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and 2010, when it was enforced. In practice, firms that wish to rebid for contract may not want 
to close very short cases in 2007, as their reputation is likely to be damaged by this behaviour.  
 
FP providers, by definition, have stronger incentives to profit maximize, because they do not 
face the non-distribution constraint, so have a stronger incentive to cut time per case. On the 
other hand, FPs were already facing these constraints in the previous contract, meaning that 
the new constraints may be more binding and onerous, for NPs.  Overall, there is ambiguity in 
what the overall effect will be. 
 
4.3.2 Outcomes 
Legal Aid is like many public service areas, in that it is difficult to measure quality and 
outcomes. Many NP firms state that their mission is about delivering justice and other broad 
outcomes for the clients that they serve, but these longer-term outcomes have never really been 
attempted to be measured by the commissioners of advice services. Some of these issues are 
discussed at greater length in Chapter 3. 
 
All providers are asked to capture the immediate outcome of the case for the client. This 
monitoring data was a condition of the contract from 2007, and prior to this was reported 
inconsistently by providers. Providers choose the outcome from a list of 19 different possible 
outcome codes in housing. These codes are grouped into two categories; those that are of 
‘substantive benefit’ for clients; and those that are not considered ‘substantive benefit’ for 
clients. These are sometimes described as ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ outcomes. One of the KPI’s, 
included as a quality measure, is that 40% of cases are closed with an outcome that is of 
‘substantive benefit to the client’ (2010 Legal Services Commission). 
 
In practice, the way the outcome codes are grouped into those that are positive and those that 
are negative is quite basic and for housing, all those cases that are considered to be concluded 
are positive.  If two or more outcome codes apply, providers are instructed to choose the one 
that appears to be the most significant for the client. A full list of these outcome codes are 
provided in the appendix (table 4.10). 
 
This system is by no means perfect.  There are many limitations to the categorising of all 
completed cases as 'substantive benefit'. This means that a provider gets the same amount of 
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credit in this monitoring scheme, for achieving the potentially life changing outcome of a client 
avoiding homelessness, as they would, for getting the vaguer outcome, which is defined as the 
client ‘advised and enable to manage their affairs better’ (referred to as ‘plan better’ in the 
rest of the paper). In the classification scheme used by the Legal Services Commission, both 
of these outcomes would count as being of 'substantive benefit' to the client, when, in reality, 
avoiding homelessness is perhaps a more tangible benefit, than planning to avoid homelessness 
in the future. 
 
This provides an incentive for providers to choose the outcome code ‘plan better’ whenever 
possible. Indeed, guidance produced by the advice sector actively encourages providers to do 
this. The LAG Legal Aid handbook advises providers to choose an outcome, which would meet 
the definition of 'substantive benefit' if possible. The Legal Action Group handbook states: 
 
“If there is a suitable positive outcome code, you should always select it, rather than one the 
LSC regards as negative. So, for example, where justified by the case, you should always select 
‘client advised and enabled to plan and/or manage their affairs better’ rather than ‘client 
ceased to give instructions’” (Legal Action Group 2011) 
 
Although this is perfectly reasonable advice, it does indicate that there are cases that are ‘on 
the line’ between being defined as substantive benefit, or not. It also means that a provider 
could appear to have improved the quality of the advice they have delivered, when all they 
have really done is changed the outcome code they report. There is also a large divergence in 
the amount of time taken on different outcome codes. Those cases that close with the outcome 
code to ‘plan better’ take significantly less time, than other outcome codes. There is also an 
outcome code (“HV”) where the matter proceeds under other Civil Legal Aid funding, such as 
Certificated Work. This takes the longest out of any of the outcomes but is not considered to 
be of 'substantive benefit' to the client by the LSC. This is considered a positive outcome by 
many legal aid experts.   
 
This does not mean it would be desirable to set targets for providers achieving more outcomes 
that end with some of the more specific outcome codes, such as code “HF”, where a client is 
housed.  It is very difficult to put the outcome codes into any sort of hierarchy, because it 
depends on the nature of the problem and the expectations of the client. Some outcomes will 
not be a valid or possible outcome for many of the cases that providers take on.  For example,  
 133 
a disrepair case will not be able to end with the outcome code ‘client retains home’ because 
the client was not at risk of losing their home. In addition, many other factors that would 
influence the outcome may be beyond the control of the provider. These issues are discussed 
at greater length in chapter 3.  
 
The debate about how outcomes, should or could, be measured is beyond the scope of this 
paper, but it means that caution is applied in using the measure of 'substantive benefit' as 
defined by the LSC, as a proxy for quality. Nonetheless, it is the only indicator for quality I 
have, so it is the one I will use. The economics literature, on NP providers, suggest that they 
will be more likely to offer higher quality advice, either due to a less binding constraint on 
profits, and/or, because they have staff more likely or able to display pro-social motivations. I 
will test whether NPs will be higher quality than FPs, in terms of more outcomes closing with 
tangible substantive benefits. 
 
In the analysis, I also look at the number of cases that each provider type closes with the less 
tangible outcome ‘plan better’. The likely effect of the reforms in 2007 and 2010, is to 
encourage providers to close more cases with substantive benefit, as they were now being 
monitored on it, but in doing so may encourage them to report more cases on the less tangible 
outcome code of ‘plan better’ since this was defined by the LSC as falling within their 
definition of 'substantive benefit'.  
 
In summary, I am looking at two main categories– the time taken per case and the outcomes 
achieved. I will test whether NPs take longer per case and whether they achieve better 
outcomes. Within both these categories, I also test for a variable that may indicate gaming, 
such as, taking very short amounts of time, or reporting the outcome code ‘plan better’. 
 
4.3.3 Summary of Research Questions 
 
In section 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 I discussed the pressures the contract changes in Period 1 and 2 put 
onto firms to reduce the time they take per case and sustain or improve the outcomes they 
achieve for clients.  
This leads several hypothesis of how NPs and FPs may respond differentially to the contract 
changes.  
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In terms of time taken, the ‘contract failure’ theories of firm behaviour would predict that FP 
providers have stronger incentives to cut time taken per case as this will increase the profit 
firms can make on the contract.  Overall, I’d therefore expect FPs to reduce the time they take 
over the contracting period more than NPs. NPs, however, have a different starting point to 
FP firms as they begin under a different funding system so they have a bigger ‘shock’ or 
increased time pressure comparative to FPs so I’d expect them to reduce time more in the 
first period. In terms of taking very short amounts of time I’d expect FP firms to have more 
of these cases and to increase the share of these cases across all time periods.  
 
Hypothesis 1a: NPs providers will reduce the time they take between Period 0 and Period 1 
more than FP providers.  
Hypothesis 1b: FP providers will take a longer time overall than NP providers in Period 2. 
 
Hypothesis 2: FP providers will report more cases closing with a very short amount of time 
compared to NP firms in every time period.  
 
The ‘contract’ failure theory also predicts that NP providers will be higher quality than FP 
firms and I’d expect them to be get better outcomes, and maintain this higher quality, 
compared to FPs in spite of the greater time pressures on providers between period 1 and 
period 2. This is captured in the following hypothesis about the proportion of cases each 
provider type achieves that have an outcome of ‘substantive benefit’ to the client (as defined 
by the LSC). 
 
Hypothesis 3: NP providers will report more cases closing with an outcome of substantive 
benefit to the client compared to FPs.  
 
The final variable to be analysed is the same as above, i.e. substantive benefit, but without 
including the most ‘gameable’ outcome measure. I’d expect NPs to be higher quality and thus 
FPs to  perform worse on the measure of ‘substantive benefit’ when the more gameable 
outcome code has been removed compared to NPs. As there is more pressure on providers to 
achieve higher outcomes in Period 2 when the KPI’s become enforceable, I’d expect FPs to 
be more likely to game and report the less tangible outcome code more in Period 2 than 




Hypothesis 4a: NP providers will achieve more cases of substantive benefit when the more 
tangible outcome code is removed compared to FPs.  
Hypothesis 4b: FPs will reduce the number of cases they close of substantive benefit with the 





The data used in this paper was obtained using a Freedom of Information request submitted to 
the Ministry of Justice. It covers all cases of Legal Help for housing cases up to 2013, and there 
are 720,618 observations. There are very few cases reported in each year before the year 2005, 
so all observations that occurred before the 1st April 2005 date were dropped.  Cases with 
providers who have less than 5 cases are also dropped. Cases where clients were aged under 
16 or over 99, are marked as missing. This left a sample of 677,517 cases.  
 
Each provider has a unique provider ID, which means it is possible to identify all cases 
completed by each provider. Providers are recorded as taking one of two organisational ‘types’ 
of supplier. The first supplier type, is solicitors firms, all of which are FP. The second supplier 
type, is NP organisations. 
 
There are 1,484 providers of legal aid over all time periods. The overall case load is fairly 
evenly split, between NPs and FPs, with 48% of the cases in the dataset conducted by NPs, and 
52% by FPs.  
 
Other information supplied about the provider is the local authority area in which they are 
operating. These have been coded to report which ones are London Boroughs, and these make 
up around 12% of cases. I have also used the Local Authority rural/urban classification, to code 
whether providers are located in a rural or more urban area. I have also coded in which UK 
region providers are based. 
 
The summary statistics are reported in two tables. The first table below reports the main 
variables in each time period. These were obtained by collapsing the data set by period, so 
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show the average characteristics by provider type (NP compared to FP) in each period. The 
second table in the next section disaggregates providers by which period they entered or exited 
the market. 
 
The first summary statistics table shows the number of FPs providing advice falls sharply over 
the course of the contracting period, with many of these firms exiting the market at the end of 
Period 1. There are 982 reported in the first period, and 481 in the last period. NP providers 
increase in number over the time period from 219 in the first period to 230 in the last. In each 
time period the average number of cases is greater for NP firms than FP firms. 
 
The dataset contains some information about the client's demographics.  This includes, their 
ethnicity (30% of cases are an ethnic minority), if they have a disability (23% of cases report a 
disability), their age, and their gender. Overall, more women access advice services than men 
(60%). 
 
There are differences between the provider types, in terms of the characteristics of their clients, 
and this was discussed at length in chapter 3. NP firms have more clients with a disability, and 
less from an ethnic minority background. The differences in the ethnicity of the clients are no 
longer statistically significant when regional and urban classification are controlled for.  The 
share of cases closed with clients with a disability rises between period 0, 1 and 2. The biggest 
increase is between period 0 and 1, although this is likely to be due to more accurate reporting 
which became a condition of the contracts in period 1.   
 
The data reports several features of the case. The first is the time that is taken in minutes. There 
are large differences between NP and FP providers in Period 0, which narrows over the next 
two periods. NP’s reduce their time, compared to FPs, by nearly an hour.   
 
The summary statistics also show that there have been large improvements, in the proportion 
of cases that end with an outcome of 'substantive benefit', between Period 0 and Period 2, with 
NP providers reporting better outcomes than FPs. In the next section, I will explore these 
differences further.   
 
There are several other features of the cases that, while not a focus of this paper, are worth 
noting. One of these is that providers differ on the duration, in number of days, of which the 
 137 
case is open for. NPs have cases open for less time than FPs. The interpretation of case duration 
is ambiguous. On the one hand it could be an indication of poor quality service for a client, as 
their case is ongoing for a long time, rather than being resolved quickly. It also could be an 
indication of gaming if providers keep cases open for a long time to ‘hold out’ for a good 
outcome, rather than close the case more immediately as has been identified in some analysis 
of the JTPA (see Courty and Marschke, 2004). On the other hand it could be an indication of 
more complex cases, that take longer to resolve. The case duration falls for both provider types 
between period 0 and period 2.   
 
Housing cases are categorised into several different types of case, which vary from a 
homelessness case, where a person is at risk of being made homeless through, to a disrepair 
case, about substandard housing. These are not included in the summary statistics table.  The 
coding for these cases changes slightly over the time period of the data set. In total there are 12 
types of case, which I combine into 9 categories, to make it possible to use the same categories 



















Variable NP FP NP FP NP FP 
       
Providers:       
Number of Firms 219 982 258 922 230 481 
Mean no. of cases by 
provider 449 139 571 168 354 123 
Total cases  98281 136278 147310 154788 81481 59379 
       
Client features:       
Age 38.89 41.53 38.53 40.25 38.99 40.16 
Ethnicity Dummy 0.30 0.20 0.23 0.19 0.22 0.30 
Disability Dummy 0.27 0.17 0.38 0.24 0.37 0.30 
Female Dummy 0.61 0.61 0.58 0.60 0.59 0.60 
       
Case features:       
Outcomes of substantive 
benefit 0.25 0.14 0.75 0.52 0.77 0.55 
Outcome of substantive 
benefit (without ‘plan 
better’) 0.18 0.11 0.46 0.36 0.47 0.34 
Time (minutes) 218.03 142.41 184.25 152.14 205.53 193.74 
Proportion of very short 
cases 0.22 0.45 0.23 0.42 0.12 0.28 
Case Duration (days) 217.70 236.45 113.34 128.40 103.83 115.46 
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4.4.1 Entering and Exiting firms 
 
Table 4-3: Period in which firms exit or enter the market 
 
No. of Providers that exit in each period No. of Providers that join in each period  
Period FP NP All Providers FP NP All Providers 
0 142 28 170 (982) (219) (1,201) 
1 517 86 603 88 69 157 
2 (481) (230) (711) 70 56 126 
 
 
Between 2005 and 2012 there are a large number of entering and exiting firms. The table above 
summarises when firms exit the market, and also when firms enter the market. In Period 0 it is 
perhaps a bit misleading to describe all the firms as ‘joining’ the market place then as this is 
the first year I am using in the analysis, in the same way it is a bit misleading to say the firms 
‘exit’ in Period 2 as this is when my analysis stops, those firms don’t leave, which is why these 
numbers are in brackets in the table above. More FP firms join, compared to NPs, in Period 1 
and 2, with 157 providers (in total) joining in Period 1 and another 126 in Period 2. The biggest 
changes over the whole time period are the  large numbers of exiting providers, the majority of 
which are FP, who exit before the end of Period 1. 517 firms exit the market who are FP 
compared to only 86 who are NP.  
 
Since there are a much larger number of firms leaving than there are joining, I look in more 
detail at some of the features of the firms that exit, compared to those that don’t in the second 
summary statistics table. This disaggregates the providers by the last period they are observed 
in the data set. So, rather than comparing period 0 to period 1 (the standard contract) and period 
2 (the unified contract), it compares all those providers whose last case was in period 0 to 
period 1 and period 2. This enables some understanding of the characteristics of the firms who 
exited the marketplace in either period 0 or period 1, compared to those who did not exit.  
 
The second summary statistics table below shows providers based on when they exited the data 
set. The providers that did not exit have on average a larger number of cases compared to those 
that exit in Period 0 or Period 1. The providers that did not exit also report a higher share of 
cases with a disability. The NP providers that don’t exit have a lower share of cases where the 
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client is an ethnic minority, and FP providers that don’t exit have a higher share of cases where 
the client is an ethnic minority.  
 
In terms of the case characteristics, the providers that don’t exit have a greater proportion of 
cases that end with an outcome that is of substantive benefit to the client (although this needs 
to be interpreted with caution for the providers that exit in Period 0 because in this time period 
outcomes were not reported consistently). The providers that don’t exit have longer average 
case time but less very short cases. They also have shorter case durations. 
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Firm exited the market 
during Period 0  
Firm exited the market 
during Period 1 
Firm exited the market 
during Period 2 
Variable NP FP NP FP NP FP 
       
Providers:       
Number of Firms 28 142 86 517 230 481 
Mean no. of cases 
by provider 75 46 495 115 1228 591 
       
Client features:       
Age 34.02 42.11 39.05 40.96 38.99 40.44 
Ethnicity Dummy 0.34 0.24 0.24 0.15 0.22 0.29 
Disability Dummy 0.28 0.19 0.35 0.19 0.36 0.26 
Female Dummy 0.54 0.60 0.59 0.61 0.59 0.60 
       
Case features:       
Outcomes of 




better’) 0.09 0.04 0.32 0.24 0.43 0.29 
Time (minutes) 184.30 138.25 179.96 136.21 205.88 180.86 
Proportion of very 
short cases 0.29 0.44 0.27 0.48 0.15 0.33 
Case Duration 
(days) 289.38 270.34 130.42 163.98 129.06 146.77 
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4.5 Empirical Strategy  
 
The first thing I do is compare how NP and FP perform on all the measures set out in section 
3, across the three time periods 
 
To recap these measures are; (i) average time taken (Hypotheses 1a and 1b)  (ii) very short 
cases (Hypothesis 2)  (iii) outcomes of 'substantive benefit' (Hypothesis 3) and (iv) outcomes 
of ‘substantive benefit’ with the less tangible outcome ‘plan better’ excluded (Hypotheses 4a 
and 4b). Outcomes were only reported consistently after 2007, so for measures (iii) and (iv), I 
can only compare across two time periods. 
 
I then look at the introduction of the unified contract in 2007, the standard contract in 2010 and 
consider whether the differences between NPs and FPs were maintained in the more 
competitive environment.  
 
The analysis can be thought of as a difference-in-difference for the first policy change, from 
Period 0 to Period 1. It is only the NPs who are being treated, as the FPs were already on 
some form of fixed fee funding system (albeit fixed fees that were tailored to the average 
costs of each firm). The FPs are effectively a control group. 
 
Between Period 1 and Period 2 the analysis can be thought of as heterogenous treatments 
analysis. Both NP and FP providers experience the same treatment, the move from the 
‘unified’ contract to the ‘standard’ contract and I am testing if the effect of that change is 
different between the two groups. There is no control. There are several reasons that I might 
expect NPs and FPs to behave differently, as discussed in section 4.1. 
 
The main estimating equation is of the following form: 
 
𝑌"3J = 	𝛼 +	𝛽	6𝑃6J + 𝛽	:𝑃:J +		𝛾6	𝑃6J	𝑁𝑃3 +	𝛾:𝑃:J		𝑁𝑃3 	+ 𝛿𝑋"J + 𝜂𝑍K +	𝑁𝑃LMN +	𝜀"3J 
 
   
𝑌"3J is one of the characteristics of interest. As set out above these are (i) average time taken 
(ii) very short cases. 
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The outcome is defined as for client i with provider j at time t in region r. 
𝑋"J	is a vector of client control variables which include the age, gender and disability of the 
client, as well as the type of case.  
𝑍K is a vector of regional controls that include the region and urban classification of the 
provider.  
 
𝑁𝑃LMN is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm is a NP provider. 
 
𝛽	6 and 𝛽	: are the coefficients on the dummies of the two contract changes (2007 and 2010) 
and whether the firm is FP. So, 𝛽	6 is the change in FP behaviour after the introduction of the 
Unified Contract. FP firms already had a fixed fee so this was not such a large change as it was 
for NPs. 𝛽	: is the change after the introduction of the Standard Contract in 2010 for NP firms.  
 
𝛾6	 and 𝛾: are the coefficients on the interactions of the two contract changes (2007 and 2010) 
and whether the firm is NP. So 𝛾6	is the differential change after the introduction of the unified 
contract for NP firms relative to FPs. This can be thought of as a ‘Difference-in-Difference’ 
estimator as it shows the effect of the introduction of fixed fees on the behaviour of NP 
providers, using  FPs are a control, since FPs were already facing a form of fixed fees (tailored 
fixed fees). 𝛾: is the differential change for NP firms after the introduction of the standard 
contract, relative to FPs. Here I am comparing the reaction of the two different types of provider 
to the same treatment (the new enforcements in the Standard contract). There is no control for 
the change between Period 1 and 2 but  the research question of interest, is whether they 
responded to the same treatment in different ways.  
 
 
The two main contract changes – the Unified Contract of 2007 (𝑃6), and the Standard Contract 
introduced in 2010 (𝑃:), are included as two separate periods. This means 𝑃6 refers to any 
cases that were started between 1st October 2007 and 14th November 2010 and	𝑃:		refers to 
cases that were started after the 15th November 2010 when the Standard Contract came into 
force. These are compared to  (𝑃O) which are cases before the 1st October 2007 when NPs and 
FPs had different contracts. The decision was made to use the start date of cases because these 
dictate the payment structure, for example, NP firms were paid on an hourly rate (not the Fixed 




For each of the regressions run in the results, I report both OLS estimators and fixed effects, to 
try and establish whether the differences come from behaviour change within firms, or if the 
differences come from providers exiting or entering the market place. The specification that 
includes provider fixed effects takes the following form: 
 
 
𝑌"3J = 	𝛼 +	𝛽	6𝑃6J + 𝛽	:𝑃:J +		𝛾6	𝑃6J	𝑁𝑃3 +	𝛾:𝑃:J		𝑁𝑃3 	+ 𝛿𝑋"J + 𝑢"3J 
 where  𝑢"3J = 		 	∅3 +	𝜀"3J 
 
	∅3 are the provider level fixed effects which do not change over the composition of the sample 
including if the provider if NP or FP or if they are located in London or not.  
 
I also run two additional specifications where I only include those firms who were ‘survivors’ 
for each of the time periods in the data for both the OLS and the fixed effects model.  
 
In the analysis of the number of cases closed with 'substantive benefit' to the client, I drop cases 
that were in Period 0, and make comparisons solely between the Unified Contract and the 
Standard Contract. This is because the outcome of the case was reported in only a small number 
of cases prior to the introduction of the Unified Contract in 2007. In this case the equation takes 
the form:  
 
𝑌"3J = 	𝛼 + 𝛽	:𝑃: +	𝛾:𝑃:		𝑁𝑃3 	+ 𝛿𝑋"J + 𝜂𝑍" +	𝑁𝑃LMN +	𝜀"3J 
    
This is a heterogenous treatments analysis, as both NPs and FPs were subject to the stricter 
KPI monitoring on outcomes in the Standard Contract. There is no control group but I 






4.6.1 Time per case 
 
4.6.1.1 Do providers take different amounts of time on average (hypothesis 1 and 2)? 
	
Regression results for the time taken in minutes are shown in Table 4.5. Column (1) and (2) 
are linear regression models, with and without controls. Column (3) is a linear regression model 
run only on those firms who are in the market for all three time periods (called ‘surviving’ 
firms).  Column (4) and (5) are fixed effects, with controls (4) and only surviving firms (5). 
The controls used are gender, ethnicity and disability (as shown in the table), as well as provider 
size, region of provider and the urban classification of the local authority, in which the provider 
is located.  
	
Comparing the time taken between NP and FP providers the biggest difference is between the 
amount of time taken by each provider type in Period 0. The coefficient on the NP dummy is 
34 minutes. This is larger in specification 2, so taking controls into account, NPs take over 40 
minutes more to deliver each case than FPs prior to the introduction of the Unified Contract. 
This is a very large and significant difference between providers, but some differences were 
expected, due to the way the two provider types were funded prior to the introduction of the 
Unified Contract in 2007. What is surprising is the extent of the convergence between the two 
provider types, as soon as the funding for NPs changes.  
 
The ‘incomplete contracts’ theory predicts that due to the NDC there is a lower incentive to 
reduce cost on the part of NPs, which would mean they would take longer per case then FPs. 
This isn’t observed in this data set after the contract changes and by the end of Period 2, they 
take very similar amounts of time. In specification 1, without controls, FPs actually take longer 
time (18 minutes) than NPs. This is a small difference, in terms of time, but is still statistically 
significant at the 5% level. Adding in controls reduces the difference slightly and FPs still take 
longer than NPs but by a very small amount (7 minutes).  
 
In specification 1, the coefficients on 𝛽6(Period 1) and 𝛽: (Period 2) are both positive, driven 
by FP providers increasing the amount of time taken per case. The increase in time that FPs 
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take between Period 0 and Period 1 is 16 minutes (𝛽6) which is small but statistically 
significant. FP providers then increase the time they take by a further 33, minutes between 
Period 1 and Period 2 (𝛽:- 𝛽6) this is a large and statistically significant change. 
 
	
The coefficients on 𝛾6 (Period 1, NP) and 𝛾: (Period 2, NP) are both negative, large and 
statistically significant. NPs reduce the time taken relative to FPs by 41 minutes in Period 1, 
and 52 minutes in Period 2. The behaviour of NPs shows some similarities to FPs, in the 
respect that they also increase the amount of time they take between Period 1 and Period 2 by 
22 minutes (see figure 4.3). However, NPs behave differently to FPs, in that that they reduce 
the amount of time they take between Period 0 and Period 1, whereas FPs increase the 
amount of time they take over both periods, in the specification without controls.  
 
 
In specification 2, OLS with more controls, the size of the coefficients of the interaction 
terms 𝛾6	  (Period 1, N) and 𝛾:	 (Period 2, NP) are still large and negative being very similar 
to specification 1. The main difference is that the coefficient on 𝛽6	is much smaller (now 7 
minutes) and insignificantly different from zero, so the change for FP’s between Period 0 and 
Period 1 is not significantly different from zero. The coefficient on 𝛽: i.e. the change 
between FP’s between Period 1 and Period 2, is still large (38 minutes) and statistically 
significant.   
 
 
So, in summary, FP providers do not change their time taken per case significantly between 
Period 0 and 1, whereas NP providers decrease the time they take between Period 0 and 1 by 
a large amount. This means I can accept Hypothesis 1a. NPs providers reduce the time 





Table 4-5. Regression results. Dependent variable: time (minutes) 
  Linear Regression Fixed Effects 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
𝛽6  16.256*** 7.227 6.488 4.101 4.918 
 (Period 1) (4.104) (3.844) (4.074) (3.499) (3.488) 
𝛽:  49.731*** 38.008*** 36.497*** 30.681*** 32.374*** 
 (Period 2) (6.348) (5.786) (6.321) (5.228) (5.473) 
𝛾6    -41.462*** -41.057*** -38.877*** -46.407*** -44.059*** 
 (NP_Period 1) (7.483) (7.322) (8.086) (7.121) (7.741) 
𝛾:    -52.574*** -49.064*** -42.231*** -48.668*** -46.291*** 
 (NP_Period 2) (9.836) (8.550) (9.206) (8.220) (8.677) 
NP 34.531*** 41.632*** 36.420*** 
  
  (8.742) (7.983) (9.156) 
  
Ethnicity Dummy  13.012*** 12.864*** 4.743*** 5.127*** 
   (2.254) (2.742) (0.862) (1.007) 
Ethnicity 
Unknown  20.437*** 22.676** 7.412** 7.322** 
 
 (5.811) (7.030) (2.403) (2.816) 
Female Dummy  3.688*** 2.670** 2.914*** 2.518*** 
  (0.870) (0.854) (0.577) (0.639) 
Female Unknown  -15.660*** -19.497*** -14.123*** -15.464*** 
  (3.039) (3.506) (2.428) (3.023) 
Disability Dummy  26.858*** 28.418*** 22.272*** 22.821*** 
  (1.752) (2.161) (0.889) (1.081) 
Disability 
Unknown  10.160* 9.481 -2.595 -3.354 
 
 (4.347) (5.033) (2.650) (2.928) 
_cons 168.412*** 119.843*** 122.553*** 188.945*** 190.765*** 
 
(4.930) (8.709) (12.821) (2.799) (3.171) 
 N 677517 677517 514030 677517 514030 
Controls included: N Y Y Y Y 
      
𝑅: 0.0108 0.0444 0.0477 
within  = 0.015; 
between = 0.011; 
overall = 0.008 
within  = 0.0158 
between =0.0043 
overall = 0.0094 









An explanation for both provider types having a greater increase in time taken between Period 
1 and 2 compared to Period 0 and 1, is that in Period 2 they were subject to a Key Performance 
Indicator (KP4), which specified a minimum amount of time, on average, providers should 
take per case. This may have stopped both provider types from reporting very short case times.  
 
The FE models have very similar results as the OLS results. All of the coefficients are the same 
sign. For the FP providers, the values of the coefficients in the FE are very slightly smaller than 
those in the OLS. For example, the coefficient on 𝛽: (Period 2) is 36 minutes in specification 
3 but is 32 minutes in specification 4. So consequently, within providers there is a smaller 
increase in time taken between Period 1 and Period 2 than occurred in the marketplace as a 
whole. A large number of FP providers exited the marketplace between Period 1 and Period 2 
and this means that some of those FP’s exiting the market place were the ones who took very 
short amounts of time. Nonetheless, the major drive of behaviour is within-provider change.   
 
For NP providers, like FP providers, overall the FE and OLS specifications are fairly similar 
overall which indicates most change comes from within providers. Nonetheless, in contrast to 
FP providers, the size of the coefficients in the FE model are greater in magnitude for period 1 
than they are in the OLS. For example, on 𝛾6   (Period 1 and NP) the coefficient is -39 in the 
OLS specification 3 compared to -44 in specification 5. This implies that the within firm change 
for ‘survivor’ firms is greater than change between different firms. The entrance and exit of 
NP firms is much more stable than FP firms, nonetheless, there was some entry of NP firms in 
Period 1 (69 firms entered) and this suggests they took a shorter time on average than the NP 
firms who had also been in the market in Period 0. This is to be expected as NP firms who 
entered in Period 1 will have started under the fixed fee funding scheme and never been paid 
for their work by hour as was the case for  NPs during Period 0.   
 
In summary, in Period 0, when they were funded differently NPs and FPs took very different 
amounts of time. As soon as the unification of contracts took effect, NPs and FPs respond in 
very similar ways to the fixed fee system, when looking only at the mean. This shows a story 
of convergence, rather than divergence, and from specification 2 when client and regional 
controls are used, the mean amounts of time spent, by both NPs and FPs, are not statistically 
different from each other.  
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This means I can reject hypothesis 1b, NP providers do not take a longer time in Period 2 
than FP providers. NPs only take longer in the first time period when they were funded 
differently, they take less time on average than FPs in Period 1 and Period 2.  
 
 
The average time can disguise some differential behaviour between providers that affects their 
distribution of cases.  The density plots in Figure 4-2 show differences in the distribution of 
NP and FP cases. These are taken from a data set collapsed by provider. In each case, although 
clearer for Period 0 and 1, FP providers have a distribution shifted over the left of NPs, so they 
have more very short cases. 
 
 
Figure 4-2: Time taken in each period 
 
This indicates that FPs increase the number of shorter cases they take on, over the course of 
the contracting period, whilst the average overall time for FPs increases. This could be an 
indication of providers gaming the contracts, by taking on cases and closing them very early, 

























Time taken by Provider
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As long as these are balanced alongside some longer cases, this will not show up in their 
average advice time. The graphs below highlight the differences, between the mean time and 







4.6.1.2 Hypothesis 2: Do FP providers close more cases in a very short amount of time 
compared to NP firms? 
	
	
The regressions in Table 4.6 show regressions with the dependent variable that time is very 
short (defined as less than 90 minutes). The fixed fee threshold is approximately 213 minutes, 
or around 3.5 hours. Therefore, these are cases that are taking less than half the amount of time 
allocated to them. It is conceivable that these providers are extremely efficient but it seems 
unlikely that good quality advice can be provided in such a short amount of time. Providers 
who consistently report such short cases will be making very large profits (unless they balance 
them with lots of very long cases).  It is surprising that so many cases end in such a short time 
period, since there is a KPI to try and guard against early closing of cases. This was introduced 
in 2007, but was only monitored from 2010, which may be one of the reasons why the number 
of these very short cases began to fall. The KPI is that cases should not end in time less than 









Period 0 Period 1 Period 2
Time - proportion of short Cases
NP FP
203 178 200168 185
218
Period 0 Period 1 Period 2
Time - in minutes
NP FP
Figure 4-3: Graphs showing different indicators of time taken by providers	
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Table 4-6. Regression results. Dependent variable: Very short time 
  Linear Regression Fixed Effects 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
𝛽6  -0.064*** -0.042** -0.033** -0.033* -0.028**  
 (Period 1) (0.015) (0.015) (0.011) (0.015) (0.010)    
𝛽:  -0.165*** -0.138*** -0.124*** -0.120*** -0.120*** 
 (Period 2) (0.020) (0.017) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014)    
𝛾6    0.038 0.036 0.027 0.049 0.033    
 (NP_Period 1) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.027) (0.027)    
𝛾:    0.027 0.016 0.005 0.040 0.028    
 (NP_Period 2) (0.030) (0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.029)    
NP -0.106*** -0.104*** -0.081** 
 
                
  (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) 
 
                
Ethnicity Dummy  -0.027*** -0.024*** -0.005* -0.005    
   (0.006) (0.007) (0.002) (0.003)    
Ethnicity 
Unknown  -0.021 -0.022 0.006 0.007    
 
 (0.017) (0.019) (0.007) (0.008)    
Female Dummy  -0.016*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.011*** 
  (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)    
Female Unknown  0.034** 0.044*** 0.034*** 0.033**  
  (0.011) (0.012) (0.008) (0.010)    
Disability Dummy  -0.052*** -0.053*** -0.040*** -0.039*** 
  (0.007) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003)    
Disability 
Unknown  -0.021 -0.015 0.009 0.011    
 
 (0.013) (0.016) (0.008) (0.010)    
_cons 0.344*** 0.462*** 0.452*** 0.276*** 0.269*** 
 
(0.020) (0.031) (0.042) (0.010) (0.010)    
 N 677517 677517 514030 677517 514030 
Controls included: N Y Y Y Y 
      
𝑅:  0.0293  0.0499  0.0496 
within  = 0.0131; 
between = 0.0903; 
overall =0.0143 
within  = 0.0159; 
between = 0.0787; 
overall =0.0165 







There are five specifications. Column (1) and (2) are linear regression models, with and without 
controls. Column (3) is also a linear regression model run only for those providers who are 
present in all three time periods (‘survivor firms’). Columns (4) and (5) are fixed effects, with 
controls and then only on ‘survivor firms’. I also ran the margins at the means, after a logistical 
regression, which gave very similar results, but I have not included these, because research 
suggests that the interaction term is estimated poorly in nonlinear models (Ai and Norton, 
2003). The controls used are gender, ethnicity and disability, provider size, region of provider 
and the urban classification of the local authority, in which the provider is located. 
 
The coefficient for NP is negative, large and significant, so NPs are less likely to have very 
short cases in Period 0. The results in this regard are similar to those for average time. The 
longer time taken by NPs in Period 0, is consistent with them being funded differently in this 
time period.  Unlike in the average time per case, the coefficients on 𝛾6 (Period 1, NP) and 𝛾: 
(Period 2, NP) are small and not statistically significant. NPs do not change the proportion of 
very short cases they take on over the course of the contracting period in a different way to 
FPs. NPs reduce their average time per case a lot more compared to FPs, between Period 0 and 
Period 1, but they do not increase the number of very short cases they complete.  This means 
there is not convergence between providers on this measure. NPs start off reporting less of 
these very short cases, and while FP providers reduce the amount of these very short cases they 
complete, NP providers also reduce the amount of cases they complete, so there are still large 
and statistically significant differences at the end of Period 2. 
 
In column 1 the coefficients on 𝛽6(Period 1) and 𝛽: (Period 2) are both negative, driven by FP 
providers reducing the amount of very short cases they close over the contracting period. The 
size of the coefficient of 𝛽: is greater in magnitude (-0.165) than	𝛽6 (-0.064), but in both cases 
the coefficient is statistically significant. The greater change in Period 2 (𝛽: ) is consistent 
behaviour with providers reducing the number of very short cases they complete when the Key 
Performance (KP4) is more strictly monitored.   
 
In specification 2, OLS with more controls gives very similar results. The size of the 
coefficients of the interaction terms 𝛾6	 (Period 1, NP) and 𝛾:	 (Period 2, NP) are still small and 
not significant, and so are very similar to specification 1. The main difference is that the 
coefficient on 𝛽6	is now very slightly smaller but is still significant. The coefficient on 𝛽: i.e. 
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the change between FP’s between Period 1 and Period 2 is still large (-0.138) and statistically 
significant.   
 
The FE models have very similar results as the OLS results. All of the coefficients are the same 
sign, and amounts are similar although the values are slightly lower in magnitude in the FE 
models for 𝛽6 and 𝛽:. So, for example, the coefficient on 𝛽6 (Period 1) is -0.033  in the OLS, 
specification 3, but is slightly smaller at -0.028 in the FE model. The similarity between the FE 
results for survivor firms and the OLS results suggests that most of the behaviour change took 
place within firms.  
 
This adds some nuance as to how providers behave in regard to time taken. NPs take less time 
than FPs on average, but this hides a feature of FP providers, that they close a greater proportion 
of cases in a much shorter time than NPs. The volume of cases closed in such a short amount 
of time causes some concern, because they fail to satisfy one of the KPI indicators in the 
contract, that cases should not fall under 20% of the fixed fee margin. In the guidance on 
reporting controlled work, the LSC state that they will “monitor the relationship between 
average case costs and the fee paid through management information and raise concerns with 
providers where the management information shows significant variances” (Legal Services 
Commission 2010). 
 
Overall, this means I can accept Hypothesis 2. FP providers report more cases closing 
with a very short amount of time compared to NP firms in every time period.  
 
4.6.2 Outcomes  
4.6.2.1 Hypothesis 3: Do NP providers report more cases closing with an outcome of 
substantive benefit compared to FPs? 
 
The regression results in Table 4.7 have ‘substantive benefit’ as the dependent variable. This 
takes a value of 1 if the case closes with an outcome that is defined by the Legal Services 
Commission as being positive to the client. As discussed at greater length earlier in this chapter, 
and also in the previous chapter, there are some limitations to this approach and it essentially 
just splits cases up, into those which have been completed, and those which have not. 
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There are five specifications; column (1) and (2), are linear regression models, with and without 
controls. Column (3) is a linear regression model which includes only those firms who were 
present in both Period 1 and Period 2 (i.e. ‘surviving’ firms). Column (4) is a fixed effects 
model with controls.  Column (5) is the fixed effects model only for surviving firms.  
 
The controls used are gender, ethnicity and disability, provider size, region of provider, and 
the urban classification of the local authority, in which the provider is located. I have dropped 
all cases that took place before the Unified Contract (i.e. Period 0) because outcomes were not  
consistently reported in Period 0 so there were many missing values. This means I am only 
comparing results and behaviour change between Period 1 and Period 2, and looking for 
heterogenous response to the policy change between NP and FP providers.  
 
A control for the time taken per case is also included, so this can be thought of as an efficiency 
measure as it captures the outcome achieved taking account of the amount of time it took. 
Surprisingly, time is not significant in any of the specifications, implying that getting a ‘good’ 
outcome does not take any longer than getting one that is not considered by the commissioner 
to be good.  
 
The coefficient on the NP dummy variable is large and significant, and is consistent across all 
of the regression specifications, with NP providers more likely to close cases with 'substantive 
benefit' to the client in Period 1.  In specification 1, the coefficient on 𝛽: (Period 2) is positive 
and statistically significant (0.040) with FP providers increasing the number of cases they close 
with a positive outcome for clients between Period 1 and Period 2.  The coefficient on  𝛽: 
(Period 2) is similar (0.043) in specification 2, which includes controls for client characteristics, 
region and time taken on the case.  
 
In specification 1, the coefficient on 𝛾:	 (Period 2, NP) is negative but is very small and not 
statistically different from zero (-0.002). In specification 2 the coefficient on 𝛾:	 (Period 2, 
NP) is also small at 0.011, and therefore, is also not statistically significant. NPs do not 
change the proportion of outcomes they report that are positive for the client in any 




Table 4-7. Regression results. Dependent Variable: Outcome of substantive benefit 
   
 
  Linear Regression Fixed Effects 
  (1) (2) (3)    (4) (5) 
𝛽:  0.040*** 0.043*** 0.023* 0.012 0.013    
 (Period 2) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008)    
𝛾:    -0.002 0.011 0.022 0.020 0.020    
 (NP_Period 2) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012)    
NP 0.153*** 0.119*** 0.104***                   
 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014)                   
Time (hours)  0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001    
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)    
Constant 0.624*** 0.555*** 0.567*** 0.702*** 0.709*** 
  (0.011) (0.019) (0.021) (0.005) (0.005)    
N 442958 442958 377568 442958 377568 
𝑅:   0.0310  0.0457 0.0431 
within  = 0.0013;  
between = 0.0478; 
overall = 0.0070    
within  = 0.0014;  
between = 0.0703; 
overall = 0.0060 
No. of groups n/a n/a n/a 1,314 585 
Controls 
included: N Y Y Y Y 
  Dependent variable is dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the case was closed with the 
provider reporting an outcome that is defined as being of ‘substantive benefit’ to the client by 
the LSC. Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
  
  
This means both providers increase the amount of cases they report outcomes of 'substantive 
benefit' between Period 1 and Period 2. There is not, however, convergence between providers, 
because NP providers were starting from a higher base level. At the end of Period 2, there are 
still large and significant differences between providers. NP close over 80% of all cases with 
'substantive benefit' compared to FP providers closing 66% of their cases with 'substantive 
benefit' (see figure 4.4). 
 
This means I can accept Hypothesis 3 that NP providers will report more cases closing 
with an outcome of substantive benefit to the client compared to NPs in Period 1 and 




The coefficient on 𝛽: in the FE models only on the surviving firms (specification 5) is smaller 
in magnitude, and not statistically significant (unlike in the OLS where it was statistically 
significant). There are 585 providers who are ‘survivors’ are present in the sample in both 
period 1 and period 2. A large number of providers exited the marketplace at the end of period 
1, mostly FP firms. These results show that most of the increase in outcomes of 'substantive 
benefit' by FP providers does not come from individual firms changing behaviour, but instead 
from FP providers who were reporting fewer outcomes of 'substantive benefit' exiting the 
market. The coefficient on 𝛾:	  in both of the FE specifications is small and not statistically 
significant (so it is the same as in the OLS).  
 
4.6.2.2 Substantive benefit with the more gameable outcome removed (hypothesis 4a and 
4b) 
 
The Legal Services Commission set a KPI for providers, on the number of cases they should 
close, with 'substantive benefit' to the client. Both provider types have a proportion of outcomes 
of substantive benefit, which is much higher than the 40 per cent requirement set out in the 
KPI. NPs perform better than FPs, but FPs also perform well, and so, if this was the sole 
measure used to assess quality, it appears that increasing the time pressures in the contract, has 
not negatively affected quality, because both providers improve. This measure, however, is a 
little optimistic in how it defines positive outcomes, and contains a range of different outcome 
codes.  
 
Of these outcome codes, the one that several commentators (Balmer et al. 2012; Citizen’s 
Advice 2010) have argued demonstrates less 'tangible outcomes' for the client is the code that 
the ‘client advised and enabled to plan and/or manage their affairs better’ (shortened to ‘plan 
better’). While it is very possible that good quality advice can end with this outcome code,  this 
code is susceptible to gaming, as it is relatively easy for providers to report this outcome code, 
without them doing much work for the client. In Table 4.8, the dependent variable is the same 
as in Table 4.7, with the only difference being that cases that have ended with the outcome 
code ‘plan better’ are no longer included in the definition as being of 'substantive benefit'.  
	
There are several interesting features about Table 4.8, in comparison to Table 4.7. Firstly, the 
size of the coefficient on the NP dummy is a lot smaller at 0.057, which is less than half the 
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size of Table 4.5 (0.153). It is still statistically significant, but this time is only significant at 
the 5% level, less than in Table 4.7.  NPs still do better than FPs on outcomes but the difference 
is much narrower when the outcome code ‘plan better’ is excluded. I can therefore accept 
Hypothesis 4a that NPs achieve more cases of substantive benefit when the more tangible 
outcome code is removed compared to FPs.  
 
 
Table 4-8. Regression results. Dependent variable: Outcome without 'plan better' 
   
 
  Linear Regression Fixed Effects 
  (1) (2) (3)    (4) (5) 
𝛽:  -0.013 -0.026* -0.027* -0.030*** -0.030*** 
 (Period 2) (0.013) (0.011) (0.012) (0.008) (0.008)    
𝛾:    0.023 0.027 0.028 0.025* 0.025*   
 (NP_Period 2) (0.025) (0.017) (0.018) (0.011) (0.011)    
NP 0.057* 0.039* 0.050*                   
  (0.024) (0.017) (0.020)                   
Time (hours)  0.032*** 0.031*** 0.035*** 0.034*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)    
Constant 0.392*** 0.442*** 0.443*** 0.306*** 0.311*** 
  (0.013) (0.027) (0.029) (0.005) (0.005)    
N 442958 442958 377568 442958 377568 
𝑅:  0.0043 0.0520 0.0552 
within  = 0.027; 
between= 0.009;  
overall = 0.019 
within = 0.027; 
between=0.001;  
overall = 0.019 
No. of groups n/a n/a n/a 1,314 585 
      
Controls included: N Y Y Y Y 
           
  Dependent variable is dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the case was closed with all 
outcome codes that are defined of being of ‘substantive benefit’ to the client without the 
outcome code ‘plan better’. Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
  
  
Secondly, this time, the coefficient on 𝛽:  is negative. It is not significant and a very small 
value in specification 1 (without controls), and is still small and negative, but just statistically 
significant, at the 5% level in specification 2. This means that when ‘plan better’ is excluded, 
there is no improvement in outcomes between Period 1 and Period 2 by FP firms.  Unlike the 
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results from table 4.7 that FPs improve between Period 1 and Period 2, now FPs do slightly 
worse on outcomes between Period 1 and Period 2. This means that all of the improved 
outcomes that are observed in Table 4.7 are driven by both NP and FP providers  increasing 
the number of cases they close with the outcome ‘plan better’. The results for the FE 
specifications are nearly identical to those for the OLS with controls for  𝛽: which suggests 
that for FP providers those who stay in the marketplace may not be better quality than those 
who exit, they are just more likely to report the tangible outcome code ‘plan better’.  
 
The coefficient 𝛾: is positive, but small and not significant, for the OLS results and is 
statistically significant, at the 5% level, in the fixed effects model. This suggests that NP 
firms who are ‘survivors’ make small improvements, compared to FPs, over the contracting 
period. In contrast, the FP firms who stay in the marketplace reduce their performance on  the 
outcomes measure in table 4.8.  I can therefore accept Hypothesis 4b: FPs reduce the 
number of cases they close of substantive benefit with the more tangible outcome code 
removed, between Period 1 and Period 2, compared to NPs. 
 
The third difference between tables 4.7 and 4.8 is that it is only in table 4.6 that the control for 
the time taken per case is statistically significant. This supports the use of the category for 
outcomes of substantive benefit used in 4.8, because by omitting the more tangible outcome 
code, it now takes longer to achieve the positive outcomes which is what one would intuitively 
expect. 
 
In summary, if I do not include ‘plan better’ as an outcome that is of substantive benefit then 
neither FPs nor NPs demonstrate an improvement in the outcomes  between Period 1 and Period 
2 by any significant amount. NPs have a higher proportion of better outcomes than FPs, so as 
both type of providers do not change behaviour between Period 1 and 2 there is no convergence 
of outcomes, and this difference is maintained. The only differential response is that FPs report 
‘plan better’ more frequently between Period 1 and Period 2, compared to NPs, which is what 
drives the improvement of FPs, on the outcomes that were shown in Table 4.7.   
 
The graphs below, compare the two ways of disaggregating outcomes of substantive benefit. 
They show that when ‘plan better’ is excluded there are no significant improvements for either 
provider type on outcomes. It is also the case that if ‘plan better’ were not considered to be an 
outcome code, which is worthy of inclusion in the group of outcomes that are defined as 
 159 
'substantive benefit' to clients, then FP providers would not be meeting the Key Performance 
Indicator, introduced in 2007, that 40% of cases should close with a positive outcome for 
clients. 
	
Figure 4-4. Graph of outcomes 
	
4.6.3 Robustness Checks 
 
In using this methodology, I am assuming that both NP and FP providers were subject to 
common trends, and that they were not differently affected by changes other than those changes 
made to the contracts in 2007 and 2010. This time period was over the same period of the 2008 
financial crisis, which led to increases in the demand for advice (Ministry of Justice 2009).  
 
It is possible that NP providers may have been affected differently by the increase in demand 
for advice for several reasons. Firstly, some types of advice saw bigger increases than others. 
A Ministry of Justice (2009) report tracked the type of query on a telephone helpline,  following 
the period after the crisis of 2008 as compared to the year before, and there were bigger 
increases in calls in debt (39%) and welfare benefits (47%) than in housing (14%). NPs conduct 
more debt and welfare benefits cases, as a proportion of their caseload, than housing advice, 
compared to FP providers, and the response to this large increase in demand in other types of 
work may have had an effect on the quality of the housing advice they provide. Secondly, in 
the wake of the financial crisis, more people with housing problems may have accessed NP 
providers. Patel et al (2008) found evidence that NP providers such as the CAB have a degree 
of ‘brand recognition’ and are better known. This could mean that people experiencing a 
problem for the first time may have sought help at a NP rather than a FP firm.   
 
The 2008 financial crisis also led to a decline of other available sources of funding providers 
rely on, but again, this may have effected NPs and FPs differently. For NP providers, who are 
0.78 0.810.62 0.66
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more reliant on grant funding, alongside the contracts examined here, the effect may be greater, 
since there has been a reduction in many of the grant funding available, due to the austerity 
policies pursued after the crisis. Private solicitors may have also faced a fall in revenue, but for 
different reasons. The recession led to a fall in the demand for some types of private legal work 
which forms the bulk of revenue in many FP firms. The Legal Services Board (2016) reported 
a greater than 20% reduction in the demand for some legal services, such as residential 
conveyancing transactions, re-mortgages and divorces in the period after 2008. 
 
A second issue is whether there are spillover effects of the contract changes in outcomes that 
are not recorded here. Grabowski and Hirth (2003) argue that the very existence of NP 
providers in a marketplace, has positive spillover effects on the market, as a whole. There are 
several ways that the work of NPs may have positive spillovers, some of which are explored 
in more detail in Chapter 3. NP providers are located in community settings, and are often 
accessed by people who have less knowledge of their legal rights. NPs also do policy work and 
campaigning, which may benefit all providers of legal aid work. None of these attributes are 
measured in the performance standards. Even those measures that are assessed in the 
performance standard, such as the outcomes of the case, capture very minimal information 
about each case, and so as a consequence, miss some attributes of quality, longer-term 
outcomes and the client experience. This is particularly important, given the theory in 
economics is based on the idea that NPs will do better on non-contractible quality.  
 
As a robustness check, to try and establish if the changes identified during the break of the 
Unified Contract and Standard Contract are attributable to those contract changes, I run some 
additional tests on outcomes that I wouldn’t expect to be affected by the contract changes, such 
as the gender of the client. Women access advice services than men, but there is no major 
difference between the time taken per case and the gender (unlike for disability and ethnicity). 
Thus, there is no particular reason why the gender case mix should change over the contract. I 
have run the same specification (see table 4.9 in the appendix) with gender as the dependent 
variable, and there is a very small but just significant negative coefficient on 𝛽6 and 𝛾6	but no 
significant results for any of the other parameters of interest (𝛽: , 𝛾:) in specification 1, and 








In this paper I tested for differences in the behaviour of NP and FP providers of Legal Aid 
before during and after a large reform to the funding of the service. I compared NP and FP 
providers on the time taken and the outcomes achieved, and I looked at whether any unique 
features of NP providers were maintained in a more competitive funding environment.  
 
I find that there are large differences in the average (mean) amount of time providers taken per 
case in the first time period, with NPs taking a lot longer on average than FPs, but these 
differences are completely eliminated by the end of Period 2. This is not consistent with some 
economic theories which predict NPs would respond less strongly to the cost pressures in the 
contracts to reduce average time. There is convergence of time taken between providers, and 
no differential response between NPs and FPs on average time. 
 
The story is different when looking at how cases are distributed.  FP providers, despite having 
a higher average time, close a larger share of very short cases compared with NP providers. 
Both provider types reduce the share of these very short cases, between Period 1 and Period 2, 
which may be a response to stricter monitoring of a performance standard, stipulating  cases 
should not be completed in such a short time period. Nonetheless, there is still a considerable 
difference between the two provider types on this measure at the end of Period 2, which 
suggests that FPs are adopting a gaming strategy to profit maximise in a way that most NPs are 
not.  
 
The time that providers take to complete cases must be considered alongside the outcomes they 
are achieving. If time is reduced per case, but positive outcomes are maintained, then this would 
be seen as an efficiency improvement. Like many other public services, it is very difficult to 
measure the quality of advice. The only measure I have available is the data on outcomes 
reported, as part of the monitoring data. Using this measure alone I find support for the theory 
that NPs are higher quality because NP providers close a much larger share of cases, with an 
outcome code, defined by the commissioner, as benefiting the client.  
 
I then disaggregate the outcomes data in a different way to how it is assessed by the 
commissioner and take out one of the outcome codes. The code I take out is one that has been 
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described as demonstrating less ‘tangible’ benefits than the other outcome codes (Balmer et al. 
2012). When this outcome code is no longer included, there are no improvements in outcomes 
by FPs over the course of the contracting period. All of the changes come from providers being 
more likely to report the most gameable outcome measure. NPs are similar to FPs, in that they 
also increase the frequency this outcome measure is used, over the contracting period, but they 
still close more cases with positive outcomes, compared to FPs.  
 
These results flag up some issues with how quality is reported in these contracts. All providers 
seem to have improved the outcomes they delivered for clients. However, these recorded 
improvements in outcomes are solely driven by providers increasing the number of times they 
use the very ambiguous outcome code that the client has been able to ‘plan better’, rather than 
more clients having the more substantive tangible outcomes of retaining their home or being 
rehoused. This, alongside the large number of cases that are closed within a very short time 
period, raises concerns that the quality of advice being delivered by some providers (both FP 
and NP) may be very low, and that this has been poorly monitored.  
 
These results have significance for a wide variety of public service areas, who outsource and 
fund their providers through a fixed fee mechanism. It raises some concerns about efforts to 
increase the diversity of providers of public services through competition. While it is true that 
the reforms did encourage more NP provision of Legal Aid advice, the NP providers ended 
up converging in behaviour, on some measures, to the FP providers they were competing 
with. This is without considering the effects on some of the more mission drive activities that 
NPs carry out, such as policy or campaigning work, or any other innovations that are not a 
part of the contracts.  
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4.8 Appendix to chapter 4 
 
Table 4-9. Robustness check. Dependent variable: Female dummy 
      
  Linear Regression 
  (1) (2) 
      
Period 1 -0.010** -0.002    
  (0.003) (0.004)    
Period 2 -0.010 -0.000    
  (0.010) (0.007)    
NP_Period 1 -0.012* -0.003    
  (0.006) (0.006)    
NP_Period 2 -0.013 -0.005    
  (0.012) (0.009)    
NP -0.001 0.010    
  (0.011) (0.009)    
N 
        585272           
585272  




    
Standard errors in parentheses 




Table 4-10. Outcome codes for housing legal aid 
Code Outcome Description Substantive 
Benefit? 
HA Client receives damages or property 
Any lump sum payment to client including any paid in reduction of rent. 
Any property right successfully asserted. 
Y 
HB Client receives new or increased periodical payment (not used after 1 
April 2013 – HA used instead)  
Y 
HC Client receives damages or property and new or increased periodical 
payment (not used after 1 April 2013 –HA used instead) 
Y 
HD Sum owed by client to a third party is reduced or is less than claimed 
A lump sum claim by a third party is successfully defended or the amount 
payable is less than claimed. 
Y 
HE Liability of client to make regular payments is reduced or is less than 
claimed A claim for a periodic amount by a third party is successfully 
defended or the amount payable is less than claimed. 
Y 
HF Client housed, re-housed or retains home 
Applies only where possession or re-housing is in issue. 
Y 
HG Repairs or improvements to the client’s home 
Work done on the home or furniture/fixtures installed or improved. 
Y 
HH Opponent/other party action benefits client 
Third party takes action. 
Y 
HI Opponent/other party action prevented 
Third party is dissuaded from taking action (other than possession cases). 
Y 
HJ Opponent/other party action delayed Extra time is gained – commonly in 
possession cases or rent payments are rescheduled. 
Y 
HK Client secures explanation or apology 
Following a complaint or query of some kind to a third party. 
Y 
HL Client advised and enabled to plan and/or manage their affairs better 
Applies where, as result of your advice or assistance, the matter for which 
advice was sought concludes and your client is better able to plan or manage 
their own affairs in future. 
Y 
HM Matter concluded otherwise 
This should only be used if there is no outcome of the most significant legal 
issue in the case which is covered by one of the above categories. 
N	
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 Matter now concluded	  
HU Matter stopped on advisor’s recommendation 
Matter stopped on the basis of advisor’s opinion that continuation does not 
justify continued public funding (includes unfavourable opinions from 
experts or informal advice from counsel). 
N 
HV Matter proceeded under other Civil Legal Aid 
Includes full or investigative representation certificates. 
N 
HW Client referred to another organisation Includes referrals about the same 
matter to other solicitors, charities or special interest groups and support 
services etc. Does not cover referral of different but connected cases. 
N 
HX Client advised and taking action themselves or with the help of a third 
party - 3Applies where you advise that you are unable to assist but the client 
carries on by themselves or with help from others. 
N 
HY Client advised and third-party action or decision awaited 
Applies where the client has sought advice and assistance before third party 
action has been taken or decision received. 
N 
HZ Outcome not known/client ceased to give instructions 
Applies where a case has ended because the client has failed to give 
instructions, withdrawn instructions, or the matter has been ended for other 
reasons before the outcome is known. 
N	
	














This chapter looks at the effect of asking people to declare their intentions in advance of taking 
part in a pro-social activity. People were asked, in one of two ways, whether they would like 
to take part in a project in the future. One group was asked to make a commitment to sign up 
in the future and another group was asked if they would like to take part in the future, compared 
to a control group that was not asked about future participation. It was found that even though 
both treatment groups showed a high level of interest in taking part, the level of reneging was 
high. A very small number of people actually signed up for the project and there was no 
significant effect of either treatment on the probability of participation. Asking people to 
commit to participate in a future pro-social activity might allow them to feel good about 
themselves and provide a way out from saying no immediately; however, if the cost of reneging 




There are several features that distinguish charitable giving from spending money on goods for 
personal consumption. If you go out for a meal, most of the utility comes from when you 
actually consume the food. For most people, giving to charity is very different. Most people do 
not check how the money they donate is spent. So, if they are donating money for meals for 
homeless people their utility is not linked to when these meals are consumed. Many people feel 
good about the act of giving, rather than the outcome of giving (see Andreoni 1990 for a fuller 
discussion). This can mean that people can even start to feel good about giving when they make 
the decision to give and feel some ‘joy of giving’ (Andreoni et al.  2015) before they part with 
their money.  
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A second feature of giving is that, while it has shown to increase people’s wellbeing (Anik et 
al. 2009; Dunn et al. 2008) and is an activity that many aspire to do, it comes at the cost of 
personal consumption. Like many other activities that are considered worthy and require 
sustained commitment, for example, saving, or going to the gym, it can be put off for the future. 
In certain cases, people are subject to self-control issues and they end up spending the money 
they intended to give on other things. 
 
Several studies have shown that charities can develop a strategy that takes these two factors 
into account to increase donations by separating the time a gift is asked for and the time the 
money is taken (Breman 2011; Andreoni and Serra-Garcia 2017). This strategy can help people 
with self-control issues to overcome their present bias and fulfil their desire to give. 
 
The challenge with this strategy, which poses an ethical dilemma for charities, is that it exposes 
people who do not want to give to unwanted social pressure. They may agree to give due to the 
social pressure and then regret the decision later (Andreoni and Serra-Garcia 2017). An 
individual who has agreed to give may feel bad for going back on his or her word if they want 
to change their mind later (Festinger 1957; Bator and Cialdini 2000). Several studies have 
highlighted that despite this pressure there is a time inconsistency in people’s decision to give; 
they often commit to donate in the future but renege this promise when the decision is not 
binding (Andreoni et al.  2015; Cotterill and Richardson 2012; Fosgaard and Soetevent 2018). 
 
This paper tests the effect of asking people in advance to take part in a pro-social activity. It 
builds on the two theoretical ideas outlined above. The first is the concept of intertemporal 
preferences. If people are asked to do something in the future, they may experience present 
bias and be more likely to agree to do it because the future seems far away. The second is to 
do with the benefits and costs associated with agreeing to give in the future. People may get a 
‘warm glow’ (Andreoni 1990) from saying yes, but if they renege they also experience some 
‘harm’ or disutility by failing to follow through on an action they committed to. Unlike many 
other studies, where they are asked to give by a fundraiser, people are asked to give in private 
through an online survey. This reduces the social pressure to sign up while still offering people 
the opportunity to state whether they intend to participate or not. 
 
The design of the experiment draws on previous research regarding time inconsistent 
preferences in relation to charitable giving, such as the ‘Give More Tomorrow’ (GMT) design 
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by Breman (2011) in which there are two time periods and payments are taken in the second 
time period. Unlike the GMT design, participants were asked to take part in a new project 
rather than increase the donation they were already making. Another difference is that in GMT 
participants signed up to donate in the first period; whereas in our design, participants are only 
asked to commit or state their intention to sign up. This is similar to the activity used in several 
other experiments where people are asked to ‘pledge’ in advance (see Andreoni et al. 2015; 
Andreoni and Serra-Garcia 2016). 
 
The contribution of this paper is twofold. Firstly, it adds to the existing empirical evidence on 
time inconsistent behaviour in charitable giving, as many people sign up for the project but 
very few take part when the time comes. The second contribution is to examine the effect of 
asking people to make an advance commitment in relation to charitable giving. This paper 
presents new evidence regarding the (lack of) effectiveness of non-binding commitments 
regarding the probability of taking part. 
 
The field experiment was implemented in a local authority in London alongside the launch of 
a charitable project. The project being launched was similar in certain regards to a Payroll 
Giving scheme in which the staff were asked to do something with a part of their salary; 
however, unlike a Payroll Giving scheme where their salary goes to charity, they were asked 
instead to take it in the form of the local currency (Brixton Pounds). This project is pro-social 
in nature because the currency is designed to support independent businesses and local charities 
but since people who sign up receive special offers and discounts it cannot be considered 
entirely altruistic. Participating in the project does impose costs on those who sign up, both in 
increased transactional costs and in restricting their choice of where they can spend their salary, 
as the Brixton Pound can be spent only in participating businesses in Brixton or donated to 
charities. 
 
Prior to the launch of the project, the staff at the council were invited to take part in a survey 
where they were asked to state their intention to take part in the project in advance. In the 
survey, participants were randomly assigned to one of three groups. One group was a control 
group who was asked no question about future participation (T0).There were two differences 
between the other two treatment groups. The first group (T1) was asked whether they would 
like to take part and what part of their salary they thought they would take home in the local 
currency under the project. This will be called a ‘light’ framing, as it is clear that they can 
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change the amount at a later stage. The second group (T2) were asked how much they would 
commit to taking when the project launched. This will be called a ‘strong’ framing, as they 
were told that this information would be processed by the payroll department and the term 
commitment was used. 
 
There were statistically significant differences between the survey responses of the two 
treatment groups. People are more likely to say they will take part, and with larger amounts, 
when they get the ‘light’ framing of the question. The ‘light’ group participants agreed to give 
an average of £9.26 more than those in the ‘strong’ group. Asking people to make a strong 
commitment put some people off at the initial stage or forced them to reveal that they did not 
want to take part. Nonetheless people in both treatment groups expressed a strong interest in 
taking part with 57% of the participants agreeing to sign up in the future. 
 
The main finding is that despite such good intentions expressed by both the groups, the sign-
up rates were very low. A large number of participants from both the groups reneged and 
neither of the treatments increased the probability of participation in the project. 
 
At stage 2, there were some differences  in the amount the participants took in the local 
currency. Those in the ‘strong’ group took, on an average, double the amount taken by those 
in the ‘light’ group. The difference was large with those in T2 taking £20.68 more than those 
in T1, however it does not remain statistically significant once the descriptive controls are 
considered. This suggests that the ‘strong’ commitment made it harder for the participants to 
renege on the amount they agreed to contribute to the project when confronted with it in the 
sign-up form, but it was possible for both groups to avoid the sign-up stage altogether and thus 
avoid the reneging costs. The very small sample sizes mean that all the results from stage 2 of 
the project need to be interpreted with caution. 
 
The most important conclusion for charities, or any project wishing to gauge what people are 
likely to do in the future, is that asking people in advance does not provide reliable answers. 
The high sign-up rates without any fundraiser present to exert social pressure indicates that 
self-signalling or self-image are important motivators in signing up. This also indicates that 
there may be a disconnect between how people like to think of themselves, the extent to which 
they like to think they support community projects, and how they actually behave in practice. 
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The structure of this paper is as follows: Section 2 discusses the previous literature and the 
basic theoretical framework used. Section 3 describes the experimental design and treatments. 
Section 4 outlines the results and Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
5.2  Previous Literature and Framework 
 
 
The experimental design used in this chapter draws on two areas of economics literature. The 
first is the theory on intertemporal preferences, as people are asked to take part in the project 
prior to the time at which the project starts. The second are theories regarding the benefits of 
charitable giving and the costs people face if they go back on their word, as people are asked 
to make a non-binding commitment to take part in the project in the future. 
 
The theory of intertemporal preferences has been applied to giving in two distinct ways. One 
theory, developed by Breman (2011), proposes that individuals have self-control problems. 
Giving is an activity, similar to saving for retirement, that is consistent with some people’s 
long-term goals but is easy to delay. A person may want to be altruistic and donate to charity 
but they put it off because it comes at the expense of personal consumption today. 
 
Thaler and Benartzi (2004) developed a strategy to increase saving, called ‘Save More 
Tomorrow’. This offered employees the option to allocate some of their future earnings towards 
a retirement plan. They found this was a more successful way to get people to increase their 
savings rate, compared to when they were asked to contribute a savings scheme that started in 
the present. Breman (2011) developed a very similar strategy for charitable giving, it offered 
existing donors the option of increasing their donations at some point in the future. She found 
that this resulted in an increase their donations as compared to when donors were asked to 
increase their donations starting in the present. The treatment effect was large, 32% in the first 
field experiment, and 11% in the second. 
 
A rather different theory is proposed by Dreber et al. (2016) who set out the idea of a dual self. 
This theory is similar to other papers that use a dual-self model, in which decisions are made 
using a combination of the short-run more impulsive self and a more patient long-run self 
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(Fudenberg and Levin, 2006). So far this is fairly consistent with the idea of a person who is 
subject to present bias. The difference in the way that Dreber et al. (2016) model charitable 
giving is that the short-run self is more altruistic compared to the long-run self, so the 
temptation is to give is in the present. So, the present bias tempts people towards giving in the 
short run, unlike in other theories (e.g. Breman 2011) where it tempts people towards personal 
consumption. The long-run self would prefer that the individual did not cave in to the 
temptation of giving and put these funds to different use. Experimental evidence from dictator 
games in the laboratory support Dreber et al. (2016) with people giving less when the payment 
is delayed. 
 
Most of the theories so far focus on the idea of self-control or temptation that might stop an 
individual from acting according to their long-term goals. Andreoni and Serra-Garcia (2017) 
outlined another theory that focuses more on the idea of ‘social pressure’. They suggest that 
one of the reasons that makes so many people agree to donate to an activity that takes place in 
the future is because they find it costly to say no. They may not want to give, but they also do 
not want to say no to a fundraiser and this results in them saying yes to a gift now that will be 
transacted in the future. This means that even though the behaviour of the people may be time 
inconsistent, their preferences are not necessarily so, since it is the delay between the decision 
and the donation that reduces the cost of saying yes. 
 
They devised an experiment similar to the ‘Give More Tomorrow’ (Breman 2011) strategy but 
with the addition of another treatment where individuals are given the opportunity to demand 
commitment or flexibility over the amount they say they will give in the future. They argue 
that people who are aware of their own time inconsistency welcome the opportunity to commit, 
whereas those that are only saying yes because of social pressure will choose the option to have 
flexibility. They estimated that 40% of time inconsistency demonstrated by the subjects was 
due to social pressure and 31.7% was due to self-control. They make the case that ‘self-control 
problems are “cured” by commitment, while social-control problems are “cured” by flexibility’ 
(Andreoni and Serra-Garcia 2017). 
 
The idea of ‘social pressure’ creates what Andreoni and Serra-Garcia (2016) describe as a 
‘moral contradiction’. There are some fundraising strategies that might raise more money for 
a charity, but also leave a large number of donors regretting their decision. The option to give 
in the future is good for people who really want to give, as they can get a ‘warm glow’ along 
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with a delay in the ‘pain of parting with their money’ (Andreoni et al. 2015) and a commitment 
can help deal with their self-control issues. There is, however, another group of people that 
does not like being asked to give but says yes due to social pressure and then feel bad about 
the decision later. 
 
This study tests an approach where people are asked to decide in advance to take part in a 
charitable project. The question is not posed directly by a fundraiser but is part of an online 
survey. The question is phrased in one of two ways, one can be described as ‘light’ and the 
other as ‘strong’. Neither of the options is binding and enables people who say they will take 
part to be reminded of what they said they would like to do, but also offers flexibility to those 
who may wish to renege. 
 
The idea behind asking for an upfront pledge is that many people deem consistency to be a 
valuable character trait. Along with the social pressure to donate to charity, there is a strong 
internal pressure amongst individuals to behave in a way that matches their own self-image 
(Bénabou and Tirole 2006; Fudenberg and Levin 2006; Cotterill et al. 2012). 
 
A pre-existing literature from social psychology suggests that people suffer from guilt if they 
inflict harm on others (see Baumeister et al. 1994 for a review). Charness and Dufwenberg 
(2006) argue that people will go to lengths to avoid what can be described as ‘guilt aversion’. 
In their paper, they tested this theory using a principal agent game in the lab where it was found 
that subjects who communicated with each other had increased participation and trust. They 
argue that one way in which the decision makers experience guilt in this setting is if they feel 
that they have let others down. This could apply to charitable giving if potential donors feel 
that they have let the charity down by donating less than what they agreed to. 
 
Despite this research, which suggests that people often have a strong desire to follow through 
on their word, empirical work on charitable pledging presents mixed results. Andreoni et al. 
(2015) concluded that a high proportion of people pledged to give when asked in advance 
(67%) but many of these people reneged on their pledge. They found that sending a thank you 
note to the people who pledged resulted in a significant reduction in reneging and increased 




Cotterill and Richardson (2012) also found that a pledge alone did not lead to higher donations 
of books to a charity project, unless the pledge was combined with a ‘publicity’ treatment where 
donors could have their names displayed in public. 
 
There is some research that finds that pledging can actually lower the amount donated. In a 
lab experiment Sutan et al. (2018) found overall donations in the groups who were asked to 
pledge were lower than those who were not asked to pledge in advance. They found that 
people who were asked to make a public pledge stated they would give a lower amount than 
those asked to make a private pledge,  but more people reneged on the amount they said they 
would pledge in the private group. They also considered the case when individuals were 
unsure of what their endowment would be, and found that increased uncertainty increased the 
amount people gave across all groups, pledge or not. This is consistent with other literature 
on windfall gains, which finds that they are more ‘spendable’ than other types of gains (see 
Arkes et al., 1994). 
 
A paper by Kellner et al. (2018) also explored giving decisions when there was uncertainty 
about whether an individual would receive a bonus or prize. They conducted five different 
settings where people were asked before or after they found out whether they had some kind 
of windfall gain. In three of their experiments they found that people who were asked to 
make a donation ‘before’ they found out if they had won their prize of bonus donated more 
than those who were only asked to make a donation ‘after’ they found out if they had got the 
prize or bonus.  
 
One reason that Sutan et al. (2018) argue that pledging may lower behaviour is that it may 
cause people to go into a ‘cold-hearted’ decision mode where they might give less than if 
they were responding more emotionally to the ask to give. Liu et al. (2008) explore how 
people respond to requests to volunteer time and give money to a charity. They found the 
order of the questions mattered, and subjects who were asked whether they would like to 
volunteer time first were more likely to actually donate money than those who were asked the 
question about volunteering after being asked about money. They suggest considering time 
first activates goals of emotional wellbeing which leads to a greater willingness to actually 







Fosgaard and Soetevent (2018) found evidence that pledging was effective in a field 
experiment on door-to-door fundraising. They had two treatments, a ‘soft’ pledge where donors 
were asked to state out loud how much they would donate and a ‘firm’ pledge where the 
solicitor wrote this amount down and signed the card which was returned to the donor to serve 
as a reminder of their intention. In their experiment, the rate of reneging was very high but 
unlike other research the pledge did increase the number of donors. Only 23% of donors 
followed through with a donation, but this increased to 36% with the ‘firm’ pledge group. 
Depending on the condition that donors making a pledge committed to some positive amount 
(they had the option not to say) they found that pledging, both ‘soft’ and ‘firm’ versions, 




I use a simple framework to look at the costs and benefits associated with signing up to the 
project which follows an approach set out in Andreoni and Serra-Garcia (2016). There are two 
stages, stage 1 is when people are asked to take part and stage 2 is when the project starts and 
sign up is confirmed. 
 
In this model, the benefits of giving that people gain are defined as 𝛼. The costs of giving are 
defined as	𝑔. The costs and benefits of giving start at the time of project launch, in stage 2; 
thus, an individual will take part if 𝛼 − 𝑔 > 0	. 
 
In this experiment, people are asked about their future intention to sign up for the project in the 
first stage but they do not actually have to commit any funds until the second stage. Along with 
the benefits that start from giving in stage 2 (𝛼) there are also likely to be some benefits that 
start from the moment a decision to give is made. 
 
In Chapter 1, I presented more detail on the different motivators for giving and followed a 
framework set out by Andreoni (1990). There are people who only get utility from the outcome 
that their gift enables. These people are usually defined as ‘pure’ altruists. In practice, many 
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people get some utility or ‘warm glow’ from the act of giving and may not even pay attention 
to how the charity uses their gift. If a person is motivated by this ‘impure altruism’ then some 
of the benefits could be felt as soon as they are asked to take part in the project and not 
necessarily when the money for a gift is paid (Andreoni et al. 2015). 
 
People may also get benefits modelled by Bénabou and Tirole (2006) in the form of improved 
reputation or social standing. This captures the idea that a person would like to appear prosocial 
in front of others. This seems less relevant for this experimental set up, as the intention people 
express is not observed by anyone else. Nevertheless, this is a community project being 
supported by the council and so senior staff at the council may feel some pressure to sign up. 
Even though the survey is private, there is some degree of visibility related to spending money, 
so senior members of staff may feel the need to be seen supporting the project. 
 
The Bénabou and Tirole (2006) framework also presents the idea that people not only wish to 
signal to other people that they are prosocial but like to be able to think of themselves as the 
sort of person who cares about giving. Participating in activities, such as donating to charity 
makes it easier for people to see themselves as a ‘good’ person and the effects can be similar 
to signalling in the presence of others. Thus, it can be said that there is likely to be some form 
of reputational utility that comes from pledging in stage 1. 
 
There are also costs and benefits, not just from the act of giving, but with the giving decision. 
Andreoni and Serra-Garcia (2017) make the distinction between a giving decision and a giving 
transaction. They argue that a certain amount of social pressure is felt when the decision to 
give is made, which is independent of when the actual giving behaviour starts. They argue that 
the emotional reaction will be negative when the ask is declined. Other papers have highlighted 
the effort people sometimes go to avoid being asked in the first place (Andreoni et al. 2017). 
A paper by DellaVigna et al. (2009) concluded that people avoided answering the door when 
they were forewarned that a door-to-door fundraiser was going to call. 
 
In this experiment, the initial request is in the form of a survey that reduces the social pressure 
outlined by Andreoni and Serra-Garcia (2017) as there is no need to say no to a fundraiser. 
Nonetheless, there is still a pressure to say yes as the subjects were given a gift of Brixton 
Pounds (£10) after completing the survey. This may have created pressure to reciprocate by 
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being enthusiastic about the project and they may also feel that it is important in terms of their 
self-image. 
 
In summary there are a range of reasons that may help people experience the benefits of making 
a pledge to give that takes place prior to the start of the project including warm glow, reputation, 
self-signalling and social pressure. Similarly, declining a pledge can lead to a range of negative 
emotions. Even those motivated solely by pure altruism, or the provision of the public good or 
service, may experience some benefit (or at least absence of cost) from the time at which the 
giving decision starts. In this simple framework, all of these different factors are condensed 
into a positive benefit from saying yes (𝑠U) where 𝑠U > 0 and there is a disutility of saying no 
(−𝑠?), where −𝑠? < 0. In this experiment, it is not possible to isolate the factor that drives 
these positive or negative effects, but what is important is that they start in stage 1, prior to 
actually signing up. 
 
Since and individual can only say yes or no, the net utility of saying no is: 
−𝑛 = 	−𝑠? −	𝑠U < 0 
Individuals will give if  
𝛼 − 𝑔 ≥ −𝑛 
 
There are two stages in the experiment. People are asked at stage 1, which is when the costs of 
saying no or utility of saying yes is experienced. The costs and utility of giving actually starts 
in stage 2, when people officially sign up for the project and are multiplied by 𝜕, which is the 
individual discount rate. If people sign up at stage 1 and then renege at stage 2, there is an 
additional cost (−𝑐), which is the cost of reneging. As outlined above, reneging will have a 
cost as people do not like to go back on their word. It is likely that this will be higher for people 
who were in the second treatment group, as they had been asked to make a commitment and 
they would have to change the amount they entered in the sign-up form if they deviate from 
the amount they agreed to give initially. 
 
This leads to three possible outcomes: 
 
1. People pledge with the intention of giving: 
 Stage 1:  𝛿	(𝛼 − 𝑔) ≥ 	−𝑛 
 177 
 Stage 2:  𝛼 − 𝑔 ≥ 	−𝑐 
 
2. People pledge and then renege 
 Stage 1:  𝛿	(𝛼 − 𝑔) ≥ 	−𝑛 
 Stage 2:  𝛼 − 𝑔 < 	−𝑐 
 
3. People don’t pledge (and do not give) 
 Stage 1:  −	𝑛 > 	−𝛿	(𝛼 − 𝑔) 
 
One of the challenges of this experimental design is it is possible for people to avoid the sign-
up stage of the project and not be reminded of the values they committed to or stated their 
intention to give, so the cost of reneging may be quite low. 
 
5.3 Experimental Design 
 
5.3.1 Implementation of the Experiment 
 
The field experiment was carried out in collaboration with Lambeth Council and the Brixton 
Pound between June and October 2012. The experiment was implemented at the time of the 
launch of a scheme called ‘Payroll Local’ (also referred to as ‘the project’). This enabled staff 
who worked at the council, to take some of their salary in a local currency i.e. Brixton Pounds. 
This experiment shares some design features with ‘payroll giving’ in that the deduction 
happens automatically every month. It differs from payroll giving because, rather than going 
directly to charity, the money is placed in an account that staff can access to either spend in 
participating independent shops and cafes or donate to local charities. 
 
The experimental design had two stages that were implemented within the delivery of the 
project.  The first stage was a survey in the form of a questionnaire that council staff could fill 
in before the project launched. This survey contained the question about future participation 
and staff were randomised into one of three treatment groups to determine if they got the ‘light’ 
or ‘strong’ framing (or the control where there was no question about future participation). The 
survey also gave an opportunity to capture demographic features of participants, which could 
be used to explore characteristics of the people who donated. The second stage was during the 
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actual launch of the project, where the staff were reminded of what they would said they would 
do at the survey stage and were asked to sign up. 
 
People were given a £10 incentive to complete the initial survey (paid in Brixton Pounds) but 
there was no incentive to sign up to the project, which might be one of the reasons that 




Staff were randomly assigned to one of three treatment groups: a control group who were not 
asked if they wished to participate in the project (T0), a ‘light’ ask (T1), and a ‘strong’ ask 
(T2). There were two differences between the treatment groups, the first was that they got a 
differently worded question in the initial survey with the ‘strong’ group getting text that asked 
them to make a firmer commitment to the project. The second was that they were reminded of 
the commitment they had made in different ways in the actual implementation of the project. 
The differences in text is presented in the boxes in the following section and the treatments are 
summarized in Figure 1. 
 
 




































Stage 1: Survey prior to the project launch 
 
 
Treatment 1 (‘Light’ ask): In the survey before the project launch, they were asked to make 
an initial pledge to take part. The exact wording was as follows: 
 
Treatment 2 (‘Strong’ ask): In the survey before the project launch, they were asked to make 
a pledge, but the wording suggested a firmer commitment than that of T1. The exact wording 
was as follows: 
 
Stage 2: Sign-up form for the project  
 
As well as the difference in questions asked in the survey, if staff went on to actually sign up 
to the project they were presented with the amount they pledged/committed in a different way.  
Not all the staff who took the survey went on to sign up for the project and not all the staff who 
signed up for the project took the initial survey. 
 
 
‘We would like to ask you to consider your participation in Payroll Local. 
How much do you think you would like to take as Brixton Pounds each month?  
We understand you may still have questions about the Brixton Pound. We are asking this 
to help us understand participation and develop the scheme. You are not signing up now. 
When the project is launched you will be asked to officially sign up. We will remind you 
of the answer you gave here if you have given us your name at the end of the survey and 
you will be asked to make your final choice then.’ 
 
‘We would like to ask you to consider your participation in Payroll Local. 
How much will you commit to take in Brixton Pounds each month? This information will 
be processed by the Payroll department of Lambeth Council. 




 Treatment 1 (‘Light’ ask): Participants were reminded of the answer they gave in the survey 
using the text in the box below (this is for a person who indicated they would take £50 a month). 
They entered the amount they wished to in a box presented with random numbers, drawn from 
the distribution of pledges.  
 
Treatment 2 (‘Strong’ ask): Participants were reminded of the answer they gave in the survey 
in the following way (this is for a person that committed to taking £50 a month). 
 
The T2 participants also had the option to deviate from the amount they had committed to take, 
but if they did so they would have to change the amount in the box. People who were in T0 or 
did not complete the survey were asked if they wished to participate and the amount in the box 
was a random number drawn from the distribution of pledges.  
 
 
5.3.3 Hypotheses  
 
There are two main research questions. The first is whether asking people in advance makes 
them more likely to take part in this prosocial activity. The second is whether the wording of 
the request makes any difference and also affects the cost of reneging on the pledge. 
 
At the pre-project survey stage, let 𝑠𝑥"3 denote a stated donation of donor j (j = 1…..n) in 
treatment I (i = 1, 2) where treatment 1 is the ‘light’ ask and treatment 2 is the ‘light’ ask. Let 
𝑠𝜇" denote the mean amount of stated donation in treatment i. 
 
“In the survey you completed in May, you indicated that you thought you would like to 
take £50 in B£ each month. Please indicate in the box below the exact amount you wish 
to take in B£ each month.” 
 
 
“In the survey you completed in May, you committed to take £50 in B£ each month. 




When people are being asked to sign up for the project, let 𝑎𝑥"3 denote an actual donation of 
donor j (j = 1…..n) in treatment I as i (i = 0, 1, 2), where treatment 1 is the ‘light’ ask, treatment 
2 is ‘strong’ ask, and treatment 0 is the ‘control’. Let 𝑎𝜇" denote the mean amount of stated 
donation in treatment i and 𝑓" the frequency of donation over zero in each of the treatment 
groups. 
 
𝐻6: 𝑓6 > 𝑓O;	𝑓: > 𝑓O 
	 
I hypothesise that individuals who are asked about their intention to give or commit at stage 1 
will be more likely to take part in the project than the control group.  
Rejection of this hypothesis will support the alternative hypothesis that people who are asked 
to give or commit in advance are no more likely to take part than those who are not i.e. 𝑓6 =
𝑓O;	𝑓: = 𝑓O 
 
𝐻:: 𝑎𝜇: > 	𝑎𝜇6 	> 	𝑎𝜇O 
Individuals who were asked to make a commitment in advance (T2) will donate more money 
to the project than individuals who were asked about their intentions to take part (T1) and both 
treatments will donate more than those in the control group. 
Rejection of this hypothesis will support the alternative hypothesis that individuals will not 
donate more money if they were in treatment 2 as compared to treatment 1 and both treatments 




The survey was sent by email to over 3000 members of staff at the local authority. There were 
370 responses to the survey, of which 136 were in T0 (control), 117 were in treatment 1 (T1), 
and 117 in treatment 2 (T2). The people who answered the survey self-selected and are likely 
to be people familiar with the Brixton Pound and more pro-socially motivated. The 
randomisation suggests that such self-selection will be independent of the assigned treatment. 
There was no difference in the proportion of people that had used the Brixton Pound before 
across the treatment groups.  
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The first table presents summary statistics from the first stage survey across the three treatment 
groups. Around one-fifth of the participants had already used the currency as a part of the 
project before. The majority of staff worked in Brixton, where the project was based. More 
women took the survey as compared to men and most of the participating staff fell in the 
medium band of pay. Just under half of them came from the Black, Asian, and minority ethnic 
(BAME) background. The majority had been to university. Most of the staff lived in London 
but most lived outside Brixton and Lambeth, where the project is based. 
 
Each of the values in table 5.1 was tested for  differences between the treatment groups to 
assess if the randomisation was balanced. There were some differences between the treatment 
groups with regards to gender with the proportion of women between T1 and T2 statistically 
significant at the 5% level. There are also some differences between the proportion that went 





Table 5-1: Summary Statistics – Mean and Standard Deviation 
 Variable T0 (Control) T1 (light) T2 (strong) 
    
Use B£ 0.20 0.22 0.17 
 
(0.40) (0.41) (0.38) 
Work Brixton 0.73 0.74 0.79 
  (0.45) (0.44) (0.41) 
Female 0.64 0.50 0.69 
 
(0.48) (0.50) (0.46) 
Low Pay 0.12 0.15 0.16 
  (0.33) (0.35) (0.37) 
Med Pay 0.65 0.65 0.54 
 
(0.48) (0.48) (0.50) 
High Pay 0.17 0.17 0.20 
  (0.38) (0.38) (0.40) 
Worked at LBC less 
than 3 years 
0.21 0.25 0.25 
(0.41) (0.43) (0.43) 
Worked at LBC 3 to 
5 years 
0.21 0.18 0.21 
(0.41) (0.39) (0.41) 
Worked at LBC 5 to 
10 years 
0.31 0.38 0.29 
(0.46) (0.49) (0.45) 
Worked at LBC over 
10 years 
0.27 0.19 0.24 
(0.44) (0.39) (0.43) 
Ethnic Minority 0.47 0.49 0.45 
 
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) 
Unknown  0.05 0.05 0.10 
Ethnicity (0.21) (0.22) (0.30) 
Went to Uni 0.78 0.73 0.64 
 
(0.42) (0.44) (0.48) 
Live Brixton 0.07 0.07 0.07 
  (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) 
Live London 0.67 0.65 0.60 
  (0.47) (0.48) (0.49) 
Live Lambeth 0.16 0.19 0.22 
  (0.37) (0.39) (0.42) 
Live outside  0.10 0.10 0.10 




Table 5-2: Summary Results 
Treatment Group Control T1 T2 
Stage 1 - Survey    
Number of observations 136 117 117 
Frequency who said they would donate some 
positive amount (f) 
n/a 74 61 
Share of participants saying they would 
donate 
 61% 53% 
Average amount committed, conditional on 





Average amount committed  





Stage 2 – Project Launch    
Number that went on to participate 11 12 8 
Percentage reneging  n/a 84% 87% 
















A summary of the results is presented in table 5.2. This table shows that the amount that people 
say they will take in Brixton Pounds was higher when the question is worded with less 
commitment. On average people who were asked their intention (T1) to take part said they 
would take £27.13 which is around £9 higher than those who were in T2 and asked how much 
they would commit to taking (£18.18). This is a large and statistically significant difference (at 
the 5% level). The frequency of people signing up is slightly lower in T2 (61 people) as 
compared to T1 (74 people), which is consistent with the stronger worded language and idea 
of commitment puts off some people. This suggests that people in T2 anticipated the cost of 
reneging and lowered the amount they committed to donate or did not sign up in the first place. 
People in both T1 and T2 indicated very strong levels of enthusiasm for taking part in the 
project with an average participation of 57%. 
 
These good intentions were not followed through with action and there were very high and 
similar reneging rates from both groups. The percentage of reneging in T1 and T2 was 84% 
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and 87%, respectively. This highlights the difference between what people agree to do in a 
survey and what they actually do in practice. The low participation makes it difficult to make 
conclusive claims about the differences between the treatments at stage 2. Nonetheless, those 
who were asked to make a commitment (T2) donated double the amount compared to those 
who were just asked about the intentions to take part and the following graph summarises the 
amount committed in advance and taken. At stage 1 in the survey, participants in T1 said they 
would take higher amounts than those in T2; however, in stage 2, during the sign up the data 
was reversed, with those in T2 taking more than those in T1. 
 
Figure 5-2 How much people agreed to take in project (conditional on giving some positive 
amount). 
There is a fourth group of 35 people who signed up to the project but did not complete the 
initial survey. They took £12.64 on average, which is significantly lower than both the control 
and the other treatments but is likely to come from the selection effect. People who chose to 
respond to a survey are signalling that they have some familiarity with the Brixton Pound and 
thus a higher willingness to want to use it and sign up to the project. These people did not 
complete the survey so we do not have information about any of their demographics. 
 
5.4.1 Hypothesis 1: Does being asked in advance make people more likely to take part? 
 
It is already clear from the summary results that none of the treatments increase the number of 
people who take part in the project and the regression results presented in Table 5.3 confirm 





















after a logit regression. The dependent variable is whether people went on to sign up to the 
project. There are no statistically significant differences between T1 and T2, as compared to 
T0 (the control). 
 
The third and fourth columns in results Table 5.3 includes controls. The only statistically 
significant variable is a dummy representing whether people have used the Brixton Pound 
before. It makes sense that this is positive and people who have some familiarity with the 
organization running the project will be more likely to sign up. Women were more likely to 
sign up for the project than men, although this difference is not statistically significant. There 
are three categories for pay, with the coefficient on low pay and medium pay both negative 
(but not statistically significant) compared to the omitted category which is those on high pay. 
People on higher salaries are more likely to take part and also people who went to university 
(although not statistically significant). 
 
This result means that I can reject Hypothesis 1. Asking people to state their intentions in 
advance, in either the ‘light’ or ‘strong’ version where they were asked to make a commitment, 





Table 5-3. Regression Results. Dependent variable: Participation in project in stage 2 
  OLS LOGIT OLS LOGIT 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
T1 'light' 0.019 0.017 0.042 0.035 
 
(0.036) (0.034) (0.059) (0.050) 
T2 'strong' -0.013 -0.014 -0.002 0.015 


























   
(0.060) (0.050) 
Worked at LBC less 




























Went to Uni 
  
0.086 0.093 





























n 360 360 199 195 






5.4.2 Hypothesis 2: People in the ‘strong’ treatment will donate more to the project than 
those in the ‘light’ group 
 
One of the reasons that might have resulted in a high rate of reneging is that people did not 
have to directly confront the choices they made in the survey, it was easy to ignore the next 
email when the project started. Similar to the findings of other studies that say that people make 
an effort to avoid being asked by fundraisers (see DellaVigna et al. 2012; Andreoni et al. 2017), 
people could have made an effort not to sign up for the project. It is possible that they continued 
to tell themselves that they would take part, or would sign up for it, but had not got around to 
it yet. People who did go on to sign up for the project were reminded about the amount they 
either stated an intention to give (T1) or committed to (T2) in advance.  
 
The low participation in the project and small sample sizes makes it hard to make conclusive 
claims about the differences between the two treatments at the sign-up stage. The results table 
(Table 5.4) shows regression results, with the amount taken (in pounds) as the dependent 
variable. (1) and (2) includes the people who did not donate anything and (3) and (4) shows 
the amount given (conditional on giving some positive amount). 
 
In (1) and (2) there are no significant differences between those in the treatment groups and 
those who were not. This is consistent with hypothesis 1 being rejected as a large number of 
people did not take part, so have a value of zero. In column two, the model with controls, the 
only statistically significant variable is the amount taken by staff from the medium pay group, 
who take over £5 less than those in the high pay group. Women give £1.45 more (not 
statistically significant) and people who live in Brixton take nearly £6 more in comparison to 





Table 5-4. Regression results. Dependent variable: Amount taken in stage 2 (£) 
  
Amount: Full Sample 
Amount: conditional on 
participating at stage 2 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
T1 'light' 0.741 1.259 3.265 -5.594 
 
(1.243) (2.142) (7.527) (9.183) 
T2 'strong' 1.204 2.461 20.682* 12.730 










Work Brixton   2.812   15.898 










Low Pay   -3.479   -29.580 










Worked at LBC less 
than 3 years 
  -2.392   -0.983 
  (2.579)   (12.441) 










Worked at LBC 5 to 
10 years 
  1.748   -2.786 










Unknown Ethnicity -9.713   0.000 
    (6.570)   (.) 









Live Brixton   6.294   -4.642 











Live Lambeth   4.325   -0.588 
    (3.656)   (23.217) 
_cons 1.832* -1.736 21.818*** 24.582 
 
(0.854) (4.484) (5.437) (26.608) 






In (3) and (4) only the people who participated in the project are included, so the sample size 
is very small. In specification (3), there is a large difference between those in the second 
treatment group. This is statistically significant at the 5% level and those who were asked to 
make a commitment of £20.68 more on average. When controls are added in the specification 
(4), the coefficient on T2 is still large at £12.73 but is no longer statistically significant (due to 
the very small sample size). There is a large negative coefficient on those who have used the 
Brixton Pound before, which seems to be driven by the only person who took £100 per month 
and has not used the B£ and by three people who have used the B£ before and have taken the 
smallest amount, £5. None of the other variables are statistically significant but there is a large 
positive coefficient on people who went to university and took £19 and more. The largest 
coefficient is on the low-pay group who take £30 less than those in the high pay group. 
 
The amount taken by those in the ‘light’ (T1) group is slightly larger than those in the control 
group, with those in the control taking an average £21.82 and those in the ‘light commitment’ 
taking £25.08. There is a difference of just over £3 each and is not statistically significant. 
 
This means that hypothesis 2 is accepted (with some caution due to the small sample size). 
Asking people’s intentions in advance does increase the amount of money taken in the project 
but only for those in the ‘strongly’ worded group (T2) and only conditional on people signing 
up to the project. It seems that people were able to renege with very low costs by avoiding 
signing up to the project easily. People who did sign up for the project were confronted more 
directly with the amount they intended to take in Brixton Pounds and those in the ‘strong’ 
group seem to have found it harder to renege on this amount. It is not possible to isolate whether 
the effect was from the differences on the sign-up form or from the question in the survey. 
 
Similar results are presented in appendix Table 2, which shows the difference between the 
amount people said they would sign up and the amount they actually signed up for. This is 
significant at the 5% level in the model without controls, with those in T1 (the light ask) having 
a larger difference between what they said they would do and what they did (£9) compared to 
those who were asked to commit in advance (T2). This drops to £5 once the controls are added 
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and it no longer remains statistically significant. Columns (3) and (4) report the amounts 
conditional to giving some positive amount, so the sample size is a lot smaller and none of the 
results are significant. The difference is still larger among that in T1, compared to T2, and the 
difference rises when controls are accounted for to £11. These results are sensitive to the 
inclusion of one outlier, as one person in T2 donated £40 more than they said they would in 
the survey, when everyone else in both treatments donated either the same as they said they 




5.5 Discussion and Conclusions 
 
 
The main conclusion that can be reached from this field experiment is that people who were 
asked to state their intention to take part in advance were no more likely to actually sign up 
than those who were not asked about their future intentions. In this study, people were asked 
in one of two ways, one had a ‘strong’ wording that asked for a commitment, the other was 
‘light’ and asked about their future intent to take part. While a large number of people, in both 
treatment groups, said they would sign up neither treatment had an impact on the actual 
participation. 
 
There were differences between the treatments with regards to the amount of money they 
contributed to the project. People who were in the treatment where they got the ‘strong’ 
wording seemed to (correctly) anticipate that the cost of reneging would be higher and 
committed to take lower amounts in the project compared to those who got the ‘light’ wording 
(T1). At the start of the project, participants who were in the ‘strong’ treatment (T2) took larger 
amounts and there was a smaller difference between what they said they would take and what 
they did take, compared to those in the ‘light’ treatment (T1) but the sample size was very 
small and more research is needed to be able to make more conclusive claims about this.  
 
The most important finding in this study for charities, or any project wishing to gauge what 
people are likely to do in the future, is that asking them in advance does not give answers 
indicative of what they are likely to do. This study found that a large number of people said 
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they would take part in a project even without a fundraiser being present to apply social 
pressure. 
 
On one hand, from a charity fundraising point of view, these results suggest that people should 
be asked for a binding commitment in advance and the cost of reneging should be higher. This 
will raise more funds for the charity and helps people who want to give but have self-control 
problems. It’s unclear if this strategy is good from a social welfare perspective, if it means that 
a large number of people who signed up did not really want to take part but also did not want 
to say no to the offer. 
 
An area that seems worthy of further exploration is why so many people agreed to take part in 
this project even without any pressure from a fundraiser. It is possible that self-signalling 
played an important role and that people wanted to be able to feel like they were the kind of 
person who would support a community project. People were able to avoid the sign-up stage 
of the project, so it is possible that these people were able to maintain their own perception that 
they would take part at some stage. It would be interesting to find out more about the extent to 
which people valued being able to think of themselves as a person who participates and if this 
belief can be maintained even when they did not participate. 
 
The results of the experiment can also explain some of the findings that relate to social activism 
online and in areas where people are asked to do things for charity in ways that do not ask for 
large commitments of time or effort. We see a large number of people sharing petitions or 
clicking on options that say that they are interested in attending political demonstrations and 
more generally associating with charitable or pro-social causes. This is unlikely to tell us much 
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Table 5-5. Regression results. Dependent Variable: Difference between intention at stage 1 
and observed behaviour at stage 2. 
  
Difference: Full Sample 
Difference: conditional on 
participating at stage 2 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
T1 'light' 8.786* 4.996 1.167 7.225 
 
(3.395) (4.940) (10.435) (15.690) 
Use B£   16.305**   10.991 










Female   -4.990   -9.196 










Med Pay   4.945   3.083 
    (5.453)   (17.365) 










Worked at LBC 3 to 5 
years 
  -0.055   26.062 
  (8.397)   (30.807) 










Ethnic Minority   -2.927   -10.582 










Went to Uni   8.702   -13.214 










Live London   2.504   38.254 










_cons 15.727*** 5.056 16.250 -19.951 
  (2.427) (12.415) (8.083) (44.034) 
n 225 121 20 20 
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